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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the nature of the second language acquisition (SLA) of 
eight international PhD students that occurred as they undertook the literature 
review when planning their doctoral research projects at a New Zealand university. 
While the social, cultural approaches have been seen as broadening the field of 
SLA by introducing diverse epistemologies (Ortega, 2012), their conceptions of 
the mind and cognition of the second language speaker as a social product, and of 
SLA as the outcome of social processes (see Atkinson, 2011a), appear to be 
problematic in terms of understanding the central mechanisms of SLA. This study 
addresses this issue by explicating the mind and cognition of the participants and 
their SLA from a phenomenological realist perspective.  
Central to the theoretical framework for the study are Husserl’s (1970) realist 
ontology and epistemology, Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) theory of language 
learning through the negotiation of meaning and Bruce’s (2008a) identification of 
extra-linguistic and linguistic areas of genre knowledge in an English-medium 
academic context while developing their literature reviews (LR). Interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009) was used as the 
overarching methodology to investigate the ontology of the participants, their 
epistemological processing, and their acquisition of academic English. This 
involved analysing monthly interviews with individual participants and 
supplementary data collected during a six-month conditional enrolment period. In 
addition, an analysis of the actual LR texts of five participants was undertaken to 
examine the textual outcomes of the LR process. This analysis focused, in 
particular, on genre knowledge and logicality as critical elements of the academic 
competence that the participants were engaged in developing.  
The findings of the study suggest that intentionality as a cognitive process was 
what enabled the participants to engage with social processes in the course of their 
SLA. This function of intentionality seems to accord to the realist notion of the a 
priori existence of the mind rather than the social, cultural idea of the mind 
emerging as the result of internalising social processes. Thought and language, as 
two separate entities in the knowledge of the participants, seemed to interact 
hierarchically in the process of undertaking the LR. Their SLA seemed to occur 
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through this hierarchical thought-language operation, which involved participants 
drawing on and using new linguistic and procedural resources to express their 
thought. In addition, the thought of the participants seemed not to be constrained 
or regulated by linguistic and rhetorical systems (either from their first language 
or English). Rather, in their efforts to engage with disciplinary knowledge when 
processing and communicating the meaning of academic texts intended by the 
authors, participants went beyond such cultural frames. Significantly, this 
meaning-uncovering intentionality appeared to facilitate parallel SLA. While 
advice and feedback from other members of their particular community appeared 
to be important to their SLA, it was not evident that social interaction was the 
central, facilitative process. Moreover, the overall findings of the study suggest a 
need to expand the scope of what constitutes SLA in academic contexts. That is, 
developing competence in using academic English appeared to involve not only 
the acquisition of linguistic resources, but also developing extra-linguistic genre 
knowledge that ensures textual coherence, in order to communicate intended 
thought including logicality and criticality successfully.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This study explores the nature of second language acquisition (hereafter SLA) of 
eight doctoral students in the context of developing disciplinary knowledge while 
undertaking a preliminary literature review (hereafter LR). The investigation is 
underpinned by the phenomenological realist perspective, and the significance of 
employing this philosophical orientation as the research paradigm is twofold. 
Firstly, it provides the basis for my own approach as the researcher to examining 
the SLA of the participants. It also provides a framework for understanding the 
epistemological approaches of the participants, through which their SLA occurs.   
In this chapter, I discuss the intentions of the study, briefly introduce 
phenomenological realism, and present the research objectives and the structure of 
the thesis.  
1.1 Intentions of the study 
This section introduces the motivation for the study and then outlines the broad 
intentions of the research.  
My motivation for undertaking doctoral research in the area of SLA and selection 
of the research topic and context arise from my own personal experience as a 
second language user of English and from the fact that, for me personally, SLA 
has been the most intriguing subject area. Yet my choices relating to the 
methodological approach and inclusion of extra-linguistic knowledge were made 
against the background of the social, cultural orientation to the field of SLA, 
which began to be evident in the 1990s. This new SLA stream has added new 
dimensions to the scope and methodological approaches of the discipline 
(Atkinson, 2011c; Block, 2003; Firth & Wagner, 1997/2007; Lantolf, 1996). Most 
significantly, while cognitivist researchers restricted their focus to linguistic 
knowledge (e.g., Doughty & Long, 2003), social, cultural researchers emphasise 
the need for “examining not only linguistic development, but also the other forms 
of knowledge” in specific social, cultural contexts (Duff & Talmy, 2011). Another 
new feature that the social, cultural strand has brought into the field involves 
valuing qualitative data from natural language learning-and-use contexts over 
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quantitative data from experimental settings (Duff, 2008a; Firth & Wagner, 
1997/2007).  
Thus, for example, in examining the nature of SLA, my research project includes 
consideration of the development of non-linguistic types of knowledge relevant to 
language use as a way of offering insights for theorising language acquisition. I 
also came to think that, in investigating my research topic, qualitative data 
constitute a richer resource when compared with quantitative data. In addition, the 
social, cultural SLA researchers’ resistance to the paradigms of the other SLA 
schools of thought – behaviourism and cognitivism is also reflected in the present 
study (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the three SLA schools of thought). 
Richards (2003) notes, “fundamental beliefs about the world” are inseparably 
related to the “understanding of the nature of the inquiry itself” (p. 29). 
Developing and carrying out my research, however, I found that it was not 
possible to align my realist worldview with the philosophical belief and research 
paradigm that the approaches to SLA within the social, cultural stream broadly 
subscribe to. While acknowledging the influences of the social approaches on the 
present study, my realist ontology and epistemology led me to question the 
theories and research findings of SLA offered by the social cultural approaches. In 
particular, I found myself resisting the social, cultural conception of the nature of 
the mind, and cognition and the principles of SLA. Gradually, it has become the 
central intention of the study to examine carefully and problematize the social, 
cultural paradigm and research studies, then alternatively seek to elucidate further 
the nature of SLA through examining the SLA of the participants of the study 
from a phenomenological realist perspective.  
The particular paradigm that underpins the social, cultural approaches to SLA can 
be identified as postmodernism in a sense that it has emerged through opposing 
the modernist paradigm of cognitivism (see Atkinson, 2011a; Lantolf, 1996; 
Rampton, 1997). It is also known as social constructivism because of its claim 
that human consciousness (mind), cognition, truths, realities, meanings and 
knowledge are all socially constructed through the interactive use of language in 
social, cultural contexts (Block, 2003; Firth & Wagner, 1997/2007; Johnson, 
2004). It is also considered as cultural, linguistic relativism for it suggests that, by 
being co-constructed in specific social, cultural contexts, knowledge, truths and 
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meanings are all culturally relative (Kramsch, 2004; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). In 
addition, poststructuralism is also applied to refer to this paradigm of social 
cultural SLA stream, when their view that “reality is not only socially constructed 
and socially distributed; it is irreducibly multiple, intersubjective, discursively 
constituted” is emphasised (Ortega, 2009, p. 218).  
Thus, based on this multiply-defined research paradigm, social, cultural 
researchers claim that the ontology of the second language speaker, including the 
mind, cognition and knowledge of second language, “originates in social 
interaction and is shaped by cultural and socio-political processes” (Watson-
Gegeo, 2004, p. 331). With this ontological conception, these researchers seek to 
explain the person’s perspectives, beliefs, attitude, behaviours or performances 
relating to second language learning and use as consequences of the influence of 
social, cultural factors (Block, 2003). They also attempt to infer how the speaker’s 
cognition and competence in using language emerges from social interactions 
(e.g., Kasper & Wagner, 2011). In addition, it is also broadly agreed by the social, 
cultural approaches that SLA should be understood as socialisation into a 
particular culture or discourse community (Duff & Talmy, 2011), and the ultimate 
goal of SLA is being able to regulate thought by means of the second language 
(Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). When following this social, cultural notion, SLA (and 
any language acquisition) suggests that the fragmented, multiple identities of the 
speaker to be socially constructed (Norton, 2000).   
Certainly, second language users are social beings who interact with others, and 
are in constant contact with the outside world, and are constrained and influenced 
by it. Nevertheless, a number of scholars caution that the ontology of a person 
cannot be reduced to the level of a social or discourse product (e.g., Burr, 2003; 
Craib, 1997; Cromby & Nightingale, 1999; Moreland & Rae, 2000; Smith, 
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009; Willard, 2007; Willig, 2003, 2008). The social, cultural 
approaches appear unable to explain adequately how language learners selectively 
respond to external contextual factors, including social interactions and relations, 
and how they eventually relate them to their own language learning. That is, their 
concepts of the human mind and cognition seem to provide insufficient accounts 
of how individuals make their own volitional choices and decisions in relation to 
their second language learning, especially if one accepts the premise that language 
learning or acquisition could involve a greater range of types of knowledge and 
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skills beyond these that relate to being socialised into a particular 
culture/community. Moreover, although language influences one’s ways of 
thinking, it needs to be questioned if such influence of language on thought 
sufficiently supports the idea that language completely regulates thought. As an 
alternative view, some scholars suggest that thought and language are 
hierarchically related in the mind, and thought regulates linguistic choices (e.g., 
Bruce, 2008a; Husserl, 1970; Pinker, 1994; Widdowson, 2007). Interrelation of 
these issues is essential to understanding the nature of SLA, and is addressed 
carefully throughout this thesis.  
Furthermore, the resistance to the social cultural paradigm also has led me to 
examine a strong presumption in applied linguistics that any researcher in the field 
who chooses qualitative, natural inquiry would follow a social constructivist 
approach (see Croker, 2009). Eventually, I came to see that associating qualitative 
research only with a certain paradigm is problematic, since the terms “qualitative” 
and “quantitative” indicate types of data, which are the consequences of 
researchers’ choice of a particular paradigm or theoretical framework (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2000; Crotty, 1998; Mackey & Gass, 2012; Willig, 2008). 
In effect, using qualitative data for research studies originates from the 
phenomenological tradition founded by Edmund Husserl, which appears to differ 
somewhat from the social constructivist paradigm (Westberry, 2009, p. 93). 
Therefore, the idea that any qualitative, naturalistic inquiry should always involve 
the social constructivist research paradigm as an essential element is also called 
into question in the present study.  
1.2 Contrasting phenomenological realism with social constructivism in 
relation to the issue of value-laden knowledge  
This section briefly discusses the phenomenological realist paradigm of the study 
in order to articulate a preliminary understanding of it. Particularly, I contrast it 
with social constructivisim in relation to the issue of the nature of knowledge 
being value-laden.   
Phenomenological realism, for which I also use the term realism interchangeably 
throughout this thesis, is a philosophical school of thought that originates from the 
philosopher, Edmund Husserl (B. Smith & Woodruff Smith, 1995). As indicated 
in its name, the principal axiom of phenomenological realism is that human 
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beings have potentiality and capacity to know the world as it is through their 
experiences. The Husserlian realist, Willard (2003a), states:  
By “realism” I refer to the view that whatever exists does so, and has 
whatever properties and relations it actually has, regardless of whether or 
not it is present to any mind. This is meant to include the view that the 
objects given in knowledge, not just in consciousness, exist and have the 
qualities and relations they are then known to have, in total independence of 
their being known. A necessary condition of realism is that neither the 
existence nor the properties of entities derive from their being an object for 
some thought, perception or reference bearing upon them (p. 163).  
The independence of the known, or the object of knowledge from the knower’s 
mind, which Willard emphasises above, provides the foundation for the objectivity 
of knowledge, or knowledge itself (Kukla, 2006; Willard, 1982). However, a point 
that I raise here is that, by stating the objectivity of knowledge, phenomenological 
realism does not suggest that knowledge is value-free. The concept of the 
objectivity of knowledge centrally suggests that the knower’s act of knowing does 
not change the nature and quality of the known, and then the knower can know 
progressively the known, as it is, when certain conditions are met (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.4 for a review of Husserl’s notions about the objectivity of knowledge 
and the three conditions for knowledge).  
In fact, how knowledge can be legitimately value-laden seems to be understood 
more clearly from the phenomenological realist view than from the social 
constructivist standpoint. From the realist perspective, value judgements about the 
objects of knowing, such as things, states of affair, or existing theories, as 
good/bad, fair/unfair, right/wrong, true/false, realistic/unrealistic or useful/useless 
should accompany an accurate understanding of such objects of knowledge. That 
is, the values that the knower attached to the objects of knowing can be potentially 
valid and reasonable only when they are based on correct knowledge of the 
qualities and relations of the objects, otherwise they may be considered to be 
biased. This is extensively experienced in day-to-day living, and the first step of 
finding out the validity and credibility of a value embedded in a piece of 
knowledge is to see whether or not the knowledge, on which any value judgement 
is based, is true or fallacious.    
In contrast, there appear to be problems with the social constructivist’s notion of 
knowledge being value-laden. For example, according to the social constructivist, 
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a knower can never access the object of knowledge (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Knowledge is thus not what represents and corresponds to the actual qualities and 
relations of the object of knowing, but rather “the form of multiple, intangible 
mental constructions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 206). Thus, knowledge is not 
knowledge of the object of knowing, but knowledge of something else that the 
knower(s) have linguistically constructed and construed (e.g., Lantolf & Thorne, 
2006; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Following this idea of knowledge, what the knower 
attaches values to is not the object of knowing but a mental construct that has 
been socially or individually constructed. This would appear to raise questions in 
relation to the reliability and validity of values in knowledge, and of the 
knowledge itself.  
This contrast between the realist paradigm of this study and social constructivism 
is extensively discussed throughout the thesis, particularly in relation to 
establishing the conceptual framework and discussing the finding of the study.  
1.3 The research objectives  
The present study aims to investigate the nature of the SLA of eight international 
PhD students in a New Zealand university in relation to their cognitive and 
epistemological dispositions and approaches to the target literature while 
preparing and writing the literature review for their full thesis proposal. In order to 
achieve this core objective, a conceptual framework is established centrally 
drawing on Husserl’s realist ontology and epistemology, Widdowson’s (1983, 
1990) concept of language acquisition through the negotiation of meaning, and 
Bruce’s (2008a) theory of genre knowledge. Interpretative phenomenological 
analysis is used as the overarching methodology (see Chapter 4), and an analysis 
of the LR sections in five participants’ research proposals is undertaken.   
The overall research question with which I seek to address the research objectives 
is: 
What is the nature of the second language acquisition (SLA) of eight PhD 
students while undertaking the literature review (LR) in English, their 
second language, during the period of preparing the research proposal at a 
New Zealand university? 
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The four subsidiary questions are:  
1. What are the central cognitive dispositions and processes that 
characterise the participants’ approaches to developing academic 
knowledge while undertaking the LR?  
2. To what extent is the SLA of the participants understood in relation to 
their cognitive dispositions and processes characterised in reviewing the 
target literature and research planning?  
3. To what extent is the involvement of the participants’ communities 
facilitative of their SLA? 
4. In what ways is the use of prototypical thought-structuring patters 
important and (thus) is indicated as part of academic English competence?  
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters including the present introduction chapter.   
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of three streams of SLA research, namely 
behaviourism, cognitivism and the social, cultural stream in terms of their 
philosophical beliefs, methodological approaches and theoretical implications. 
The focus of the review is on the contributions and limitations of the three SLA 
streams, particularly on those of the social stream, in order to clarify how the 
present study is similar to and diverges from previous studies, and to identify in 
what ways this study contributes to the field of SLA.   
Chapter 3 establishes the conceptual framework of the study. For the 
philosophical and theoretical foundation, I draw on Husserl’s (1970) theory of 
knowledge. The chapter then reviews theories and concepts that are necessary to 
examine the nature of SLA in relation to the development of overall academic 
knowledge in an English medium academic context. In addition, I also discuss 
issues central to understanding second language speakers, such as the concepts of 
criticality and competence in language use.  
Chapter 4 introduces the methodology of the present study. It presents an 
introduction to interpretative phenomenological analysis (hereafter IPA) (Smith et 
al., 2009), the overall methodological approach of the study, the rationale for the 
critical use of IPA, the procedures of data collection, analysis and reporting 
findings, and a discussion of the quality and validity of the study.  
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Chapter 5 reports the findings of the study emerging as the interpretation of the 
data, which consist of the participants’ own accounts (interviews) and materials 
that they produced while undertaking the LR. The sections of this chapter address 
the four subsidiary questions respectively.  
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the study reported in Chapter 5, in the light of 
the conceptual framework established in Chapter 3. Here I seek to clarify the 
nature of the mental faculties and epistemological dispositions of the participants, 
and the nature of their SLA and some issues involved SLA in English-medium 
academic contexts.     
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It summarises the key arguments of the study 
emerging from the discussion of the findings, discusses the limitations and the 
implications of the present study, and finally suggests some future research 
directions.     
1.5 Defining central concepts 
This section seeks to articulate the definitions of the concepts central to this 
present study in order to clarify descriptions and discussions throughout the thesis.  
 the (conscious) mind of a person : the mental faculty that constitutes the 
core of the personhood as non-material substance and (thus) accounts for 
mental acts of knowing, understanding, “perceiving, desiring, remembering, 
fearing, loving, doubting, judging and even dreaming or day-dreaming” 
(Woodruff Smith & McIntyre, 1982, p. xiii). It acts through the function of 
the brain but it is not the function of the brain itself; it has certain qualities, 
such as being conscious of his/her own mental states and acts, exercising 
freewill, or being aware of morality/immorality, which cannot be reduced to 
the neural and chemical activities of the brain (Chalmers, 2010; Custance, 
1980; Davis, 1983; Eccles, 1982, 1994; Kelly et al., 2007; Lewin, 1992; 
Nagel, 2012; Plantinga, 2011; Stapp, 2007;Trefil, 1996). Instead, the mind 
is rather what is in charge of the brain operation (Eccles, 1982, 1994).  
 cognition: a collective term for the mental acts or processes of the mind 
listed above 
 intentionality: the directedness” (aboutness or ofness) of the conscious mind 
(Woodruff Smith & McIntyre, 1982). According to Husserl (1970), because 
 9 
 
of the intentionality of the mind, the person is able to engage with the world 
and attain experiences and knowledge  
 transcendence of the mind or transcending quality of the mind: This refers 
to mental state or capability to perceive or intuit things/states of 
affairs/events/concepts as they are beyond cultural/linguistic frames. 
Therefore, the cognising cycle in the process of knowing takes place 
between mental representations and the object of knowledge, through which 
the knower potentially can know the object as it is (Husserl, 1970).   
 thought: mental content; the flow of intentional mental images or states. A 
thought can be expressed in language, but thought is fundamentally not 
linguistic, and a person can think without using language. A thought can 
arise from perception, or from thinking of some other thoughts (Moreland & 
Rae, 2000; Willard, 1984).    
 academic English competence: knowledge of and ability to use procedural 
and systemic resources of academic English 
 second language acquisition (SLA) in an English-medium academic context: 
developing competence in using academic English as a second language: 
acquiring knowledge of and developing ability to use procedural and 
systemic resources of the language  
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2 BEYOND THREE PARADIGMS IN THE STUDY OF 
SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION 
2.0 Overview: Three paradigms in the study of SLA 
Rationale for reviewing the three streams of SLA 
This chapter presents a review of three schools of thought in the study of second 
language acquisition (hereafter SLA), behaviourism, cognitivism and the social, 
cultural stream. The present study, as SLA research, is a “tiny dwarf on the 
shoulders of giants”, in the sense that it would not exist without the foundation of 
extant theoretical perspectives and empirical SLA studies. In particular, the 
selection of the research topic and methodology has been made under the 
influence of the social, cultural stream. Nevertheless, as stated in the introductory 
chapter, the philosophical standpoint of this present study is fundamentally 
different from any of the paradigms of the three SLA streams. Therefore, the 
review is primarily aimed to demonstrate that my awareness of this difference has 
emerged from a developing understanding of the three schools of thought. This 
has required me to illustrate extensively their philosophical beliefs, theoretical 
underpinnings and approaches to investigating second language learning. In 
addition, I also critically examine each of the three paradigms, in order to share 
with the reader how the position of this present study and those of the three 
streams are different, and clarify the extent to which the present study draws upon 
the previous literature in the field of SLA.  
Three paradigms in SLA: Behaviourism, cognitivism and the social stream 
The study of SLA began to develop in the 1940s drawing on behavioural 
psychology and general theories of learning (Brown, 2007). At that time, 
behaviourism was practically the sole SLA theory of learning and was 
unchallenged by other competing traditions for two or three decades. Under this 
tradition, SLA was conceptualised as verbal habit formation (see Section 2.1.1). 
However, from the 1960s, behaviourism was gradually replaced by cognitivism, 
which sought to understand SLA in terms of changes in the mental states and 
processes underpinning such changes (see Section 2.1.2). The cognitivist 
paradigm then dominated the study of SLA, and still largely maintains the 
position of being the “mainstream” of SLA (Atkinson, 2011a, p. 16). However, 
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when Firth and Wagner(1997/2007) perceived an “imbalance in SLA research 
practices” (p. 758), and when Lantolf (1996) published his paper entitled, “Letting 
all the flowers bloom”, challenges to the dominance of cognitivism in the field of 
SLA were signalled. This third group has been referred to as proposing social, 
cultural orientations to investigate SLA (Firth & Wagner, 1997/2007, p. 757). 
Atkinson (2011a) emphasises that this third theoretical approach is not one 
approach but in fact a body of diverse approaches. However, as he also 
acknowledges, the different approaches of the members of this group subscribe to 
several common beliefs about the nature of truth, knowledge, reality, mind, 
identity and language. These axiomatic beliefs shared by social, cultural SLA 
scholars are postmodern, in a broad sense that it began to form from resisting the 
modernist basis of the cognitivist approach to SLA (Atkinson, 2011a; Lantolf, 
1996; Rampton, 1997). More specifically, they represent the paradigm of social 
constructivism that assumes the reality in the human realm is socially constructed 
(Block, 2003; Ortega, 2009).   
Overview of the chapter 
This chapter allocates more space to the social, cultural stream than to 
behaviourism and cognitivism for the reason that the work of the former has more 
significant implications for the present study than that of the others. Section 2.1 
reviews the basis of both the behaviourist and cognitivist approaches to SLA. This 
section firstly describes their philosophical and methodological backgrounds, 
major theoretical positions and concepts, then reviews and comments on critiques 
of these two important SLA traditions. Section 2.2, then considers the social, 
cultural orientations to SLA. After identifying six different approaches from this 
third SLA tradition, this section considers their philosophical background, and 
then provides a more detailed review of each of the different social and cultural 
approaches. The review of the three SLA streams involves critical comments on 
their concepts and notions, based on the paradigmatic position and perspective 
underpinning this present study.  
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2.1 Behaviourism and cognitivism 
2.1.1 Behaviourism 
Philosophical background and research principles 
The behaviouristic approach to SLA has its roots in the work of behaviourist 
psychologists active from the 1920s to the 1950s, psychologists such as Watson, 
Thorndike, and Skinner (Ellis, 2008). It is also closely associated with structural 
linguistics, exemplified in the work of Bloomfield, Sapir and Twaddell (Brown, 
2007). The philosophical background of the behaviouristic tradition and structural 
linguistics is empiricism, which Francis Bacon initially propounded in the 17th 
century, inspired by the scientific revolution at his time (Jordan, 2004). 
Empiricism is a philosophical belief that any reliable, scientific knowledge can be 
obtained only through physically perceivable data, that is, through observation 
(Willig, 2008). For example, a recent empiricist psychologist, A. F. Chalmers 
(1999), stated, “[K]nowledge should be derived from the facts of experience” (p. 
3). Considering A. F. Chalmers’ comment in the context of SLA, the “experience” 
refers only to what the researcher physically sees. The existence of any mental 
phenomena, such as mind, spirit or soul, was discounted. Twaddell (1935) 
asserted: 
Whatever our attitude toward mind, spirit, soul, etc. as realities, we must 
agree that the scientist proceeds as though there were no such things, as 
though all his information were acquired through processes of his 
physiological nervous system. In so far as he occupies himself with 
psychical, non-material forces, the scientist is not a scientist. The scientific 
method is quite simply the convention that mind does not exist. (p. 9) 
Following this empiricist point of view, behaviourist SLA researchers constructed 
their theories dependent on inductive data collection methods, most typically, 
observing the structures of different languages and language learners’ behaviours 
(Brown, 2007; Johnson, 2004; Jordan, 2004).  
Language learning as habit formation 
Behaviouristic SLA researchers and practitioners saw the process of language 
learning as the same as that of learning in general, which consists of habit 
formation reinforced through a repetitious stimuli-response process (Johnson, 
2004; Mitchell & Myles, 2004). They drew on principles of structural linguistics, 
such as proposed by Bloomfield (1933, pp. 29-31), who theorised first language 
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acquisition in terms of the stimulus-response learning principle and behavioural 
psychology, such as proposed by Skinner (1957). Thus, following the emphasis of 
structural linguistics on the spoken forms of language considered as “the primary 
medium of language”, the behaviourist SLA scholars designed teaching methods 
to reinforce speaking skills through oral repetition and memorisation of sentence 
patterns (J. C. Richards & Rogers, 2001, p. 55). For example, Fries developed so 
called the ‘Michigan Method’ of teaching foreign languages, which is now known 
as the audio-lingual method (Larsen-Freeman, 2000). 
The behaviourist approach to SLA also paid considerable attention to the role of 
first language on second language habit-forming. According to behaviourist 
researchers, the transfer of the first language works negatively or positively for 
second language learning, depending on the similarities and differences of the 
structures of the learner’s first and second languages (Lado, 1957). This idea was 
based on the structural linguistic explanation of language: language can be 
identified with its overtly observable structural features, and subsequently, 
“languages can differ from each other without limit” (Brown, 2007, p. 9). As 
Lado (1957) explains: 
We have here the major source of difficulty or ease in learning the structure 
of a foreign language. Those structures that are similar…will be transferred 
and may function satisfactorily…Those structures that are different… will 
not function satisfactorily in the foreign language and will therefore have to 
be changed. (p. 59) 
Aiming to promote effective second language teaching and learning, Lado (1957) 
attempted to develop a set of systematic procedures to compare and contrast the 
learner’s first and second languages. This comparison of languages is referred to 
as contrastive analysis (CA). Lado suggested five dimensions of language 
comparison, which are systems of sound, grammar, vocabulary, writing and 
cultures. Through CA, two versions of contrastive analysis hypothesis (CAH) 
were developed. The strong version aimed to predict (and thus prevent) errors that 
will occur based on the first and second language comparison (Ellis, 2008), while 
the weak hypothesis was to analyse (and thus fix) the learner’s actual recurring 
errors (Gass & Selinker, 2001).  
 
 14 
 
Critiques of the behaviourist SLA tradition 
Prior to pointing out their limitations, the positive contributions of the 
behaviourist SLA research to the field of second language teaching and learning 
should be acknowledged. Researchers and theorists from this stream must be 
credited with beginning the serious study of how second languages are learnt, and 
with pioneering the study of SLA as an autonomous academic field. Behaviourism 
also explains some aspects of language acquisition, both first and second, and has 
some contribution to second language pedagogy. However, behaviourism was 
fundamentally criticised because of its philosophical beliefs, and in particular, its 
attachment to empirical study of observable behaviour, which completely 
disregards the mental processes related to language learning. An initial, powerful 
critique that resulted in the discrediting of the behaviourist approach to SLA came 
from Chomsky (1959), which seems to be still considered valid by current 
theorists (Brown, 2007; de Bot, Lowie, & Verspoor, 2005; Lightbown & Spada, 
2006; Mitchell & Myles, 2004). Chomsky’s (1959) critical review of Skinner 
(1957) identifies the following problems that undermine the behaviouristic notion 
of language acquisition: 
 the behaviourist theories of human verbal behaviour were established 
drawing on “analogy to laboratory study of lower organisms” (p. 39), 
rather than real human behaviour; 
 human beings act even when sufficient stimuli (feedback) are not given: 
for example, children can acquire the complex system of a language even 
when being exposed to a minimal repertoire of the language; 
 language learning involves mental activities such as generalising, 
hypothesising and understanding highly complex information, which 
cannot be explained by the idea of habit formation; and, 
 children create and understand new, unlearnt (not-imitated) utterances.  
In addition to Chomsky’s critique, the results of subsequent research, such as error 
analysis (EA) studies that particularly challenged CAH, suggest that second 
language knowledge and behaviours are not predicted precisely by the first and 
second language comparison (Long & Sato, 1984). More recently, Johnson (2004) 
has also argued that the behaviourist approach ignored important factors relating 
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to SLA, factors such as the learner’s own feelings, intuitions and understandings 
of their learning experiences.  
2.1.2 Cognitivism 
Philosophical and methodological backgrounds 
The philosophical view of the cognitive approach to SLA traces its origin back to 
René Descartes in the 17th century, who had a strong faith in the power of the 
human mind for logical thinking and reasoning (Jordan, 2004). This philosophical 
tradition influenced by Descartes is knowledge as rationalism, and “rationalism 
and empiricism (the philosophical basis of behaviourism) were mutually exclusive” 
(p. 81). Jordan argues that: 
[r]ationalism was based on the assertion that knowledge of the world is 
gained by the working of the intellect, reasoning from assumptions to 
conclusions, with various rules of logic and language to guide the process. 
Empiricism, on the other hand, was based on the assertion that knowledge 
of the world is derived from observing actual events in the real world. (p. 81) 
That is, the rationalist belief is that deductive reasoning from hypotheses to results 
through logic and language is the way to develop knowledge. Two main 20th 
century scholars who established the methodological foundation of cognitivism 
based on the rationalist beliefs were Karl Popper and William W. Bartley (Jordan, 
2004). Overall, it is suggested that researchers attempt to strengthen and improve 
the theory through following empirical and experimental studies, to gain objective 
knowledge of the world through the lens of a particular theory, which is still open 
to falsifications and critiques. 
SLA as cognitive science 
Chomsky’s theoretical arguments played an important role in proposing that SLA 
was a mental phenomenon although later the majority of cognitive SLA 
researchers rejected his belief in the existence of an inborn language 
predisposition in humans (first termed the language acquisition device and later 
the universal grammar) (Brown, 2007; Johnson 2004; Lightbown & Spada, 2006). 
Researchers following the cognitive approach make it clear that SLA is “a branch 
of cognitive science” (Doughty & Long, 2003, p. 4), and that the study of 
language acquisition is concerned with changes of linguistic systems in the 
learners’ mind (Doughty & Long, 2003; Gass, 1998; Selinker, 1972; Skehan, 
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1998). The central purpose of the cognitive-oriented enquiries in SLA is to inform 
teaching and learning by uncovering brain functions, cognitive processes, factors 
and variables that relate to the acquisition of linguistic items and interlanguage 
development (see Norris & Ortega, 2000). Taking up the rationalist 
methodological frameworks, cognitivist research studies use psychometric 
methods yielding quantitative data. For example, (Ellis et al., 2009) states: 
“[e]stablishing the means for measuring” L2 knowledge as a way to attest the 
change in L2 knowledge system is also one of main interests of the researchers in 
this position (p. 27).  
Use of a computing metaphor for the mind and explicit/implicit linguistic 
knowledge  
One of the central theoretical features of this tradition is to explain the human 
mind and language acquisition by means of the metaphors of the information 
processing of computer, reflected in the use of such terms as input and output 
(van Patten, 2004; Skehan, 1998). For example, Skehan (1998) stated: 
We have seen how information-processing models are helpful in separating 
the different stages [of second language acquisition] concerned (input, 
central processing, output), and in providing an organizing framework for 
more detailed discussion of the functioning of each separate stage. (p. 73) 
The principal framework of the cognitive approach consists of well-known 
constructs, such as native speakers (NSs) and non-native speakers (NNSs) and the 
notion of second language learners’ development of an interlanguage system 
(Selinker, 1972). The interlanguage system of the non-native speaker of a 
language is seen as being constantly revised by the learner forming, testing and 
refining hypotheses, as they move toward the system of the native speaker of the 
language. With this conceptual framework, and on the basis of what is observable 
– input (what one is exposed to) and output (what one produces), different models 
have been established to infer what is not observable – the human mind’s 
language acquisitional process described in terms of the black box metaphor 
(Long, 1980).  
Researchers in this tradition are also particularly concerned with the distinction 
between acquisition and learning (Ellis et al., 2009; Krashen, 1981). According to 
Krashen (1981), acquisition takes place spontaneously and incidentally during 
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natural language use and mostly resulting in implicit knowledge with which one 
automatically uses language without purposeful effort to recall the knowledge. On 
the other hand, learning refers to the process that mostly produces explicit 
knowledge, the conscious memory that people purposefully recall to understand 
and control their language behaviour (Ellis, 2008). Certain researchers in this 
tradition, such as Krashen, view acquisition and implicit knowledge as more 
desirable and ideal than conscious learning and explicit knowledge. However, 
others have employed both concepts to understand some second language learning 
variations, such as second language or foreign language environments, formal and 
informal learning, or age differences (DeKeyser, 2003). They also attempted to 
examine the interface between the different types of linguistic knowledge, and 
discover how these variables may relate to the development of second language 
competence (Ellis et al., 2009; Skehan, 1998).  
Critiques of cognitivism  
Cognitivism has been criticised by social, cultural researchers who find their basis 
in different philosophical assumptions. Firstly, the focus of this cognitive research 
tradition, which is primarily on the acquisition of discrete grammar rules, has been 
questioned. This emphasis on micro-level linguistic features is considered to fail 
to operationalize all of the elements of successful language use by second 
language users (Johnson, 2004), and does not adequately explain the development 
of the second language speaker’s overall competence to use a second language 
(Kramsch, 1993). In addition, social, cultural researchers contend that cognitivist 
researchers discount the role of social, cultural contexts, and reduce the role of 
other people surrounding the second language speaker to that of only triggering 
input and providing opportunities for output. Thus, each individual learner is 
depicted as a closed, internal mechanism (in terms of the computing metaphor), 
isolated from social cultural contexts and other people (Atkinson, Churchill, 
Nishino, & Okada, 2007; Firth & Wagner, 1997/2007; Johnson, 2004). Recently, 
cognitivist researchers acknowledge the critiques on their insufficient attention to 
the social aspects of language learning, and seek to embrace the social into the 
framework of their research (e.g., Mackey & Goo, 2007; Mackey & Polio, 2009; 
Philp & Mackey, 2010).  
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Another problematic issue concerning cognitivism relates to its three central 
concepts – the dichotomy of the native speaker (NS) / non-native speaker (NNS), 
the language learner and interlangauge (Kramsch & Whiteside, 2007). Firth and 
Wagner (1997/2007) strongly argue against the oppositional binaries of NS and 
NNS. They point out that these two dichotomising constructs provide a deficit 
view of second language speakers of a language as ever-deficient and inferior to 
L1 speakers. That is, “a NS is assumed unproblematically to be a person with a 
mother tongue, acquired from birth” while a NNS “as a defective communicator”. 
In addition, they note that identifying L2 speakers as ‘learners’ may imply that 
their L2 competence is underdeveloped and they are not sufficiently competent 
users of the language, and “[t]he L2 system of speakers is at the “transitional 
phase”, always “on the move” toward NS competence as the target (2007, p. 764).  
Summary and implications of Section 2.1 
The review of the behaviourist and cognitivist schools of thought in the study of 
SLA in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 offers a glimpse of how these two traditions theorised 
and conceptualised SLA along with the challenges that both approaches have 
stimulated. My research is opposed to the central tenet of behaviourism that 
disregards the existence of psychological mental phenomena, for the reason that 
they are not physically observable. As will be discussed in Chapter 3 in greater 
detail, I adhere to the phenomenological realist beliefs that suggest the human 
mind and cognition are as real as any physical, material phenomena, and consider 
that exploring psychological processes is essential in understanding SLA. 
In this regard, I acknowledge that the cognitivist SLA researchers’ view of 
cognitive processes as central to SLA has a significant strength, bringing to light 
what behaviourism omitted into the study of SLA. However, the concepts of 
cognition, mind and mental processes that cognitivism proposes differ 
considerably from those of my research. To indicate how my research approach 
distinguishes its conceptualisation of mind from that of cognitivism, I present 
Searle’s (1992) statement: 
[Cognitivism supposes] that computation is an intrinsic feature of the world 
and that consciousness and intentionality are somehow eliminable…or 
reducible to something more basic, such as computation. … I argue that 
[c]onsciousness and intentionality are intrinsic and ineliminable. (p. xiii)  
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Thus, I argue that SLA processes are complex, broad and multi-layered so that 
they are not simply understood by means of the computer metaphor of the 
cognitivist approach. Particularly, the language processes in the human mind 
involve not just syntactical operations but more importantly the comprehension 
and expression of meanings that the computer is never capable of. In addition, 
when saying that SLA is cognitive process, it does not mean that it is isolated 
from social and cultural contexts. Rather, based on the notion that cognition is 
embodied and directed toward the world outside (Husserl, 1970; Woodruff Smith 
& McIntyre, 1982), I consider that an SLA should be researched and explained in 
relation to the social, cultural context where it occurs. Moreover, it is questionable 
if SLA can be sufficiently understood when solely focusing on the speaker’s 
linguistic knowledge. Rather, this present study considers that the study of SLA 
needs to be concerned with how the speaker “integrate[s] a wide range of different 
types of knowledge in order to…[learn and use language] that is both 
linguistically accurate and socially appropriate (Bruce, 2008a, p. 1).  
2.2 Social, cultural SLA stream 
2.2.1 Diverse approaches in the social, cultural SLA stream  
The first Focus Issue of the Modern Language Journal (hereafter MLJ) in 2007 
addressed a debate among researchers in the study of SLA, which had begun a 
decade earlier between two different streams – cognitivism and the social cultural 
orientations. By re-presenting Firth and Wagner’s 1997 paper, this Focus Issue of 
MLJ firstly reminded readers that the argument is still ongoing. It then gave voice 
to the social, cultural strands of SLA research. In a work by Atkinson (2011c), 
researchers from most of these social, cultural SLA strands were given 
opportunity to restate their own positions. They are the: 
 sociocultural approach (hereafter SCT);  
 complexity theory approach; 
 sociocognitive approach; 
 identity approach; 
 language socialisation approach (hereafter LS); and, 
 conversation-analytic approach (hereafter CA).  
In addition to these six approaches that Atkinson (2011c) presents, the ecology 
approach that also appeared in the 2007 debate can be counted as a social cultural 
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approach. Although, in most cases, I allocate one section to each approach, I 
combine the reviews of the complexity theory, sociocognitive and ecology 
approaches in one section (Section 2.2.5) for the reason that they share much in 
common with each other by employing the notion of ecology.  
A common attitude of these socially oriented researchers is a welcoming and 
celebrating of the diversity of the study of SLA, diversity being seen as a positive, 
healthy indicator of the advancement of the field (e.g., Johnson, 2004; Lantolf, 
1996; Swain & Deters, 2007). The openness and tolerance toward other research 
approaches that social and cultural strands exhibit, however, mostly seems to 
extend toward other approaches within the social cultural paradigm, which is 
identifies them as one collective SLA stream (see Block, 2003; Lantolf, 1996).  
2.2.2 Philosophical beliefs among the social, cultural approaches 
To identify the philosophical, axiomatic beliefs about the nature of reality, truth, 
the human mind and cognition, knowledge and language that the social cultural 
approaches broadly agree with, different terms have been employed: 
postmodernism (Rampton, 1995, 1997), linguistic (cultural) relativism (Kramsch, 
2004; Lantolf, 1996), (social) constructivism (Block, 2003; Ortega, 2009), or 
poststructuralism (Pennycook, 2001; Ortega, 2009). The number of these different 
constructs related to different aspects of the postmodern philosophy shared by the 
social, cultural approaches to SLA seems to be partially due to its nature of 
defying clarity and orderliness, which characterises it as allusive, indeterminate 
and at times self-contradictory (see Alvesson, 2002). In addition, this 
philosophical trend began as a movement to “a questioning of and rejection of the 
fundamental assumptions of modernism” (Burr, 2003, p. 10), throughout which a 
number of theorists developed their own philosophical systems. Bourdieu, Derrida, 
Edwards and Potter, Foucault, Lincoln and Guba and neo-Vygotkians, such as 
Engeström appear to be some of those thinkers from whom these social, cultural 
SLA approaches find their intellectual orientations.  
When I review and discuss the social, cultural approaches, I use the names above 
that refer to their philosophical basis, depending on the emphases made by 
researchers themselves. However, I use the term of social constructivism most for 
the reason that the term represents clearly the worldview of the studies from this 
stream (e.g., Clark & Gieve, 2006; Donato, 1994; Duff, 2002, 2008b; Lantolf & 
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Thorne, 2006; J. S. Lee & Anderson, 2009; Menard-Warwick, 2009; Morita, 2004, 
2009; Norton, 2000; Park, 2007; Thorne, Black, & Sykes, 2009). Most 
distinctively, social, cultural SLA researchers doubt and refute the objectivity of 
knowledge, of truth, and of one unified reality of the world. They deny any direct 
association between human consciousness and the outside world, arguing that 
almost everything – truth, reality, and human experience, cognition and identity – 
is constructed through human interactions mediated by language or discourse. 
Therefore, they view that there are multiple truths, multiple realties and 
fragmented, multiple identities of one person, which members of a particular 
community co-construct, and which are bound to historically, socially and 
culturally specific contexts. For human learning, processes of social interaction 
and practices are emphasised, with the belief that human mind, cognition, 
knowledge and language competence are created through interpersonal language 
use in social, cultural and political contexts.  
In a review of the different social and contextual approaches to SLA in the 
following sections (Sections 2.2.3 to 2.2.7), I attempt to scrutinise how the 
philosophical assumptions of the social cultural SLA stream described above are 
realised in the practical applications of each of these approaches. In so doing, I 
discuss, in relation to SLA, the contributions and weaknesses of the various social, 
cultural approaches.   
2.2.3 Sociocultural theory (SCT)  
Sociocultural theory (SCT) is a complex theory originating from the work of the 
Soviet psychologist, Vygotsky (1978, 1986), whose work has exerted 
considerable influence on the other social, cultural approaches to SLA as well as 
SCT. In particular, his notion of the relationship between language and thought, 
which corresponds to Whorfian linguistic relativism (i.e., language creates and 
shapes thoughts), is one of the most intrinsic tenets of the social, cultural 
approaches (Atkinson, 2011c; Kramsch, 2004). 
To understand how SCT scholars approach and theorise SLA, it is firstly 
necessary to examine the principal sub-theories and concepts of SCT. These 
involve Vygotsky’s four principal concepts, (symbolic) mediation, internalisation, 
private (inner) speech and the zone of proximal development (ZPD). In addition, 
Activity Theory, which has been developed to extend Vygotsky’s original 
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concepts (e.g., Engeström, 1999), and the concepts of self-regulation and 
cognitive mediation, which are the elaboration of the concept of mediation 
(Karpov & Haywood, 1998), are also important in understanding SCT. These 
major SCT concepts together constitute a complex framework to understand 
human learning and development that especially focus on “human psychological 
processes (so-called higher mental processes)”, including language acquisition 
(Lantolf, 2011, p. 25).  
A fundamental SCT proposition about human beings and their development is that 
inner mental processes are internalised and developed from external social 
interaction (Johnson, 2004; Jonassen & Rohrer-Murphy, 1999; Lantolf, 2000b, 
2011; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). Lantolf (2011) explains this view of human 
development with the key concept of ‘mediation’, referring to “the creation and 
use of artificial auxiliary means” (p. 25). In the physical world, lower mental 
functions (e.g., perception and involuntary attention) “are regulated by the 
environment” (Johnson, 2004, p. 107). On the other hand, higher mental processes, 
such as “planning, monitoring, rational thought”, are regulated by language, the 
most powerful symbolic tool, which is internalised into the mind through 
collaborative social activities (p. 107). Two types of symbolic mediation or 
regulation in the mind are metacognitive mediation by “semiotic tools of self-
regulation” and cognitive mediation by scientific concepts (Karpov & Haywood, 
1998, p. 27).  
Higher mental functions (thought) mediated by language take place firstly “on the 
inter-psychological plane” in the form of social interaction, and later “on the intra-
psychological plane” in the form of private and inner speech (i.e., thinking for 
SCT researchers) (Lantolf & Thorne, 2006, p. 153). Scaffolding – careful 
guidance and support given to the learner by somebody else –within the zone of 
proximal development (ZPD) is conceptualised as the core mechanism for 
different aspects of human development, including language acquisition, through 
the process of internalisation. According to Lantolf and Beckett (2009, p. 460): 
All forms of development begin as external social activity, which are then 
appropriated by the individual as a result of this activity. This occurs in the 
ZPD, which is generally defined as the difference between what someone 
can do alone and what he or she can do with mediation. 
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When Vygotsky developed the concept of ZPD, it was originally meant to explain 
child development, but SCT researchers employ the concept to investigate any 
learning process taking place involving any relationships, such as teacher-student 
interaction, peer-peer interaction (for which the concept of ZPD is mutual), and 
also not only individual but also collective interactions (Lantolf &Thorne, 2006).   
Meanwhile, Activity Theory is employed as a methodological framework for 
understanding human learning and development (Jonassen & Rohrer-Murphy, 
1999). It attempts to account for the mechanism of how human behaviour and 
thought result from activities that are mediated by socially and culturally 
constructed tools, such as language (Engeström, 1999). That is, Activity Theory is 
a framework that aims to examine how the motives of individuals and 
communities arise from socially, culturally constructed needs, and how such 
motives drive individuals and communities to participate in activities. People find 
and play their own roles (division of labour) in such activities based on 
community rules (explicit) or conventions (implicit), the whole process of which 
then produces the development of human mental and behaviour (Lantolf, 2000a). 
In Activity Theory, the interaction between the cognition of individuals and social 
activities are also explained with the concepts of internalisation – how human 
mental processes emerge from external activities and externalisation – how 
human beings as agents act on, and transform their social cultural environments 
(Engeström, 1999). 
The concepts and sub-theories, such as mediation, internalisation, private (inner) 
speech, ZPD and Activity Theory, which constitute the Vygotskyan theory of 
learning and cognitive development in general, have been applied to explaining 
second language learning. Thus, for SCT researchers, SLA centrally involves 
internalising the knowledge of second language that is inter-personally 
constructed by means of scaffolding in a social, cultural context (Lantolf & 
Thorne, 2006). In addition, based on their conception of the mechanism of SLA 
and ontological axiom that language regulates and creates thought, these 
researchers propose notions about the epistemology of second language learners. 
These notions are, in essence, commensurate with the linguistic relativist 
perspective that SLA involves “the simultaneous acquisition of a whole new 
universe and a whole new way of looking at it” (Kaplan, 1972, p. 100). Lantolf 
and Thorne (2006) state: 
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[L]earning a new language is about much more than acquiring new 
signifiers for already given signifieds (for example, the Spanish word for 
‘fork’ is tenedor). It is about acquiring new conceptual knowledge and/or 
modifying already existing knowledge as a way of re-mediating one’s 
interaction with the world and with one’s psychological functioning. (p. 5) 
Earlier, Dunn and Lantolf (1998) also proposed:  
[L]anguage is acquired through the revolutionary activity of making 
meaning, which is the case of children especially, entails the creation of the 
very tools used to make meaning…from the sociocultural perspective, 
second language learners have a second chance to create new tools and new 
ways of meaning. Thus, accents, (un)grammaticality, and pragmatic and 
lexical failures are not just flaws or signs of imperfect learning but ways in 
which learners attempt to establish (new) identities and gain self-regulation 
through linguistic means. In an important sense, L2 learning is about 
gaining the freedom to create – a freedom that native speakers have a 
greater difficulty achieving but to which children, up to a point, have access 
in learning their L1. (p. 427) 
Therefore, for SCT researchers, learning a second language means creating “new 
tools and new ways of meaning” (Lantolf & Thorne, 2006, p. 5) or “acquiring 
new conceptual knowledge” in the language (Dunn & Lantolf, 1998, p. 427). This 
is, as mentioned above, achieved when careful scaffolding is provided within the 
person’s second language ZPD. Under this principal notion of SLA and second 
language speakers, SLA researchers taking the SCT approach have mainly 
examined four aspects of language learning, which are: 
 the extent to which second language speakers’ thinking processes are 
mediated and regulated by their first and second languages (e.g., Appel & 
Lantolf, 1994; Centeno-Cortés & Jiménez Jiménez, 2004; H. J. Smith, 
2007; Swain, 2006a; Ushakova, 1994); 
 second language learning and acquisition through attending classrooms or 
courses or partaking in different social activities especially in relation to 
the concept of the ZPD (e.g., de Guerrero & Villamil, 2000; DiCamilla & 
Anton, 1997; Ohta, 2001; Poehner, 2007); 
 the relationship between activity and motivation for language learning 
(e.g., Swain, Lapkin, Knouzi, Suzuki, & Brooks, 2009); and, 
 the role of concept-based regulation for learning second language 
grammar and lexical items (e.g., Anton & DiCamilla, 1998; Ohta, 2001; 
Verity, 2000).  
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The SCT approach has been acknowledged for its leading contribution to 
acquainting the field of SLA with “the radical reorientation towards the 
fundamental role of social processes in SLA” (Ortega, 2009, p. 217). With its 
concept of social scaffolding within the learner’s ZPD, it also has inspired the 
reformation of pedagogical methodologies and strategies in the context of 
language teaching (Candlin & Mercer, 2001). Nevertheless, problematic issues 
arise from the SCT approach to SLA, particularly from its axiom that language 
regulates thought, which need to be carefully discussed.  
Centrally, based on their fundamental notion of thought and language, SCT 
researchers suggest, “[T]he ultimate accomplishment of self-regulation in the L2 
is if mediation can be performed via L2 (as opposed to L1)” (Ortega, 2009, p. 
221). Thus, on one hand, they claim that second language learning gives 
opportunity for one to gain new ways of thinking through experiencing “accents, 
(un)grammaticality, and pragmatic and lexical failures” (Dunn & Lantolf, 1998, p. 
427). On the other hand, however, these researchers are openly sceptical about the 
possibility that second language speakers may achieve this ultimate goal of SLA – 
being able to think in the L2) (Centeno-Cortés & Jiménez Jiménez, 2004; Lantolf, 
2011; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006; Ushakova, 1994). In this regard, Lantolf (2011) 
states:  
Based on extensive research in Russia, Ushakova (1994) suggested that L2 
learners are unlikely to develop the capacity to use the L2 to mediate mental 
functioning even when they can use it in social interaction…A decade later, 
Centeno-Cortés and Jiménez-Jiménez (2004), using a more complex 
research design than in previous studies, again found that L2 speakers, 
including advanced speakers, were unable to use the language to mediate 
their online thinking during complex task. (p. 28) 
Earlier, Lantolf and Thorne (2006) also argue: 
[A]s proposed by Ushakova (1994)…late acquisition of language beyond 
the first are laid down on the psychological foundation organized through 
the meanings internalized in one’s first language; that is, we may speak 
more than one language but we have only one inner speech. What this 
means then is that our thinking processes are fundamentally carried out 
through the support (i.e. mediation) provided by our first language. The 
research reviewed in this chapter [Chapter 4 of the book] seems to provide 
fairly strongly support for Ushakova’s claim. (p. 110) 
This suggested inability of L2 speakers in relation to thinking or self-regulation 
can be controversial, particularly when applied to English-medium academic 
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contexts, in which a considerable number of professional scholars and students 
use the language as their second language. Difficulties and challenges that these 
second language speakers in the contexts may experience can be anticipated 
without much controversy. However, assuming that they cannot think in the 
language that they have to use for their academic tasks could create an impression 
that they are ever deficient and challenged in such contexts. In fact, for example, 
in the extension of this SCT epistemology of second language speakers, Atkinson 
(1997) suggests that second language speakers of English are unlikely to engage 
in critical thinking, which is embedded in the language of Western culture. 
Considering the importance of criticality in an English-medium academic context, 
this type of suggestion could generate a deficit image of second language speakers 
in the context (see Section 3.3.5, Chapter 3 for a review and discussion of 
criticality).    
Here, however, arguing over whether or not L2 speakers can think in L2 would 
not be the point, because the idea that thinking or producing thoughts (mental 
contents) only occurs in language seems to be fundamentally flawed. For example, 
as Vygotsky himself acknowledges within phylogenesis, one of the four domains 
of his genetic method for studying human development, human mental capacity is 
fundamentally different from those of other primates (Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). 
However, his overall sociocultural theory suggests that mental functions before 
language acquisition are no different from those of other primates, and higher 
mental processes (i.e., human thinking) begin to emerge with language acquisition 
(Johnson, 2004). A dilemma that is not clearly explained here is why and how a 
human baby whose mental capacity is already distinguished from those of other 
primates only engages in primate-level mental functions until learning language. 
The problem in this dilemma becomes clearer when considering recent brain 
research conducted by Edwards and his colleagues (Doria et al., 2010). According 
to them, the areas of the human brain involved in introspection, a type of higher 
level thinking, and other conscious mental acts are completely mature at birth, 
rather than being developed during childhood while acquiring cognitive skills.  
In fact, a number of theoretical suggestions exist in the extant literature that could 
challenge the SCT notion of thinking only in language. For example, cognitive 
grammarians and cognitive linguists propose that human beings develop linguistic 
conceptual systems with which they engage in thoughts based on non-verbal 
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experiential bases or image schemata (Fauconnier, 1997; Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 
2007; M. Johnson, 1987; Lakoff & M. Johnson, 1980/2003; Langacker, 2008). 
These cognitive linguists are also cultural relativists who assume that human 
cognition and the mind are socially constructed in particular cultural contexts. 
Thus, their ontological belief about cognition and thought are not fundamentally 
different from SCT researchers (see M. Johnson, 1987; Lakeoff & M. Johnson, 
1980/2003). However, they allow for the existence of cognition and thought 
(which makes it possible to establish experiential bases or image schemata) before 
a person acquires language. Following this view, even after language acquisition, 
thoughts are often considerably dependent on experiential images and the 
conceptual systems are largely extra-linguistic (M. Johnson, 1987).  
Moreover, some scholars, such as Bruce (2008a), Chenoweth and Hayes (2001), 
and Widdowson (1983, 2007), suggest a hierarchical organisation and operation 
of extra-linguistic and linguistic knowledge in the mind. This appears to imply 
that thought is not only independent of language, but also that it rather regulates 
and constrains the use of language. Some studies of bilingualism and code-
switching (hereafter CS) seem to be based on an ontological assumption of 
thought and language similar to that of Bruce and Widdowson (de Bot, 2002; 
Grosjean, 2008; Kroll & Dijkstra, 2002; M. C. Potter, So, Eckardt, & Feldman, 
1984) The basic assumption of these bilingualism and CS researchers is that 
bilinguals select between two languages to communicate meanings. For example, 
Kroll and Dijkstra (2002) introduce “the revised hierarchical model”, which 
suggests: 
[In the mind of a bilingual, there are] different levels or representation; at 
the level of word form … independent lexical representations for each 
language, but at the level of meaning … a single conceptual system” (p. 
302).  
Particularly, de Bot (2002) proposes that CS involves language choice, during 
which “the transition from [largely language-independent] conceptualization to 
language-specific coding takes place” (p. 293). Thus, although clarifying the 
existential relationship between thought and language seem not to be their main 
concern, it seems that the bilingualism scholars have developed their work based 
on the central assumption that there is an area in thought and cognition that is 
independent of language.  
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As Willard (1984) points out, clarifying whether or not thought is language-
contingent is closely related to how one defines knowledge and describes the 
process of knowledge attainment (see Section 3.1, Chapter 3 for a fuller 
discussion of this issue). Consequently, for investigating SLA occurring in the 
process of developing academic knowledge, deciding perspectives about the 
ontological relation between thought, language and knowledge, and 
epistemological process is a critical matter. This study takes a position of 
resistance against the Vygotskian idea about language-thought relation. 
Alternatively, it seeks to rethink the thought-language issue from the realist 
perspective, while describing the realist conception of knowledge in Section 3.1, 
Chapter 3. Based on this, I discuss the SLA of the participants of the study in 
Chapter 6.  
The following four sub-sections review the social cultural approaches to SLA 
termed language socialisation, emergentism, the identity approach and the 
conversation-analytic approach.  
2.2.4 Language socialisation (LS)  
The language socialisation (hereafter LS) approach principally explains the 
process of language acquisition by using the concept of socialisation (Ochs & 
Schieffelin, 1984). LS researchers consider that the socialisation approach 
complements the acquisition approach, which defines language learning narrowly 
as a cognitive phenomenon of linguistic knowledge development (Duff & Talmy, 
2011). They suggest that LS, by contrast, “explain[s] [language] learning in much 
broader terms, examining not only linguistic development, but also the other 
forms of knowledge that are learned in and through language” (Duff & Talmy, 
2011, p. 93).  
The fundamental theories and concepts of LS were developed through cross-
cultural studies of the development of first language socialisation (e.g. Ochs & 
Schieffelin, 1984). They drew on “sociological, anthropological, and 
psychological (especially Vygotskian) approaches to the study of social and 
linguistic competence within a social group” (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986, p. 163). 
That is, LS aims to understand “how persons become competent members of 
social groups and the role of language in the process” (p. 167). According to their 
maxim “socialization through language and socialization into language” (Ochs & 
 29 
 
Schieffelin, 2008, p. 5), they hold the view that “reality, including concepts of self 
and social roles, is constructed through social interaction (interactional use of 
language)” (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986, p. 165). They emphasise the relativity of 
language and language learning across different cultures (Ochs &Schieffelin, 
1984), contrasting with an approach that has identified universality in different 
languages and in the use and learning of these languages (e.g., D. E. Brown, 1991). 
Then as research methodologies, they employ phenomenological and 
ethnomethodological approaches from their cultural, relativist perspectives.   
Another important framework that LS researchers employ is the notion of the 
learner as an apprentice or a legitimate peripheral participant in a community of 
practice (hereafter CoP) (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). This notion is 
echoed in Duff and Talmy’s (2011) definition of LS as a “framework for 
understanding the development of linguistic, cultural and communicative 
competence through interaction with others who are more knowledgeable or 
proficient” (p. 93). They stressed the importance of relative, situational contexts 
of learning (what Schieffelin & Ochs [1986] term as different cultures), in which 
knowledge, meanings and understandings are created and defined. A simple 
version of the basic concept of this notion is that a particular CoP is the place 
where this situational learning takes place. Learners conceptualised as newcomers, 
apprentices or novices, engage in vocational practices with experts or established 
members of the community. Through this engagement, the newcomers gradually 
become experts who eventually achieve “mastery of knowledge and skill” and a 
“full participation” in the community (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 29). The learning 
process in the context of CoP is reciprocal (that is old timers also learn from 
newcomers).  
As their linguistic basis, LS researchers employ Halliday and Hassan’s systemic 
functional perspective, which proposed that the functions and systems of language 
are parallel to those of social, cultural structures (G. Williams, 2008). Halliday 
(1989) states, “Language is understood in its relationship to social structure (an 
aspect of culture)”, and in turn as social semiotic, “one of a number of systems of 
meaning that, taken altogether, constitute human culture” (p. 4). Language 
systems, including grammar, are developed and organised through functional 
use(s) of language in responding to social needs, primarily to social interaction 
that precedes other needs (Halliday, 1973; Halliday & Hasan, 1989). These 
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linguistic explanations manifest the principle of LS – socialisation in and through 
language use (Duff & Talmy, 2011) and language development through the 
process of language socialisation (Williams, 2008). 
As Atkinson (2011c) points out, the LS approach has tended to overlook the 
mental aspects of SLA because of its emphasis on the importance of social, 
cultural processes of language learning. The 2004 article of Watson-Gegeo, an LS 
researcher, appears to be an attempt to overcome this perceived limitation of the 
LS approach, in which she extensively discusses the ontology of the human mind 
and cognition and mental aspects of language learning. Overall, her argument in 
the article clearly represents the LS perspective for understanding these matters. 
She contends, “Cognition originates in social interaction and is shaped by cultural 
and socio-political processes” (p. 331). In order to support this position, she firstly 
draws on a number of studies from other disciplinary areas, such as neuroscience, 
psychology and anthropology. Then she links these studies to her LS perspective 
for second language acquisition. Thus, essentially, the LS perspective of human 
mind and cognition articulated by Watson-Gegeo endorses the notion that one’s 
language, knowledge, experience are all socially constructed through the process 
of socialisation, a perspective that is broadly shared by the other social, cultural 
approaches, including the SCT approach (see Atkinson, 2011b; Block, 2003).  
The LS approach to SLA has made the important point that language learning 
involves not only linguistic knowledge but also “other forms of knowledge” (Duff 
& Talmy, 2011, p. 94). It also contributes to the recognition that second language 
learning and use always takes place in social, cultural contexts. Despite this, 
however, there are issues relating to the philosophical and theoretical disposition 
of this approach, which I discuss in the rest of this section.  
Firstly, there seem to be some fundamental problems in the ontological belief of 
the LS approach that the mind and cognition of language learners emerge from 
social processes. For example, as evidence of this belief, LS researchers suggest 
that social, cultural factors exert influence on language learners. However, social 
influences on language learners do not seem to indicate that their mind and 
cognition are products of social processes, but rather seems to suggest that their 
existence precedes any social engagement. This is because, in order to be 
influenced by social factors, their mind and cognition should exist first. More 
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fundamentally, social, cultural processes centrally involve human interactions 
between agents (participants) with their intentional minds (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.1 for a more detailed review of the concept of the intentionality of the mind). 
Therefore, the LS (and other social, cultural approaches) notion that the mind and 
cognition of language learners originate from social processes appears to be 
ontologically impossible, unless speculating a hypothetical situation in which a 
person initially engages in social processes with neither mind nor cognition. In 
addition, unlike the scientific claims identifying the mind with the chemical, 
neural reaction of the brain to external stimulations, which Watson-Gegeo (2004) 
draws on, others suggest that the mind is not the brain function as such but what is 
in charge of that function (e.g., Eccles, 1982, 1994). In fact, a number of scientists 
and philosophers have argued for the a priori existence of the mind and cognition, 
pointing out the inadequacy and improbability of scientific and sociological 
explanations against this existential nature of the mind and cognition (e.g., 
Chalmers, 2010; Custance, 1980; Davis, 1983; Eccles, 1982, 1994; Husserl, 1970; 
Kelly et al., 2007; Lewin, 1992; Nagel, 2012; Plantinga, 2011; Stapp, 2007;Trefil, 
1996; Willard, 2000, 2007). 
The inadequacy of presuming that the mind and cognition of language learners 
originate from social processes seems to manifest itself in the studies carried out 
by some social, cultural researchers. As Duff and Talmy (2011) admit, there have 
been SLA research findings that do not completely fit into the framework of 
socialisation. For example, Norton’s (2000) research shows that both the learners 
themselves and the members of the target language community resisted playing 
the roles imposed by the community. The learners who were not socialised into 
the target language community, however, did not fail to learn the target language. 
Similarly, through a meta-analysis of L2 socialisation studies, The LS researchers 
Bronson and Watson-Gegeo (2008) acknowledge that language learners may want 
to keep their own identities rather than accepting new identities expected by their 
L2 communities. This seems to imply that SLA may involve a number of aspects 
that cannot be accounted for when based on the conception of the mind and its 
intention as ultimately a product of social, cultural processes.  
In addition to their concept of the mind and cognition, the dilemma that L2 
socialisation researchers have encountered seems to arise from the concept of 
language learning as socialisation into a CoP. Ortega (2009) notes that, when it 
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comes to SLA, “socialization could risk being just a more fashionable guise of the 
dangerous ideology of assimilation” (p. 241). In a similar vein, Bruce (2011) 
challenges the adequacy of the CoP approach to account for the acculturation of 
outsiders into North American academic communities. More essentially, he 
provides a detailed critique of the CoP approach, in relation to its application to 
language learning context. According to him, the concept of CoP may actually 
obscure what is really happening at the site of language learning, especially in the 
context of higher education. For example, the CoP approach postulates “‘mutual 
engagement’ and ‘joint enterprise’ toward the achievement of a common goal” (p. 
22) as the principal mechanism of learning or attaining knowledge and language. 
However, in academic contexts, particular groups and individuals, such as those 
of academic staff or doctoral students, have their own particular goals in 
advancing their own knowledge. In addition, he also points out that the 
established members in the context, such as supervisors, examiners or reviewers, 
do not always facilitate new comers to become the members of academic 
community, but they also play “gate-keeping roles” (p. 22).   
Throughout this thesis, I contrast the social, cultural concepts of the mind of 
language learners and language learning with those of the present study, and 
discuss the implications of this divergence.  
2.2.5 Emergentism: Ecological perspectives, complexity theory and the 
sociocognitive approach  
Ecological perspectives (Kramsch, 2002b), complexity theory (N. Ellis & Larsen-
Freeman, 2006; Larsen-Freeman, 1997), and the sociocognitive approach 
(Atkinson, 2010) are generally recognised as three separate SLA approaches. 
However, the central notion of each of these three approaches seems that second 
language competence emerges through adapting oneself into constantly changing 
circumstances in which the person interacts with diverse people and environments 
over time (Atkinson, 2011b; Kramsch, 2002a; Larsen-Freeman, 2011). Using this 
overarching core concept, proponents of the three strands have taken up each 
other’s work to support their own, resulting in considerable resemblance with one 
another in some aspects. I draw on the construct of emergentism from N. Ellis and 
Larsen-Freeman (2006) and Ke and Holland (2006), to refer collectively to these 
three approaches. There appear to be three central commonalties across 
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complexity theory, the sociocognitive approach and the ecological perspective, 
which this section mainly discusses. Prior to this, I briefly describe divergences 
within the three strands.  
One noticeable difference is that each has its own, slightly different views on 
cognition. The ecology perspective suggests the somewhat radical notion that 
“any use of language, be it learning language or using it…does not derive from 
structures in the head…but are new adaptations that emerge from the seamless 
dynamic of timescales” (Kramsch & Whiteside, 2008, pp. 599-660). That is, 
language use and learning does not involve cognitive process, but new adaptations 
to a changing socially constructed environment. On the other hand, complexity 
theory and the sociocognitive approach see the cognitive process as an adaptive, 
distributional process that occurs in conjunction with social interactions (Atkinson, 
2010; Larsen-Freeman, 2011). In addition, in relation to research methodology, 
complexity theory uses participants’ personal, retrospective accounts as data, such 
as their diaries (Larsen-Freeman, 2007), while, the other two approaches collect 
natural conversations and develop their own analytic procedures that involve 
adaptations of the techniques of conversation analysis (see Atkinson, 2010; 
Kramsch & Whiteside, 2008) 
The most prominent commonality among the emergentist approaches is that they 
conceive of language development through the use of metaphors for patterns, 
balances, and operations of nature. Some of the representational metaphors 
employed by this group of researchers are ecology, affordance, alignment, 
adaptation, equilibrium, chaos/dynamic system (Atkinson, 2010; Kramsch, 2002b; 
Larsen-Freeman, 1997; Leather, 2002; van Lier, 2000). For example, ecology 
refers to the naturally balanced relationship between animals/plants and their 
environments. Then, language ecology suggests the relationship between language 
users and their environments as a holistic, balanced system. The other constructs 
are utilised to explain how the whole system is operationalized.  
In addition, all the three emergentist approaches tend to avoid dualistic metaphors, 
such as linguistic structure/social structure in relation to SLA, but see them as part 
of a continuum. Kramsch (2002a) argues that the two metaphors of language 
acquisition/socialisation lead one to think that language learning is only either 
cognitive or social, although it involves both cognitive and social aspects. Larsen-
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Freeman (1997) urges a blurring of the boundaries of false dichotomies, such as 
use/learning, competence/performance, individual/social, mental process / 
language as social, cultural use. Atkinson (2010) emphasises the continuum 
(connectedness) and alignment of cognition, body and world: the embodiment of a 
person’s cognition, the existence of which is then extended to public milieus. In 
sum, they try to view second language acquisition in a holistic way, suggesting 
that language speakers, their interlocutors and their environments are all 
components of one system. They further argue that the constructs pervasively 
used in other SLA studies artificially compartmentalise the phenomenon of 
language development into smaller parts, which in fact keep them from 
understanding it appropriately.  
Particularly, the understanding of the complexity theory approach to SLA has 
derived from the theory of thermodynamics from biology and ecology (Larsen-
Freeman, 1997; 2011), which seems to be then shared with the other two 
emergentist approaches (see Atkinson, 2010; Kramsch; 2002a & b; Kramsch & 
Whiteside, 2008). According to these theories, an iterative cycle between chaos 
and self-organisation is the pattern of the self-development of biological and 
ecological systems. Taking this up, Larsen-Freeman suggests that language 
develops while language users try to align themselves with their environments. 
Every interaction between a person and her context is unique, complex and non-
linear, and language development appears unpredictable and even chaotic. Yet the 
process involves a quick, instinctive and flexible self-organisation and -adaptation 
to the environment (Cameron & Deignan, 2006; Larsen-Freeman, 2006; Mellow, 
2006). This emergentist notion of language acquisition challenges the cognitive 
SLA theorists and researchers who depict language acquisition taking place in an 
orderly manner (Larsen-Freeman, 1997).  
The significance of the emergentist perspectives is their emphasis on the complex 
and dynamic nature of language development: a notion that would appear to be 
self-evident, but that could be lost in theories that may oversimplify SLA so that it 
easily fits into particular theoretical frameworks. Overall, they argue that 
compartmentalised, dichotomised SLA constructs and metaphors are often created 
for the convenience of the researcher, but may actually distort what takes place 
(Kramsch, 2002b; Larsen-Freeman, 1997).  
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Here, however, the claim of emergentism that any human constructs (including 
the ones in the study of SLA) are all just metaphors that do not correspond to the 
real world should be carefully considered. It is important to probe carefully 
whether or not concepts used by SLA researchers and theorists rightly identify 
things, events or states of affairs involved in the process of language learning and 
use. However, as the names of different body parts serve to indicate what we 
actually have in our bodies, many of the constructs that emergentist researchers 
attempt to eschew are in fact important to represent the actual mental and physical 
worlds, and thus are necessary for studying SLA. Besides, it is not evident that it 
has been necessary to understand human activities, while abandoning the existing 
cognitive constructs, such as “beliefs, rules, concepts and schemata” (see 
Kramsch & Whiteside, 2008, p. 59). It may, in fact, be problematic to apply the 
ecology metaphor to human consciousness and reasoning activities given its 
origin in the non-reasoned adaptive behaviours of non-human living organisms in 
the natural world. Mead (1934) clearly stated that “a social situation [is] distinct 
from such bare organic responses as reflexes of the organism” (p.194). Moreover, 
the notion of self-organisation from chaos was originally a theory for non-living 
cell structures and scientists even raised objections when this theory was applied 
to account for living cell structures, which are more complex than non-living cells, 
but still much simpler than any human phenomena (e.g., Yockey, 1977, 2002). 
Therefore, it would appear that applying the same theory to understanding SLA, 
which is one of the most complex, conscious human activities, may lack validity 
given the very different processes involved.  
2.2.6 The identity approach 
The identity approach to SLA began with Norton Peirce’s (1995a) argument that 
the relationship between language learners and the social world is not adequately 
conceptualised in SLA research. She later contended that describing the language 
learner as having a fixed, unitary personality and motivations, which are 
considered to be decisive factors for the success of language learning, is a 
misconception (Norton & Toohey, 2001). Drawing on the concept of subjectivity 
suggested by the feminist poststructuralist, Weedon (1997), the identity approach 
suggests an alternative meaning of the language learner identity as “how a person 
understands his or her relationship to the world, how that relationship is 
constructed across time and space, and how the person understands possibilities 
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for the future” (Norton, 2000, p. 5). Norton emphasises that the language learner’s 
identity can be understood only in terms of inter-relations with diverse people, 
and it is thus multiple and changeable at different times and contexts. Unequally 
distributed power between the learner and local people in the target language 
community, which is embedded in language use, crucially affects social 
interactions through which the learner’s identity is constructed (Norton, 2000; 
Norton & McKinny, 2011; Norton Peirce, 1995a).  
Identity research studies have found that there are always power struggles and 
identity negotiations at the site of language learning and use. Second language 
learners, when they participate in social activities with L1 users, often perceive 
themselves as humiliated, powerless, not-received (listened to) and not-allowed to 
speak (Day, 2002; Heller, 2006; Higgins, 2009; Pavlenko & Blackledge, 2004). 
Norton (2000) acknowledges the notion that communicative competence develops 
through meaningful language use. At the same time, she also stresses that since 
the unequal power struggles that the language learners often experience and their 
perceived understandings of themselves (their identities) greatly affect the 
development of communicative competence, they should be addressed in 
theorising the process of SLA.  
In addition to the central notion of the identity approach described above, the 
concepts of investment, imagined communities and imagined identities also 
constitute important part of this approach. Norton (2000) argues that what 
language learners expect from learning a language is more complex than a single-
minded desire to access the target language culture, as suggested by the 
conventional theories of integrative motivation. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept 
of cultural capital, Norton and McKinney (2011) propose that learners invest in 
the target language learning and their identity negotiation, expecting that “they 
will acquire a wider range of symbolic and material resources (cultural capital)” 
as “a good return on that investment” (p. 75). Unlike the idea of being motivated 
or demotivated, which entails a positive/negative dual sense, the concept of 
investment involves the learner’s voluntary choice of the extent to which to invest 
her time and effort in language learning. Once invested, the learner engages not 
only in the target language learning, but also in constant identity negotiation 
(Norton, 2000; Norton Peirce, 1995a & b).  
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While the concept of investment has always been part of the identity approach, the 
concepts of imagined communities and imagined identities started to appear only 
from 2001 (see Norton, 2001). The concept of imagined communities was 
originally by Anderson (1983/1991), which the identify approach has adapted to 
“refer to groups of people, not immediately tangible and accessible, with whom 
we connect through the power of the imagination (Norton & McKinney, 2011, p. 
76). An imagined community is not an unreal fantasy. Its members, however, 
most probably live at different times and spaces, “yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion” (p. 6). Then “a learner’s imagined community 
invited an imagined identity” (Norton, 2001, p. 166). Employing the notions of 
imagined communities and non-participation, taken from Wenger (1998), Norton 
(2001) reanalysed her previous research data from two studies – 1995 and 2000. 
Although her two participants made an effort to learn the target language in a 
class, they chose to be non-participants of their class communities, eventually 
withdrawing from them. Their efforts in language learning involved their 
investment, not in the immediate class community, but in their own imagined 
communities to which they believed they belonged. Their imagined communities 
in which they also imagined their own desired identities played an important role 
in their language learning.  
The notion of identity as the speaker’s own understanding of him/herself, which is 
largely reflected in the concepts of investment and imagined community, 
acknowledges the importance of enabling language speakers to have their own 
voices in SLA studies. However, careful consideration needs to be given to 
whether or not the poststructural conceptual framework of the identity approach 
according to which the speaker has fragmented and multiple identities actually 
represents a language learner’s own understanding of his/her identity. As the 
identity approach suggests, a person’s identity has multiple dimensions at 
different times and in different contexts. This is also discerned by the realist 
philosopher, Willard (2000. 2007) when he proposes that a person’s self (identity) 
has multiple parts and qualities, and develops and matures (both negatively and 
positively) through time. More importantly, however, he suggests that these parts 
and qualities of one’s self relate to each other and make up the whole, unitary 
being. Then the person can have the capacity to choose to live out the person that 
she desires to be. Furthermore, the poststructural idea of an individual’s 
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fragmented, multiple ideas has long been criticised in the field of psychology. For 
example, Parker (1998) points out that such a notion of identity has caused 
problems for understanding personal integrity. Burr (2003) and Willig (2008) also 
propose that a person’s life history or autobiography should be addressed when 
examining the sense of identity and self. That is, when a person negotiates her 
identity through a particular social interaction, it is not that a fragmented identity 
is created, but it is more likely to be that her whole being confronts social 
conflicts and power struggles, which results in the type of further identity 
development that Willard proposes.  
As Norton and McKinny themselves (2011) observe, different understandings of 
the speaker’s identity would result in different implications for SLA. In the 
present study, the issue of identity is not centrally examined. However, 
understanding the identity of the participants who are second language speakers of 
English is still very important. I value the participants’ first person perspectives, 
which the identity approach to SLA strives to embrace in researching second 
language learning. Therefore, while taking this view of the identity approach – 
one’s identity as a participant’s own understanding of herself from the first person 
perspective – my research aligns its stance with Willard’s phenomenological 
realistic position on identity as an a basis for understanding the participants of the 
study.  
2.2.7 The conversation-analytic approach (CA) 
Conversation analysis has been used by SLA researchers as a data analysis 
method to examine micro-level procedures and techniques for transcribing and 
analysing verbal conversations involving second language speakers (Nunan, 
1992). For example, in applying the general principles and themes of CA to the 
study of SLA, Markee (2005) suggests that CA, as a data analysis tool, helps to 
understand some SLA concepts, such as comprehensible input or output in terms 
of micro-level details. However, the conversation-analytic approach (hereafter CA) 
discussed here is not just a data analytic method but an approach to SLA with its 
own theoretical and methodological frameworks (Kasper & Wagner, 2011).  
CA has been particularly influenced by ethnomethodological sociology (Kasper & 
Wagner, 2011; Markee, 2005), and finds its origins from Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson’ work in the 1970s (Schegloff, Koshik, Jacoby, & Olsher, 2002). By its 
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nature, CA eschews being framed by “exogenous (i.e. externally imposed) 
theories” in expounding data analysis (Kasper & Wagner, 2011, p. 122), but it 
attempts to establish its own theoretical entity through meticulous, microanalytic 
illuminations. Markee (2005) states: 
[W]hen the same fragment of talk is retranscribed to yield an even more 
find-grained transcript of the interaction, not only do we develop a more 
detailed analysis of the organizational structure of the learning activity 
under study, but we also develop a deeper substantive understanding of the 
socially distributed nature of human cognition and SLA (p. 3).  
In addition, CA researchers try to make sure that data should be natural in a sense 
that they are not produced for the purpose of research. As data, they involve not 
only talk but also “other forms of conduct” occurring natural conversations, such 
as “the disposition of the body in gesture, posture, facial expression, and ongoing 
activities in the setting (Schegloff et al., 2002, p. 3). The two types of natural 
conversations that CA examines are ordinary, mundane conversation and 
institutional talk, an example of the latter being classroom interaction (Kasper & 
Wagner, 2011; Markee, 2005; Schegloff et al., 2002).  
Through detailed, micro-level examinations of naturally occurring conversations, 
CA researchers show that it is human nature to be able to achieve the orderliness 
of conversation, no matter if conversing in first or second language (Sacks, 
Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977; Schegloff et 
al., 2002). Scheloff et al. (2002, pp. 4-5) provide some examples of conversational 
orderliness, which are turn-taking, turn organisation for contribution, action 
formation, sequence organisation, the organisation of repair (or communication 
difficulty or breakdown), word/usage selection, recipient design and overall 
structural organisation of the occasion of interaction. The notion of the 
conversational orderliness has enabled CA researchers, such as Firth (1996) and 
Wagner (1996), to observe that competence in using language is not just as the 
“object of” learning, but perhaps more importantly, “fundamental condition for” it 
(Kasper & Wagner, 2011, p.119). That is, CA suggests that the competence 
related to second language learning should be understood in this “dual sense” 
(Kasper & Wagner, 2011, p. 118); on one hand, competence as an actual ability 
that enables language learners to participate in second language interactions more 
effectively; on the other hand, as potential capability that they strive to develop 
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more (Kasper & Wagner, 2011; Mori & Hasegawa, 2009). The central moments 
CA researchers seek to examine are as follows: 
 when second language speakers organise the order of talk with their own 
interactional competence (e.g., Lee, 2006);  
 when the development of their interactional competence emerge (e.g. Mori 
& Hasegawa, 2009); and, 
 when challenges and tensions in using and learning second language arise 
(e.g., Brouwer, 2003). 
In fact, by expanding this principled dual concept of competence, Firth and 
Wagner (1997/2007) challenged the notion of communicative competence as 
equating to the ideal, unproblematic competence of native speakers using their L1, 
which non-native speakers (NNSs) should aim to achieve. They try to go beyond 
the problematic concept of language learners as NNSs, and understand how they 
actually deal with and experience second language interactions in the context of 
learning or use the language (also see Section 2.1.2 for the context of NNS/NS 
discussion).  
However, despite these contributions made by the CA approach to SLA, some 
concerns about this approach arise, particularly in relation to their explanations of 
the cognition and identity of second language speakers. The CA view of cognition 
and identity has centrally taken up the philosophical belief of discursive 
psychology (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 2005; Potter, 2003), which is 
known as an extreme social constuctionism (Burr, 2003; Willig, 2008). Kasper 
and Wagner (2011) put it as follows: 
CA relocates cognition from its traditional habitat in the privacy of people’s 
minds to the arena of social interaction … Since socially shared cognition 
and learning are publicly displayed in interaction, they become available to 
researchers for analysis, obviating the need to construe hidden internal 
processes behind observable behaviour (pp. 120-121).  
The CA ontology of the language user expressed in the statement above is thus 
that the cognition of the language user dwells not in “the individual mind” but in 
“the public sphere of social life” (Kasper, 2009, p. 3). The CA approach basically 
shares the idea of human cognition as the outcome of social processes with the 
other social, cultural SLA approaches (see Kasper and Wagner, 2011), but its 
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perspective of cognition seems to be most radically social, in terms of its denial of 
the individuality and privateness of mental processes. Certainly, language users 
influence each other for what each of them cognises, and their thoughts and 
feelings can be displayed to a certain extent in the process of social interactions. 
Nevertheless, the radical CA assumption that each individual’s entire cognition 
can be socially shared is not plausible. Firstly, in general, people do not (and 
cannot) express everything that they think and feel, and what they say can be 
different from what they really think or feel. Then in essence, a person’s cognition 
is the act of the mind of the person (Husserl, 1970), which is unceasing regardless 
of whether or not he/she engages in social interactions. Thus, the mental state or 
process of the person that others can sense through observation would be only a 
small portion of his/her cognition unless the person willingly discloses more of 
his/her mental world.  
In addition, Kasper and Wagner’s (2011) proposal that identities “are not assumed 
to reside in a person but are interactionally produced, locally occasioned, and 
relationally constituted” and are “multiple, fluid, fragmented, and conflicting” (pp. 
121-122) also calls for a careful examination. This CA conception of identity 
converges with that of the identity approach reviewed in Section 2.2.6. However, 
CA understands identity of the language speaker in a more ahistorical way, stating 
that one’s identity is only locally relevant to “any given moment in their talk” (p. 
121). The central problem of the CA view of the language user’s identify is that, 
as Burr (2003) points out, “the humanistic self cannot be replaced by something 
that performs its explanatory function” (p. 180). That is, although people can be 
known in terms of their social roles, such as language learners or teachers, the 
integrated core being of each unique individual cannot be completely identified 
with certain social roles that they perform. In addition, the discursive concept of 
identity that CA draws on seems to fail to “address the questions about 
subjectivity – that is, our sense of self, including intentionality, self-awareness, 
and autobiographic memories” (Willig, 2008, p. 106).  
The discussion of the issues in the CA approach relating to the language user’s 
cognition and identity will be reflected in the methodological approach of the 
present study to examining the SLA of the participants.  
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Summary and implications of Section 2.2  
As stated in the overview of this chapter, the social, cultural SLA stream offers 
valuable insights to this study. Most of all, the researchers in this SLA school of 
thought emphasise the importance of researching SLA at macro-level (i.e., 
involving other forms of knowledge) rather than only at a micro-level of discrete 
grammar points or vocabulary items (Duff & Talmy, 2011; Johnson, 2004; 
Kramsch, 1993). As the emergentist approach emphasises, the process of SLA 
may be thus a much more complex process than cognitivism has theorised with its 
computer processing metaphors (Larsen-Freeman, 2007, 2011). Moreover, as the 
CA approach suggests, the concept of competence in relation to language learning 
and use is not just what the language user strives to achieve but also what enables 
her to engage in actual language learning and use (Kasper & Wagner, 2011; Lee, 
2006). Particularly, in relation to researching second language learning, as the 
identity approach proposes, the learner’s own perspective and understanding of 
language learning should be valued and embraced when examining their second 
language learning experiences (Norton & McKinny, 2011).  
Nevertheless, as argued throughout Section 2.2, this present study resists the 
social SLA researchers’ ontological perspectives of the mind, cognition and 
language and their epistemological assumption about the process of knowledge 
and language development. Therefore, while incorporating elements of what the 
approaches from the social, cultural SLA stream bring to the enterprise of 
researching second language learning, I will seek to establish an alternative 
conceptual framework for researching the SLA of the participants of the study 
from a realist perspective. This will be the focus of Chapter 3.  
2.3 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 reviewed the three theoretical approaches to the study of SLA in terms 
of implications of their philosophical backgrounds, theories of SLA, research 
framework and research findings. Each of these SLA streams provides valuable 
suggestions in understanding the experience of second language learning and use, 
but I also contended that there is a fundamental disagreement between their 
paradigms and that of the present study. In the following chapter, which aims to 
establish the conceptual framework of this present study, I discuss this issue more 
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extensively. In so doing, I explicate my philosophical, paradigmatic position that 
lays the foundation of this research.   
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3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING SLA IN 
KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT 
3.0 Overview  
In Chapter 2, I centrally sought to highlight and comment on the philosophical 
tenets of the three SLA streams as they relate to the nature of human beings and 
human language, tenets that underpin their theoretical approaches and research 
frameworks. I firstly challenged the idea of behaviourism in relation to the fact 
that it excludes the mental aspects of language learning, limiting the scope of 
research to what is physically observable. In addition, I also questioned the 
theoretical orientation of cognitivism that explains the complex process of SLA 
using computer metaphors that isolate the process from the development of other 
types of knowledge and from social cultural contexts. Then the social, cultural 
stream was more extensively and carefully reviewed. In so doing, I centrally 
argued that the axiomatic beliefs about the human nature of second language 
speakers shared by the different approaches of this research stream provide only 
limited understandings of the nature of SLA, despite the contributions that they 
have made to the field.  
Overall, from the critical review of the three SLA streams, the need to establish 
the basis for the philosophical position and theoretical underpinnings of the 
present study emerged. Therefore, Chapter 3 aims to:  
 provide an understanding of consciousness (the mind), cognition, thought, 
knowledge and language from a phenomenological realist perspective; and, 
 establish a theoretical framework for examining SLA occurring in 
developing and sharing academic knowledge: specifically, the participants’ 
SLA experiences throughout undertaking the literature review (LR).   
Section 3.1 is a review of Edmund Husserl’s (1970) investigations of knowledge, 
seeking to offer a realist ontology of the mind, cognition, knowledge and language 
and epistemology in accounting for how knowledge is generated and the role of 
language in this process. This involves discussing how Husserl’s clarifications of 
cognition, knowledge and language contrast with those of other SLA paradigms.  
In so doing, I intend to establish some general principles for investigating the SLA 
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of the participants of the present study in developing and communicating their 
academic knowledge.    
Section 3.2 firstly seeks to conceptualise the meaning of undertaking the LR. It 
then centrally reviews Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) concept of language learning 
through the negotiation of meaning and Bruce’s (2008a) theory of genre 
knowledge. The review in this section is to pave the way for considering some 
mechanisms of language learning and the possibility to expand the scope of SLA 
to involve both extra-linguistic and linguistic systemic resources in academic 
contexts. In addition, I deal with two more issues – competence in using a second 
language and the criticality of second language speakers of English.    
Finally, Section 3.3 concludes the chapter.  
3.1 Reconceptualising mind, cognition, knowledge and language: A 
review of Husserl’s theory of knowledge    
This section consists of six subsections. Section 3.1.1 presents the perspective 
from which I review Husserl’s theory of knowledge. Sections 3.1.2 to 3.1.4 
summarise his work in terms of the three developmental stages of his theory, 
revealing his emergent thinking on the mind, cognition and knowledge. Section 
3.1.5 then highlights the progressive nature of knowledge, which has been 
explicated throughout the three preceding subsections. Finally, Section 3.1.6 
discusses the role of language in the process of knowledge attainment.   
3.1.1 Phenomenological realist tradition  
Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1939) was a philosopher whose central concern was 
investigating the nature of human consciousness and knowledge. He is known as 
the founder of what is now called phenomenology (Inwood, 1999), and the 
principal ideas of his approach are presented in his masterwork, Logical 
Investigations (1900 – 1901) (Fisette, 2003).  
Husserl’s ontology of consciousness and knowledge has brought forth quite 
divergent interpretations from two different phenomenologist groups (B. Smith & 
Woodruff Smith, 1995). The first group of scholars base their ideas on the work of 
the German philosophers, Heidegger and Gadamer, “French phenomenologists, 
such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricour”, and the American philosopher, Aron 
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Gurwitsch (p. 37). They believe that the world is contingent on the perceptions of 
the mind, so “knowledge ultimately consists in just the evidential relations of 
corroboration among intuitive experience and higher levels of judgement” (p. 36). 
The second group consists of phenomenological realists, such as Adolf Reinach, 
Roman Ingarden, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Dallas Willard, Barry Smith, James P. 
Moreland and David Woodruff Smith. Their argument is that the world is 
independent of the mind, and thus “knowledge of it is a matter of “truth-making” 
relations between what is known and our judgement thereof” (p. 36). Particularly, 
against the general belief that Husserl became an idealist at his later work, Willard 
and Moreland argue that Husserl maintains his realist perspective throughout his 
career (Moreland, 1989; Willard, 2011).  
While the theoretical approach of the second group encompasses the potentiality 
that the knowledge of the known (the object) corresponds to the object, that of the 
first group precludes such a potentiality. In fact, there are parallels between the 
idea of the first group of phenomenologists and that of the social, cultural SLA 
researchers. My research draws on the realist work of the second group, 
particularly, that of Willard (1982, 1984, 1995 & 2003a & b), who has explored 
and interpreted Husserl’s theory of knowledge.  
In providing a theoretical basis for the present study, I centrally draw on the ideas 
that Husserl proposes in his work, Logical Investigation (translated by Findlay in 
1970), and I also refer to his following works:  
 Formal and Transcendental Logic (translated by Cairns in 1969); 
 Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (translated by Gibson 
in 1931); 
 The Idea of Phenomenology (translated by Alston & Nakhnikian, in 1964) 
 Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (translated by 
Willard in 1994);  
 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy (translated by Rojcewicz & Schuwer in 1989)  
3.1.2 The first stage  
Husserl’s first scholastic career was that of a mathematician. Consequently, his 
exploration of knowledge began from dealing with knowledge of abstractions that 
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do not involve authentic, concrete objects. Later he gradually realised that the 
clarification of knowledge should be of knowledge in general, and began to 
include the knowledge of authentic, concrete objects into his work (Willard, 1982, 
1995). For Husserl (1970), any entities that exist in the physical and mental 
worlds can be the objects of knowing, such as:  
 the parts, moments and wholes of things, processes, events, states of 
affairs; 
 the parts, moments and wholes of the mind, consciousness and cognition; 
 species or essences, such as laws of universal logic and moral laws; 
 ideal objects such as numbers or languages; and, 
 mental properties resulted by acts of judgements (i.e., concepts, theories 
propositions).  
At this stage, Husserl (1994) theorised knowledge by means of two concepts: 
representations and intuitions. Representations refer to “psychical experiences not 
including their objects themselves as immanent objects” – the objects that are 
perfectly intuited by the mind – and intuitions refer to “psychical experiences [that] 
really include those objects within themselves as their immanent contents” (p. 
154). As Willard (1995) notes, Husserl characterised representational thoughts as 
abstract, symbolic (including linguistic), merely intended and inauthentic, and 
intuited thoughts as concrete and authentic. At this early period of his work on 
knowledge, he considered that knowledge would become complete when 
representational thought was confirmed by, or satisfied with intuitional thought. 
However, this epistemological conception of Husserl’s led to important 
philosophical questions. Particularly, the ontology of the immanent object was 
problematic; although his intention appears to describe the cognitive capacity to 
have complete knowledge of the object with the concept of immanent object, it 
was not clear whether it refers to the object itself or a mental reflection of the 
object. Thus, the concept of the immanent object was rather keeping him from 
articulating his realist idea that knowledge can potentially be the actual knowing 
of the object as it is (Woodruff Smith & McIntyre, 1982).  
Nevertheless, from this early period, his realist idea of the relationship between 
language (a symbol) and thought (a concept) clearly differs from that of most of 
social constructivist scholars (including the social, cultural SLA researchers), who, 
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according to Willard (1984, p. xi), “quickly and comfortably assume that human 
consciousness is essentially linguistic” (see Section 2.2). Husserl’s notion in 
relation to subject matter knowledge clearly shows that he did not see human 
thought as fundamentally linguistic: 
[S]o perfectly and assuredly do [words and letters] surrogate for the 
concepts really intended, that in the majority of cases we do not notice the 
distinction between the two [i.e., words/letters and concepts], in spite of the 
huge gulf separating them. The signs and fragments of experiences stand in 
place of genuine concepts, but that they do so is unnoticed by us. (Husserl, 
1994, p. 31) 
That is, as Willard (1995) points out, “[o]ur thoughts when doing intellectual 
work consist almost totally of inauthentic representations” (p. 141). However, 
Husserl discerned that thoughts (concepts) are not the words themselves that 
encode them, but they are two separate entities. This ontological clarification of 
thought has a very important implication for the nature of knowledge: it indicates 
that the mind does not need to be constrained by language to cognise the object 
and produce thought although what is cognised can be linguistically expressed, so 
that it can know the object itself.  
3.1.3 The second stage 
The central advancement that Husserl achieved at the second stage of his 
theoretical development, which is considered to end with The Fifth Logical 
Investigation (1970, pp. 533-659), is an exposition of how it is possible for a 
person to go beyond language and their own consciousness, and reach the thing 
itself through the act of knowing. That is, Husserl intends to show that human 
beings are capable of knowing of, or conceptualising an object of knowledge 
exactly as it is. This idea of his amounts to the concept of the transcending quality 
of consciousness, which differs markedly from the approach that thinking or 
knowing always occurs through language and (thus) the operation of the mind and 
cognition is essentially only linguistic. The first step that Husserl (1970) took for 
this achievement is to remove the concept of the immanent object from the system 
of his theory of knowledge. He clearly states, “It will be well to avoid all talk of 
immanent objectivity” (p. 560)”. That is, it appears that, by realising that what is 
intuited or grasped in the mind is the object itself, he concluded that the concept 
of immanent object is unnecessary and even misleading.  
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The elimination of the concept of the immanent object enabled Husserl to develop 
two insights that are central to his theory of knowledge (Willard, 1995). Firstly, it 
led him to develop further the concept of intentionality, which then allowed him 
to explain why and how the human mind can go beyond language and conscious 
perceptions or experiences, reach the object and achieve the knowledge of the 
object itself (p. 147). According to Husserl (1931), the intentionality of 
consciousness (mind) is “the peculiarity of experiences ‘to be the consciousness of 
something’” (p. 204) and “expresses the fundamental property of consciousness” 
(p. 357). It is “often characterized as the “directedness” (aboutness or ofness) of 
consciousness” (Woodruff Smith & McIntyre, 1982, p. 1). That is, when one 
intends to know about a particular object, all the person’s acts of mind (both 
representations and intuitions) involved in that knowing are directed at the object. 
This directedness makes it possible that “consciousness reaches out [to the thing 
itself] beyond what is actually lived through” (Husserl, 1970, p. 701). Thus, 
knowing is not just an interaction between representational thoughts and intuitions 
(both of which are acts of the mind), but it essentially involves the object of 
knowing itself (Willard, 1995). This statement suggests that the process of 
knowing makes no distinction between the condition of knowing any object of 
thought whether it belongs to the physical world or the ideal world (e.g. abstract 
concepts or universal logic or moral laws) (p. 149).  
Another significant advancement that Husserl (1970) achieved through being free 
from the idea of the immanent object is that the object of knowing exists 
objectively and independently of the mind (p. 332). Thus, for example, if I try to 
comprehend Widdowson’s published concept of the negotiation of meaning as the 
object of my knowledge, I may have different understandings (representational 
thoughts) over time. Unless Widdowson himself changes the meaning of the 
concept, his originally intended meaning remains intact, existing separately as an 
independent property from my mind (and from his own mind as well). This 
separateness of the concept of negotiation of meaning as my object of knowing 
from my understandings of it allows me to keep comparing my understandings 
with the concept that Widdowson intended, by repeatedly returning to its 
definition given by him. In this way, it may (or may not) be possible that I 
understand the concept exactly as Widdowson intends at a certain point. The real 
implication of the clarification of the existence of the object of knowing 
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independent of the knower’s mind was not yet completely articulated at Husserl’s 
second stage (Willard, 1995). However, this understanding of the ontological 
relationship of the act and object of knowing provided the basis of the third stage 
of his analysis of knowledge.  
Husserl’s strict sense of knowing considerably differs from the social, cultural 
SLA researchers’ understanding of knowledge (see Section 2.2). Husserl’s notion 
of knowledge allows for contrasting concepts in relation to knowledge, such as 
misunderstanding /correct (precise) understanding or illusion/reality. On the other 
hand, the social, cultural approaches to SLA only look at the subjective, 
relativistic aspects of knowledge, not clarifying how such contrasting concepts 
can be incorporated into their notion. In addition, Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality of the mind provides the basis for resisting the ontological state of 
the mind that the social, cultural SLA researchers propose: that the mind is a 
social, cultural product. Intentionality, which allows one to get involved in the 
world, and perceive and know it, is the quality or property of the mind (Woodruff 
Smith & McIntyre, 1982). Thus, the idea that a person starts to make contact with 
other people and the world (which requires having intentionality) before the mind 
emerges from social interaction is insisting something impossible: instead, it 
appears to be much more plausible to consider that the mind exists prior to any 
social interactions and intentionally initiates engagements with the social world 
(Eccles, 1982, 1994; Nagel, 2012).  
3.1.4 The third stage 
Husserl’s central concern throughout the Sixth Investigation (1970, pp. 660-869), 
which is the third stage of his analysis of knowledge, is to address what he had 
grappled with since the First Investigation, that is, how “the objectivity of the 
content known” is possibly attained despite “the subjectivity of knowing” (p. 42). 
As Willard (1982) notes, Husserl’s realist perspective acknowledges the 
subjectivity of knowing. Willard states: 
Certain time-worn philosophical questions about knowledge arise from the 
fact that the experiences – cognitive and otherwise – of each person are a 
part of his and only his life, and exhibit characteristics peculiar to him alone. 
My present perception of that tree out of this window and from this chair is 
indelibly mine. It has features that in all probability will never be combined 
in just this way again…As a particular event it is non-repeatable even within 
my own life stream. (p. 380) 
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However, Husserl (1970) suggests that there are irrefutable conditions that allow 
one to know the intrinsic qualities of the object of knowledge as they are through 
his/her subjective act of knowing. These three conditions for knowledge are: 
 the transcending quality of the mind to perceive (intuit) the object of 
knowledge itself;  
 the laws of logic being independent of actual acts of knowing and directing 
thought interconnectedness in conformity with necessities and possibilities; 
and,  
 the intersubjectivity of communities within which knowledge is 
communally shared and validated/invalidated.  
Firstly, Husserl’s use of transcendence is to mean that the mind and thought of the 
knower can go beyond symbolic/cultural frames as well as his/her own mental 
representations, perceiving the object of knowledge itself. This is an idea that 
contrasts starkly with the Vygotskyan sociocultural epistemology that claims that 
the human mind must be mediated by symbolic tools to perceive and cognise the 
world (see Lantolf, 2000a). Husserl suggests that, by transcending, the knower 
can keep comparing the relationship and quality of the thoughts of the object 
produced in the act of knowing with those of the object itself, and amending 
his/her own mental representations to be closer to the object progressively. For 
Husserl, when the former finally corresponds with the latter, the knower 
experiences, in Husserl’s term, fulfilment with knowledge, the very state of 
“finding something to be as it is thought to be” (Willard, 1995, p. 138). Husserl’s 
idea of fulfilment with knowledge reflects his assertion of the credibility of human 
perceptions and memories in general (although they sometimes fail us, more often 
they are reliable). It also indicates his recognition of the capacity of the human 
consciousness for being aware of the fulfilled (or unfulfilled) state of one’s own 
knowledge.  
As Husserl (1970) had already propounded at the earlier stages, the transcendence 
of the mind is possible because of the fact that the object of knowledge 
objectively exists independently of the knower’s mind. At this state, he reconfirms 
this:  
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The object is intellectually grasped by the intellect, and especially by 
‘knowledge’ (itself a categorical function), but it is not thereby falsified [or 
changed]…Otherwise…relational and connective thought and knowledge 
would not be of what it is, but would be a falsifying transformation into 
something else. (pp. 819-820).    
Here it needs to be stated that the objectivity of knowledge that Husserl suggests 
from his realist perspective is distinguished from the positivist idea of objectivity, 
which Kukla (2006) refers to as aperspectival objectivity. She illustrates: 
[Historically there are] several strands of objectivity…Among these, facts or 
objects have ontological objectivity to the extent that they are real and 
independent of their appearance to us. Derivatively, a claim or judgement 
has ontological objectivity if it asserts such ontologically objective facts. 
Aperspectival objectivity, in contrast, attaches in the first instance neither to 
facts nor judgements, but to warrant. A claim has aperspectival objectivity 
to the extent that its warrant is independent of the contingencies of the 
claimant’s personal character and context. Aperspectival warrant is what is 
left over when the contingent self is forcibly exorcised from the epistemic 
scene. (pp. 80-81)  
Evidently, Husserl’s argument for the ontological objectivity of knowledge is not 
about the warrant declared by authorities (e.g., expert groups) but about the 
independence of the object of knowledge from the knower, and, thereby, the 
potentiality of the knower’s judgement. Upon this condition of the object of 
knowledge being objective, transcendence and then fulfilment with knowledge 
can possibly occur. In addition, truth (or falsity) and conditions of truth (or falsity) 
of propositions and concepts as complex, referential thoughts emerge from 
“agreement [or disagreement] between propositional meaning and the correlative 
state of affairs” (Willard, 1984, p. 189). Thus, for example, I confirm or 
disconfirm my thinking of a transparent glass door before me by actually checking 
whether or not there is a glass door. Husserl (1970) notes:  
What the [mere] intention means, but presents only in a more or less 
inauthentic and inadequate matter, the fulfilment – the act attaching itself to 
an intention, and offering it ‘fulness’ in the synthesis of fulfilment – sets 
directly before us, or at least more directly than the intention does. In 
fulfilment our experience is represented by the words: ‘This is the thing 
itself’. (p. 720)  
However, perceiving or intuiting the object of knowledge alone cannot be 
sufficient for knowledge (see Husserl, 1970, p. 725). This is because what is 
present “to us [can be] insufficiently conceptualized to be known” (Willard, 1995, 
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p. 143). Only when one understands the quality of the object and the relations of 
its parts by means of logical reasoning, and utilising and interlinking relevant 
concepts, the transcendence of his/her mind to the same object is likely to provide 
the person with fuller knowledge. For example, perceiving a crying child with his 
bleeding finger and pieces of broken glass next to him alone does not allow one to 
comprehend the situation unless the person infers that the child’s wounded finger 
would have been cut by one of the glass pieces. Such inference involves a number 
of concepts, such as “Broken glass can hurt people” or “Children cry when 
feeling pain”, and also causal relations between those concepts. In addition, 
transcendence is also not always a necessary condition for subject matter 
(scientific) knowledge. This is for the reason that following common senses, 
mathematical formulae or scientific methods can produce knowledge even if the 
objects of knowledge are not present to us (Husserl, 1970, p. 201). In those cases, 
such inauthentic means still need to be “analysed as to [whether or not] they 
produce true results, and thus transformed into genuinely logical techniques that 
provide knowledge” (Willard, 1995, p. 143).  
The second condition for knowledge, applying the laws of logic, is what is 
involved in conceptualising the object of knowledge through reasoning. In 
discussing this second condition, it is necessary to understand what is occurring in 
the process of conceptualising the known, through which thoughts are interrelated 
with each other. Husserl illustrates this process with the theory of wholes and 
parts that he began to develop after the Third Investigation (1970, pp. 435-489) 
(Willard, 1982, 1995 & 2003a). This theory is, in short, a clarification of how 
thoughts (the parts), such as concepts and propositions of the same object are 
interrelated with each other, getting integrated into the united whole, a piece of 
knowledge of the object. Husserl (1970) states: 
All perceiving and imagining is…a web of partial intentions, fused together 
in the unity of a single total intention. The correlate of this last intention is 
the thing, while the correlate of its partial intentions are the thing’s parts 
and aspects. Only in this way can we understand how consciousness reaches 
out beyond what it actually experience. It can so to say mean beyond itself, 
and its meaning can be fulfilled. (p. 701)  
Husserl (1970) also refers to the principle for interconnecting thoughts into a 
piece of knowledge (the whole) as founding or foundation (pp. 463-464, 581, 651 
& 817). That is, certain ideas are enacted after, or founded upon other ideas, the 
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whole process of which results in knowledge generation. The interrelations of 
thoughts of the same object in the process of knowing the object can be 
linguistically expressed. Husserl calls the linguistic expression of thoughts and 
thought relations as identification (naming the object in language), for the reason 
that they, “give to the object the character of a thing known” (Husserl, 1970, p. 
697), and the meanings bestowed to the object “tangibly adheres to its object” (p. 
688) (see Section 3.1.6 for a more review of identification).  
According to Husserl, only when the knower applies the laws of logic (or pure 
logic) to interrelating thoughts of the moments, parts and whole of the same object, 
can his/her understanding of the object become the knowledge of the object as it is. 
Husserl (1970) stresses, “The peculiar patterns of combination of the concepts, 
propositions and truths which form the idea unity…can of course only be called 
‘logical, in so far as they are instances falling under logic” (p. 186). Simons (1995) 
notes: 
[Husserl] wished to refute psychologism, the view that the laws of logic are 
descriptions of regularities in the way we think, which implies that different 
ways of thinking may embody distinct but equally acceptable logics. 
Husserl wishes instead to show there is a single logic which is objectively 
binding for all…the laws of logic are viewed as principles governing a 
timeless realm of abstract, or to use the term Husserl preferred, ideal 
meanings. (pp. 106-107) 
The most central nature of logic is, therefore, that it is not what one experientially 
or culturally learns, but what belongs to universal, a priori knowledge, or to the 
lawfulness of essences (Husserl, 1970, p. 446 & p. 833). Explicating the a priori 
nature of laws of logic, Willard (2003b) states that “[t]hey would remain true if no 
minds existed” (p. 73). He further states: 
Those laws do not tell you how you have to think, but they certainly tell you 
how you can think if you would think coherently and consistently. They 
cannot force you by an unconscious power to follow…a course of thought 
that will only let you go from truth to more truth, but anyone who 
consciously chooses to follow such a course of actual thought can be sure 
they are doing so by subjecting their thinking to the patterns laid out by the 
laws of formal logic. (p. 75) 
One may or may not think in accordance with the laws of logic that “dictate 
relevant necessities and possibilities” for concepts, propositions and interrelating 
thoughts (Willard, 1982, p. 396). Consequently, the person can or cannot obtain 
 55 
 
true knowledge of the object. The laws of logic also allow one to examine 
whether his/her own or others’ knowledge is valid or invalid.  
Husserl’s realist view of logic evidently contrasts with the cultural (linguistic) 
relativist assumption that logic is socio-culturally derived and produces culturally 
relative knowledge and truths (e.g., Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Hill & 
Mannheim, 1992; Hyland, 2005; M. Johnson, 1987; Kaplan, 1972, 1987; Kramsch, 
2004). Rather, his overall concept of laws of logic suggests how the human mind 
in specific cultural contexts can follow rigorous, coherent logic in interconnecting 
thoughts, eventually generating knowledge the truthfulness of which is valid 
across time and space. In this regard, Woodruff Smith (2003) clearly states, 
“Where today’s logicians take a theory to be a set of sentences in a well-defined 
language, Husserl took the theory to be the system of propositions expressed by 
such a set of sentences” (p. 30). The definition and description of logic provided 
by Geisler and Brooks (1990) is compatible with Husserl’s notion of logic. 
According to them, logic is ordering thoughts in a way to “come to correct 
conclusions by understanding implications and the mistakes people often make in 
thinking” (p. 13). They also note that there are a number of different kinds of logic, 
“but the basic laws of logic are the same for all logic…Aristotle [whose logic has 
passed onto Western culture] didn’t invent logic; he only helped to discover it” (p. 
14). 
Finally, Husserl’s third element of objective knowledge is the intersubjectivity (a 
state in which the cognitions of different individuals converge onto the same 
object of knowledge) of the knower’s community. In a particular community “a 
harmonious exchange of experiences” (1989, p. 85) or intersubjectivity takes 
place. This enables the community members to share knowledge and “verify [each 
other’s] memory, check [each other’s] inference, evaluate [each other’s] 
hypothesis” (Willard, 1982, p. 381). Thus, for Husserl, intersubjectivity is a way 
of achieving the objectivity by means of crosschecking the validity of the 
knowledge of an object, which is possible because the object exists objectively 
and (thus) independently of those involved in that knowledge validation. This 
intersubjectivity that Husserl proposes has a subtle, but clear difference from the 
aperspectival objectivity that Kukla (2006) identifies, which claims that a certain 
piece of knowledge holds the objective truth because it is the knowledge of a 
certain authoritative group of people.  
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Intersubjectivity as the third condition of objectivity of knowledge requires 
clarifying what elements of knowledge can be shared by many people. As 
previously mentioned in this section, a person’s perception or experience of a 
particular object at a particular moment cannot be repeated or shared with 
anybody else, so it still remains unique and subjective (Husserl, 1931, p. 105). 
What can be intersubjectively shared among community members and make 
knowledge objective are universalities or abstract essences embedded in particular 
objects at particular moments (Moreland, 1989), which are often cognised and 
expressed as general concepts, propositions and theories. With reference to this, 
Willard (1982) notes that “what can be repeated and shared on Husserl’s view are 
of course the ‘significational species’ or essences that enter into cognitive 
experiences as their intentional qualities or determinations” (p. 396).  
The combination of the three conditions for the objectivity of knowledge – the 
transcending quality of the mind, the laws of logic and the intersubjectivity of 
epistemological communities – is what makes knowledge possible. In this regard, 
an approach which claims that knowledge is a merely shared belief co-constructed 
by people through language in a particular cultural community and thus there are 
only culturally relative truths, seems to “threaten to undermine the very possibility 
of knowledge itself” (Willard, 1982, p. 380). Particularly, if cognition or 
knowledge “is a linguistic affair” (Husserl, 1970, p. 158), “[t]ruth and existence is 
relativized (in various ways) to human language” (Willard, p. 1984, p. 192). 
Willard also states: 
Husserl supposes…that knowledge is ultimately a matter of seeing objects 
and events and Ideas – including those involved in knowing itself – to be the 
way they are in themselves, not as they are in relation to a mind or a 
language or a culture or a form of life. The seeing referred to need not, 
moreover, be in any sense linguistic. For him, if there is no insight into the 
way things are there is no knowledge. (p. 192) 
Just being co-constructed by people in the same culture does not guarantee a piece 
of information to be knowledge. History clearly teaches us that numerous notions 
and ideas that were co-constructed and once believed as knowledge by a number 
of people or even by a whole society turned out to be false knowledge. It is often 
found that religious cult groups or even terrorist groups, which are practically 
cultural communities or communities of practice, co-develop illusions and believe 
them as truthful knowledge of the world. If defining knowledge as just shared 
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meanings co-constructed by people in a particular cultural community, the ground 
to discern rightly whether pieces of information, such as the ones above, are 
true/false, good/evil or real/unreal would be lost.  
3.1.5 Graduated nature of knowing 
Husserl (1970) acknowledges that pure fulfilment or completely full knowledge is 
a rare phenomenon (p. 831), no matter if we “assure ourselves that we could do so 
if we wished” (Willard, 1995, p. 153). As Husserl (1970) cautions, there are “too 
many false and even absurd recognitions”, which are often mistaken as real 
fulfilments, because false knowledge “borrows its character of fulfilment from the 
authentic case” (p. 727). In this regard, Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) 
point out that partial and superficial knowing does not result in adequate 
knowledge of the person or thing of knowing. Willard (1995) suggests this type of 
“lowest level of fulfilment” even if it is not always false knowledge, provides 
“only an abstract descriptive knowledge of objects that does not reveal their 
identity” (pp. 154-155).  
Husserl (1970) thus emphasises that, even in the case in which the knower 
achieves a full knowledge of an object, such fulfilment with knowledge is usually 
progressive. That is, it is a continual process of “serial fulfilments”, through 
which a level-higher fulfilment is arrived at after lower-level fulfilments (and each 
level of fulfilment involves syntheses of sub-fulfilments as well) (pp. 735-736). 
An important point here is, however, not to measure the degree of fulfilment of 
knowledge that one gains, but to understand how the graduated nature of 
knowledge is possible. Knowledge is not merely “the consensual belief of an 
epistemic community” (van Dijk, 2003, p. 85), or something linguistically 
constructed through social interactions in the way that the postmodern social 
constructivist insists (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Rather knowledge involves the 
actual object of knowing itself, which essentially allows one to make a gradual 
progress of his/her knowledge over time.  
In Section 3.2.2, I consider how second language learning would take place in the 
context of the progressive development of academic knowledge, drawing on 
Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) concept of language learning through the negotiation 
of meaning.  
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3.1.6 The nature of language and its function for knowledge acquisition and 
communication  
This section highlights Husserl’s notion of language in his theory of knowledge, 
which I will relate to explaining the SLA of the participants of this present study. 
Language or the philosophy of language was not Husserl’s main concern: his 
description of language is “mainly to support his conception of logic”, a condition 
for knowledge (Simons, 1995, p. 106). Nevertheless, he is regarded as one of the 
philosophers who exerted considerable influence on the modern philosophy of 
language, particularly on speech act theory (Burkhardt, 1990).  
For Husserl, language is a formal property that itself is one of objects of 
knowledge (see Section 3.1.2). As a number of scholars after him also propose 
(e.g., Halliday, 1973; Searle, 1969, 2002; Widdowson, 1983), he discerned that 
language has two functions – to mean and to communicate (Simons, 1995). 
However, unlike the common emphasis on its function to communicate, Husserl 
considers the function to mean is the more fundamental aspect of language. This 
is expressed in his definition of language as “a system of signs by means of which, 
in contrast to signs of other sorts, an expressing of thoughts comes to pass” (1969, 
p. 20). He also states, “[W]hen we live in the understanding of a word, it 
expresses something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not” 
(1970, pp. 278-279).  
Another significant feature in Husserl’s notion of language is his ontological view 
that thought and language are two separate systems or entities in the mind, which 
I mentioned in the previous sections. He puts it: 
[T]hinking – a word the sense of which must be gathered from the often-
used combination…language and thinking…has an enormously broad 
sense[,]…the whole of man’s psychic life: For indeed it is often said also 
that …in language man expresses his psychic life…But here we must be 
more cautious. Actually man does not “express” all his psychic life in 
language; nor is he ever able to do so…[T]he word “expressing” [implies] 
that, with every word and every combination of words…the speaker means 
something. Stated more precisely…the speaker’s practical intention is 
obviously not directed ultimately to the mere words, but is directed “through” 
them to their signification. The words carry significative intentions; they 
serve as bridge leading over to the significations, to what the speaker means 
“by” them. (1969, p. 22)  
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The ontological separateness of thought and language that Husserl describes 
above is well articulated by Moreland (2012): 
A proposition [thought] is the content of a sentence. For example, It is 
raining and Es regnet are two different sentences that express the same 
proposition. A sentence is a linguistic object consisting in a sense-
perceptible string of marking formed according to a culturally arbitrary set 
of syntactical rules, a grammatically well-formed string of spoken or written 
scratchings/sounds. Sentences are true just in case they express a true 
proposition or content. (p. 20) 
The ontology and function of language in relation to thought that Husserl 
proposes amounts to its role in the acts of identifying and (thus) objectifying the 
object of knowledge in the process of knowing mentioned in Section 3.1.4. The 
act of identification is linguistically expressing thoughts and thought relations that 
bestow meanings to the objects of knowledge. In addition, B. Smith (1990) 
summarises Husserl’s notion of the function of language in terms of the relating 
objectifying acts and the objects of knowing: 
Husserl’s theory of language and of linguistic meaning is based on this 
theory of objectifying acts…Husserl argues, be objectifying acts: the acts 
whose species are linguistic meanings are in every case acts of 
“representation” or “object fixing”… More precisely: all expressions are 
associated either with nominal acts – which are directed towards objects in 
the narrower sense – or with acts of judgement – which are directed towards 
states of affairs (p. 35).  
Thus, the acts of identification and objectification in knowing involve both 
nominal acts and acts of judgement, or propositional acts, which produce names 
and sentences respectively (Simons, 1995). In addition, since the object of 
knowledge is often not just an isolated thing (object) or state of affairs but “whole 
manifolds of correlated objects and states”, the outcomes of identification can be 
even interrelated sentences (discourse), up to forming of a theory (p. 134) (also 
see Husserl, 1969).  
Linguistically expressed knowledge can be shared by many people, and because 
of that the language used to express (mean) knowledge also fulfils another 
function of language – the communicative function. For Husserl, This occurs 
when the utterance of a speaker “intimates to the hearer a fact about the mental 
acts of the utterer which the hearer understands” (Simons, 1995, p. 109). The use 
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of language emerging from Husserl’s theory of knowledge can be found mainly in 
relation to three cognitive acts, which are: 
 to identify and objectify the object of knowledge by expressing extra-
linguistic concepts or propositions relating to the same object; 
 (in particular) to express thoughts or ideas for the purpose of sharing 
knowledge with others; and,  
 to understand others’ thoughts in knowledge linguistically expressed in 
forms of words, sentences or theories (i.e., when the object of knowledge 
is linguistically encoded knowledge of others).  
Crucially, for Husserl, since logic is a key condition for knowledge, the soundness 
and meaningfulness of language (text) that expresses knowledge can be achieved 
when logic is applied to the thoughts and thought-relations consisting of the 
knowledge (Simons, 1995). For example, as pointed out in Moreland’s (2012) 
quotation above, sentences are linguistically encoded propositional thoughts and 
thus related sentences are related thoughts. Then it is a universal phenomenon that 
people assign two-value semantics (Willard, 1984) or interpropositional relations, 
such as Simple Contrast or Condition-Consequence (Crombie, 1985). For Husserl, 
assigning semantic relations itself does not bestow meaningfulness and soundness 
to language, but it is only possible when logic governs thought-relations that are 
expressed as sentence relations (Willard, 1984).     
Husserl’s realist notion of language in knowledge, which involves the function of 
logic in language use, is not of using a particular language but of general 
principles that can be applied to using different languages in attaining and 
demonstrating knowledge. In Section 3.2.3, I will initially consider how Husserl’s 
notion of language would be relevant to English-medium academic contexts. Then 
Chapter 6 will discuss this issue more extensively based on the findings of the 
study.    
Summary and implications of Section 3.1 
Section 3.1 reviewed Husserl’s theory of knowledge, specifically in relation to the 
nature of the mind, cognition, knowledge and language, in order to establish the 
basis for investigating SLA in conjunction with the development of academic 
knowledge. Since the need for the study has arisen from dissatisfaction with the 
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three paradigms in the study of SLA, considering these theoretical elements has 
been imperative.  
Husserl’s exposition of the mind and cognition fundamentally challenges the 
notion that the mind and cognition are the products of social, cultural processes. 
The concept of intentionality, a core quality of the mind, suggests that the very 
existence of the mind and cognition prior to any social interactions is what 
enables human beings to engage in social interactions. In addition, Husserl’s 
notion of knowledge plainly differs from the idea in the study of SLA, which 
claims that knowledge is socially co-constructed through the use of language. He 
acknowledges that knowledge occurs in a specific epistemological culture or 
context, and reflects the structure or pattern of the social cognition of the culture 
(1970, pp 185-186). He also states the important role of language in knowledge 
attainment and communication. However, he further claims that developed 
knowledge, which is valid and truthful beyond the particular epistemological 
culture, can be obtained when the three conditions of the objectivity of knowledge 
– transcending quality of the mind, the universal laws of logic and communities – 
are met.  
Based on this understanding of how knowledge is formed, and what the nature of 
knowledge is, the use of language in relation to the act of knowing has been 
derived. Most centrally, language is used in the process of knowing to identify 
and objectify the object of knowledge through expressing thoughts of the same 
object and the interrelationship between such thoughts and their expression. This 
language use reflects the function of language to mean, which is, according to 
Husserl, more fundamental than its function to communicate. Nevertheless, the 
need for using language for a communicative function also arises, when the 
knower intends to share his/her linguistically encoded knowledge with others, 
who intend to understand such knowledge.  
In the light of Husserl’s theory of knowledge and language, Section 3.2 will 
centrally review theories and concepts that account for the mechanism of the 
language acquisition, and the structure and operation of extra-linguistic and 
linguistic knowledge in English-medium academic contexts. 
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3.2 Theories, concepts and issues in examining SLA in English-medium 
academic contexts 
This section reviews theories, concepts and issues relevant to investigating SLA in 
an English-medium academic context from the phenomenological realist 
perspective established in Section 3.1.  
Section 3.2.1 reviews the literature on undertaking the literature review (LR) for a 
research project, which suggests that it is a process of developing academic 
knowledge and demonstrating it. Then Section 3.2.2 reviews Widdowson’s theory 
of second language learning through the process of the negotiation of meaning, 
and relates it to a Husserlian perspective of the gradual progress of knowledge. 
The following Section 3.2.3 reviews Bruce’s (2008a) theory of genre knowledge 
that clarifies the elements and operations of extra-linguistic and linguistic 
resources required to comprehend and create texts in English-medium academic 
contexts, discussing the process and scope of SLA in the contexts. In the section, I 
also briefly discuss the possible connection between academic genre knowledge in 
English-medium academic contexts and Husserl’s (1970) notion of operating 
logic in language use. In the next two sections, Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, I review 
issues relating to the language user’s competence and criticality of second 
language speakers of English.  
3.2.1 Undertaking the LR for a research project 
Various definitions of the term literature review suggest that it is demonstrating 
knowledge relevant to a research project for which one carries it out. For example, 
some of the LR state that it is: 
[what gives] a picture of the state of knowledge and of major questions in 
your topic area (Bell, 2005, p. 110) 
an important chapter in the thesis, where its purpose is to provide the 
background to and justification for the research undertaken (C. Bruce, 1994, 
p. 218) 
a written summary of journal articles, books, and other documents that 
describes the past and current state of information on the topic of your 
research study (Creswell, 2012, p. 80) 
[what] extracts and synthesises the main points, issues, findings and 
research methods which emerge from a critical review of the readings 
(Nunan, 1992, p. 217) 
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a coherent argument that leads to the description of a proposed study 
(Rudestam & Newton, 2001, p. 57) 
In addition, Paltridge and Starfield (2007) suggest that the LR aims to 
“contextualize the student’s research” through describing and synthesizing “the 
major issues related to the topic of the research” (p. 99). That is, as a final product, 
the LR centrally demonstrates the researcher’s knowledge of the previous 
literature on his/her particular subject area relevant to her research topic.  
While the definitions of the LR provided above emphasise its final outcome, some 
LR guidance books considers that undertaking the LR involves the process of 
knowledge development that must occur before knowledge demonstration. For 
example, Ridley (2008) notes that the undertaking of the LR is “to engage with, 
understand and respond to “the relevant body of knowledge underpinning [one’s] 
research” and to show “you have engaged with, understood and responded to such 
knowledge (p. 2). Similarly, Hart (1998) also states: 
[A] review of the literature is important because without it you will not 
acquire an understanding of your topic, of what has already been done on it, 
how it has been researched, what the key issues are…you will be expected 
to show that …you have understood the main theories in the subject 
area…The review is therefore a part of your academic development – of 
becoming an expert in the field. (p. 1 – emphasis added) 
Therefore, in all, undertaking the LR is a process of developing a body of 
knowledge in a particular subject field relating to the research topic that the 
researcher investigates, and demonstrating the knowledge to others. Particularly, 
for PhD research projects, the LR is expected to produce an outcome that involves 
“the presentation and use of the literature [in a way] that scholarliness is clearly 
apparent” (Holbrook, 2007, p. 1021). 
A concept that is relevant to the LR as a process of developing knowledge to 
undertake a research project is that of textual experience. Textual experience 
refers to indirect experiences that gained from “books, lectures, lessons, 
conversations, etc.” (Rosen, 1998, p. 30), enabling the resaercher to expand 
his/her “interpretative repertoire” (Cousin, 2010, p. 15). Cousin adds: 
We might not have experienced [what we need to know about our research] 
personally but…we can immerse ourselves in the scholarship to expand 
what we are alert to in our own assumptions and those of others …We also 
enter the research terrain with theoretical perspectives and ideas about what 
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to look for on the basis of our textual experience. If that experience is 
limited, we will limit both the questions we ask and the responses we hear. 
(p. 15)  
Thus, the concept of gaining textual experiences to prepare for subsequent 
research fieldwork is in effect integral to the process of doing the LR, as a result 
of which one can “formulate research questions… identify relevant theories…and 
methodology”, and later have insight to understand her data (Ridley, 2008, p. 3). 
Significantly, the concept also suggests expanding the concept of undertaking the 
LR from having “a written dialogue with [other] researchers” (p. 2) to engaging in 
both written and spoken interactions with people in academic contexts, in the 
process of developing knowledge (textual experience) for the research project. For 
example, to develop knowledge while undertaking the LR in a research project, 
the researcher not only engages in the central activity of reading relevant literature. 
He/she also engages in diverse social interactions, such as conversations with 
supervisors, email exchanges with authors, and asking questions at academic 
functions.   
3.2.2 Widdowson’s theory of language learning through the negotiation of 
meaning 
This section reviews Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) theory of language learning 
through negotiating meaning embedded in text, to understand how second 
language would be acquired in the process of undertaking an LR as 
conceptualised in Section 3.2.1.  
The term negotiation of meaning has been widely used by SLA researchers to 
refer to a particular conversational exchange or strategy that interlocutors 
undertake to prevent and repair communication breakdowns (see Ellis & 
Barkhuizen, 2005, pp. 166-170). However, Widdowson uses the same term much 
more broadly, stating that “language use can be regarded as “essentially a matter 
of the negotiation of meaning” (1990, p. 105). He (2007) puts it: 
For communication is always a matter of negotiating some kind of common 
agreement between the parties in an interaction. The first-person party, the 
sender (P1), formulates a message by drawing on systemic and schematic 
knowledge and the second-person party, the receiver (P2), brings similar 
knowledge to bear in interpretation. Communication is effective to the 
extent that there is some convergence between the two. (p. 54) 
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Thus, the negotiation of meaning that Widdowson conceptualises is not just a 
certain strategy that deals with problematic situations occasionally emerging 
during conversation. Instead, it refers to the person’s overall intention to 
communicate what he/she means or to understand what others mean, and also all 
cognitive acting to achieve the intention. This negotiation of meaning basically 
involves both message producer (P1) and message receiver (P2), and their mutual 
effort to exchange meaning. However, in relation to language learning, 
Widdowson mainly focuses on P2’s mental processing occurring while engaging 
the negotiation of meaning, and knowledge elements that P2 draws on for this 
processing. This mental processing and knowledge elements involved in the 
process of negotiation of meaning are already indicated in his statement above, 
and in what follows I review them more carefully.  
Firstly, Widdowson suggests schemata (schematic knowledge) and linguistic 
systems (systemic knowledge) as two types of knowledge that P2 utilises to 
negotiate meaning embedded in P1’s spoken or written text. Schematic 
knowledge refers to the knowledge of P2 that he/she considers as relevant to the 
meaning intended by P1, while systemic knowledge means linguistic resources 
necessary to decode the meaning. With the term schemata, Widdowson refers to 
both the schemata of the content of the meaning and the schemata that I wish to 
call as procedural schemata although he himself did not use this term. He instead 
introduces two types of schemata, namely ideational schemata or frame of 
reference and interpersonal schemata (1983, 1990 & 2007), both of which may be 
considered as procedural schemata. Ideational schemata are drawn on when 
engaging in a non-reciprocal negotiation of meaning embedded in a written text 
to identify the overall flow or organisation of the text. On the other hand, 
interpersonal schemata are activated when P2 undertakes a reciprocal negotiation 
of meaning while having an interactional conversation which allows him/her to 
anticipate the overall procedure of the conversation (1990).  
Secondly, for Widdowson (1983), P2’s perceptual cycle occurs between his/her 
schematic knowledge and the meaning that P1 intends to communicate during the 
process of the negotiation of meaning. Figure 3.1 represents this perceptual cycle. 
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Figure 3.1: P2's perceptual cycle during the negotiation of meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (Widdowson, 1983, p. 66). Reprinted with permission.  
Through the perceptual cycle, P2 “is directed to explore phenomena by a 
particular schema. This exploration leads to a sampling of information, which in 
turn modifies the schema which activated this ‘perceptual cycle’ in the first place” 
(p. 65). Thus, through the perceptual cycle, the initial content schema that P2 has 
drawn on becomes his/her actual knowledge of the meaning embedded in P1’s 
text. Realism in Widdowson’s concept of the negotiation of meaning has been 
recognised (e.g., Price, 1999), and to a large extent, this notion of having a 
perceptual cycle for negotiating meaning can be seen as a specific case of 
Husserl’s notion of knowledge attainment in general, in which the object of 
knowledge is the meaning intended by the other person. Particularly, the idea of 
schema modification through the perceptual cycle has a close resemblance to the 
gradual progress of developing knowledge in Husserl’s sense, which is to “have a 
sequence of representations of the same object…up to the point where, ideally, the 
object is completely given as it is thought of” (Willard, 1995, p. 146).  
Widdowson’s notion of language learning through the negotiation of meaning 
centrally involves the perceptual cycle outlined above. As described in his 
aforementioned statement, Widdowson contends that the key for successful 
meaning communication is the convergence between P1’s and P2’s own schemata 
(both content and procedural) and systemic knowledge. Thus, when P1 and P2 
share the common procedural and linguistic resources, from P2’s point of view, 
negotiating (understanding) the meaning that P1 intends is likely to be achieved 
successfully. According to Widdowson (1983) himself and many other scholars 
(e.g., Bruce, 2008a; Hyland, 2005, 2009; Swales, 1990, 2004), within a particular 
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culture or community, or even a particular subculture of a culture, the members 
share conventionalised procedural patterns and linguistic resources for 
communication. Therefore, if P2 happens to be a new member of a particular 
community who does not have enough knowledge of the procedural and systemic 
resources of the community, the undertaking of the negotiation of meaning can be 
a driving force to learn these resources. In this regard, Widdowson notes: 
Schematic knowledge, then, is a necessary source of reference in use 
whereby linguistic symbols are converted into indices in the process of 
interpretation. But we should note, too, that language development itself, the 
acquisition of knowledge of symbolic meanings, is activated by the need to 
extend schematic knowledge so as to cope more effectively with the social 
environment...we need to identify areas of schematic knowledge which the 
learners will accept as independently relevant and worth acquiring so that 
the learning of the language is seen as the necessary means to a desired end. 
(1990, p. 103)  
Here two important points need to be made. Firstly, Widdowson’s notion of 
language learning through the negotiation of meaning implies that language 
learning involves not only the acquisition of linguistic systems, but equally 
importantly the acquisition of procedural knowledge or schemata of a particular 
community. This idea is more specified in Section 3.2.3 following while 
reviewing Bruce’s (2008a) theory of genre knowledge. Secondly, according to 
Widdowson (1990), language learning through the negotiation of meaning 
naturally occurs in the context of the first language acquisition. However, he 
stresses that, in the case of negotiating the meaning embedded in a second 
language text, the negotiation may not automatically guarantee language learning. 
This is mainly for the reason that P2 is likely to activate his/her first language 
resources to understand meaning encoded by the second language, rather than 
solely depending on the second language sources encoding the meaning. Thus, for 
the sake of second language acquisition, the meaning negotiation should be 
accompanied by the person’s intentional effort to use the procedural and linguistic 
resources of the second language for the negotiation:  
The internalization of the system as a communicative resource is only likely 
to happen …when there is a recurrent association of new schematic 
knowledge with new systemic knowledge. Such a state of affairs is normal 
in first language acquisition, where there is a concurrent discovery of 
language and the world, as I suggested earlier. But the focusing of form as a 
condition for comprehension, will usually have to be artificially induced by 
some contrivance or other in a foreign language situation (p. 112).   
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Thus, again, what Widdowson proposes here is that, to achieve second language 
learning, it is important for the person to make a purposeful and deliberate effort 
to utilise the procedural and systemic resources that encode the meaning as the 
main means by which he/she understands the meaning.  
Here I wish to contrast Widdowson’s notions about language learning with those 
of social, cultural SLA researchers, to articulate his suggestion of how language is 
learned. For example, language development through the type of meaning 
negotiation that Widdowson proposes differs from the language learning process 
that the SCT approach suggests, in which the knowledge of language is co-
constructed “on the inter-psychological plane” prior to being internalised into “the 
intra-psychological plane” (Lantolf & Thorne, 2006, p. 153). Instead, for 
Widdowson, language learning centrally involves the voluntary, cognising effort 
and processing of the language learner’s mind while engaging in spoken and 
written texts. In addition, his notion of language learning through the negotiation 
of meaning presupposes that the meaning intended by P1 can be (and should be) 
precisely transmitted to P2. On the other hand, social, cultural SLA researchers 
undermine the value of this concept of meaning transmission from P1 to P2 as if it 
treats P2 as an passive actor, also arguing that precise meaning transfer from one 
person to the other is not possible (e.g., Donato, 1994; Duranti, 1986; Jacoby & 
Ochs, 1995; Kramsch, 2000, 2004; Lantolf, 1996; Littleton & Whitelock, 2005; 
Prior, 1998). However, any interpretation of meaning without an accurate 
understanding of it would possibly result in communication breakdown or a 
certain degree of miscommunication. In such a situation, the function of the 
language encoding the meaning might be misunderstood and subsequently 
learning new features of the language would rather be hampered (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.3 for a more in-depth discussion of issues in the linguistic relativist 
view). 
Moreover, it would be necessary to mention that, although this study accords with  
Widdowson’s overall notion of language learning, it diverges from his argument 
that implies that the rhetorical conventions of a particular culture regulate the 
thought (content) of people in that culture (1983, 1990 & 2007). Instead, for 
several reasons, I rather argue that a person’s thought, although framed by 
language and culture to a certain extent, also moves beyond cultural/linguistic 
frames. Firstly, here it is proposed that people’s ways of thinking are centrally 
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related to their worldviews and epistemologies, which are higher level 
frameworks than the rhetorical schemata of their local cultures. Thus, within a 
particular culture or subculture, such as an academic subject field, people who 
share the same rhetorical conventions display different ways of thinking based on 
their own worldviews (Hyland, 2009). Secondly, communication (the negotiation 
of meaning) between P1 and P2 is possible not just because they are in the same 
context within a particular culture (Kramsch, 2004). It is also achieved because, in 
their own minds, P1 and P2 instantiate abstract concepts used in the 
communication with real events or things beyond the immediate context and even 
beyond the culture (Willard, 1982). In addition, learning procedural and linguistic 
knowledge of a second language through the negotiation of meaning that 
Widdowson suggests would appear to be possible because the language learner 
can transcend his/her existing procedural schemata framed by his/her first 
language and culture. In fact, my last two points above, which Widdowson did not 
involve in his theory of language learning while emphasising the aspect that a 
person’s thought is framed by cultural schemata, may need to be considered when 
understanding SLA through the negotiation of meaning.  
I will draw on the review of Widdowson’s notions of language learning through 
the negotiation of meaning in this section when discussing the SLA of the 
participants in relation to their striving to comprehend the target literature in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1.   
3.2.3 Knowledge areas involved in using and learning academic English and 
their operations: Bruce’s theory of genre knowledge 
The previous Section 3.2.2 initially discussed that learning the language of a 
particular culture involves learning both extra-linguistic procedural schemata and 
linguistic systems of the language. This section reviews Bruce’s (2008a & b, 2011) 
theory of genre knowledge, to consider the areas of knowledge and their co-
operation involved in language learning and use when the cultural milieu of a 
language is an English-medium academic context.   
In his theory of genre knowledge, Bruce (2008a) is centrally concerned with the 
clarification of how extra-linguistic and linguistic elements of knowledge are 
operationalized in creating text in English-medium academic contexts. He 
suggests that language use in the contexts centrally involves creating text “that is 
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both linguistically accurate and socially appropriate” by integrating “a wide range 
of different types of knowledge” (p. 1). He argues:  
[O]ne of the crucial issues in many of the theories for classifying discourse 
(such as in terms of genres or text types) is the nature of the relationships 
between extra-linguistic knowledge and linguistic knowledge. Some have 
found it convenient to focus solely on linguistic knowledge around a social 
genre construct, thus avoiding many issues associated with joint models that 
combine linguistic, cognitive and social knowledge within a framework for 
rhetorical organization. (p. 83) 
The significance of his argument is that it provides a basis for reconsidering the 
scope of language learning from solely looking at the acquisition of linguistic 
knowledge to examining both extra-linguistic and linguistic resources essential for 
successful language use in academic contexts. In addition to this, Bruce’s 
argument above also intends to contrast his genre knowledge model particularly 
with the systemic functional approach that the language socialisation (LS) 
approach has drawn on to underpin their perspective of the function of language 
(see Section 2.2.4). He points out, “[I]n the case of the systemic functional 
approach, the lexico-grammatical characteristics tend to be regarded as genre-
defining” (p. 35), an approach that echoes the social constructivist notion that 
linguistic knowledge defines extra-linguistic knowledge or thoughts. With such 
concerns, he proposes the hierarchical relation and operation between extra-
linguistic and linguistic knowledge in creating socially appropriate academic text 
with the concepts of social genre (hereafter SG) and cognitive genre (hereafter 
CG) knowledge. Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship between extra-linguistic 
and linguistic knowledge and its operation occurring when a person “create[s] a 
whole extended written text” (Bruce, 2008a, p. 94), involving the concepts of SG 
and CG.  
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Figure 3.2: The relationship between extra-linguistic and linguistic knowledge 
and its operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (Bruce, 2008a, p. 95). Reprinted with permission.  
According to Bruce (2008b), SGs are “socially recognized constructs according to 
which the whole texts (or conventionally recognized sections of texts, such as 
Methods sections in research articles) are classified in terms of their overall 
purpose and function” (p. 39). Academic text has been identified with other 
constructs such as genre (e.g., Swales, 1990), or discourse types (Virtanen, 1992), 
and particularly Bruce’s construct of social genre is intended to articulate the 
socially conventionalised aspect of academic text. The key notion of his genre 
knowledge theory is that the linguistic realisation of the content of academic 
knowledge by means of types of SG is mediated by thought- or text-organising 
cognitive patterns. The concept of CG refers to such cognitive patterns, for the 
reason that these patterns are those of extra-linguistic psychological processing 
occurring while creating academic texts. Bruce (2008b) defines CGs as “the 
overall cognitive orientation and internal organization of a segment of writing that 
realizes a single, more general rhetorical purpose to represent one type of 
information within discourse (p. 39). He states that “whole texts realizing 
different social genres (such as scientific reports) typically combine and frame a 
range of cognitive genres” (2008b, p. 140). Through his research He has identified 
four different types of CG that frequently appear in academic texts, namely: 
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 report – the presentation of data or information that is essentially non-
sequential 
 explanation – the presentation of information with the orientation on 
means   
 discussion – a focus on the organization of data in relation to (possible) 
outcomes / conclusions / choices  
 recount – presentation of data or information that is essentially sequential 
or chronological (p. 96) 
Bruce (2008b) identifies four different levels of organisational knowledge of CGs 
(from higher to lower), which are image schemata (M. Johnson, 1987), discourse 
patterns (Hoey, 2001), cognitive processes (Crombie, 1987) and interpropositional 
relations (Crombie, 1985). Particularly, at the lowest and most specific level of 
the model, interpropositional relations creating binary values, such as Condition – 
Consequence, are salient for different CGs to be a coherent rhetorical unit. These 
relations between propositions are claimed to reflect universal human conceptual 
processes across different languages and cultures, although the linguistic encoding 
and realisation of such relations is culturally specific and unique (Crombie, 1985). 
Table 3.1 provides Bruce’s (2008a, p. 97) CG model with the definitions of 
semantic relations between two value propositions from Crombie (1985, pp. 18-
26).
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Table 3.1: Cognitive genre model 
Cognitive 
genre 
Rhetorical 
purpose 
Image 
Schemata 
Discourse 
patterns 
Cognitive 
processes Interpropostional relations or Semantic relations between propositions 
Report 
Presentation of 
information that 
is essentially 
non-sequential 
WHOLE-
PART; UP-
DOWN 
General-
Particular 
(Preview-
Details) 
Associative 
Amplification: This relation involves explicit or implicit repetition of the propositional 
content of one member of the relation in the other member, together with a non-
contrastive addition to that propositional content 
Bonding: This is a not-elective, not-sequential relation between conjoined or 
juxtaposed propositions 
Explanation 
Presentation of 
information 
with a focus on 
means by which 
something is 
achieved 
SOURCE, 
PATH, 
GOAL; LINK
General-
Particular 
(Preview-
Details) 
Logico-
deductive; 
Temero-
contigual 
Means-Purpose: In this relation, the purpose member outlines the action that 
is/was/will be undertaken with the intention of achieving a particular result 
Means-Result: The means member states how a particular result was/will be or can be 
achieved 
Discussion 
Focus on the 
organization of 
data in relation 
to possible 
outcomes, 
conclusions or 
choices 
CONTAINER
; LINK 
General-
Particular 
(Generalisation-
Examples); 
Matching 
Relations; 
Problem-
Solution 
Logico-
deductive 
Simple Contrast: The is a relation involving the comparison of two things, events or 
abstraction in terms of some particular in respect of which they are different 
Contrastive Alternation: This relation involves a choice between antitheses. Where two 
things, events or abstractions are involved, they are treated as being in opposition 
Bonding    
Reason-Result  
Grounds-Conclusion: A deduction is drawn on the basis of some observation 
Concession-Contra-expectation: In this relation, the truth of an inference is directly or 
indirectly denied 
Recount 
Presentation of 
data that is 
essentially 
chronological  
SOURCE, 
PATH, GOAL
Problem-
Solution 
Tempero-
contigual 
Chronological Sequence: The relation of Chronological Sequence provides the 
semantic link between event propositions one of which follows the other in time. These 
events, which need not be in the past, may be long or short in duration 
 Sources (Bruce, 2008a, p. 97; Crombie, 1985, pp. 18-2)
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In addition, the knowledge of CGs also regulates the use and learning of the 
knowledge of linguistic systems necessary to utilise to incorporate prototypical 
CGs and thus eventually appropriate SGs into academic writing, such as: 
 textual grammar – the use of items of grammar and syntax as integrated 
features of a text (2011, p. 84) 
 metadiscourse – the means by which propositional content is made 
coherent, intelligible and persuasive to a particular audience (Hyland, 
2005, p. 39), which is related to writer stance, an element of social genre 
knowledge (2008a, 2011) 
 vocabulary knowledge – vocabulary items that are relevant to academic 
writing (2011, pp. 96- 98) 
According to Bruce (2008a, 2011), native speakers of English are likely to have 
implicit knowledge of the SGs and CGs recognised and employed in English-
medium academic contexts arising from their prior knowledge and experiences of 
texts. However, second language speakers of the language, particularly novice 
writers may not have developed this type of academic English genre knowledge. 
Therefore, following his suggestion, some important points can be made in 
considering SLA in an English-medium academic context. First, SLA in the 
context involves learning both SG and CG knowledge as well as linguistic 
systems. Second, the hierarchical cooperation between CG knowledge and the 
knowledge of linguistic systems in creating text may have some impacts on how 
academic English is learned by second language speakers of the language.  
Here an important matter that needs to be discussed is the relation between genre 
conventions, particularly CGs and universal laws of logic that Husserl (1970) 
proposes (see Sections 3.1.4 & 3.1.6). This is for the reason that both CGs and 
laws of logic are suggested as extra-linguistic systems that one can apply to 
interrelating thoughts and then to the textual realisation of such interrelated 
thoughts. One evident distinction between the two is that while the four academic 
CGs that Bruce has identified are prototypical patterns particularly within the 
English-medium academic context, the logic that Husserl proposes is the absolute 
principle applied across different contexts. A potential issue is that most genre 
theorists would not agree with this distinction between CGs and logic, because 
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they take the cultural relativist position and suggest that there is logic of English 
language and this logic is part of English rhetoric (e.g., Hyland, 2005; Kaplan, 
1972, 1987). However, when taking Husserl’s realist position, it would be 
possible to consider academic CGs and laws of logic as two separate normalities 
or regularities that people need to incorporate into structuring thought and text in 
the English-medium academic context.  
The review of Bruce’s theory of genre knowledge in this section will be applied to 
discussing the findings of the present study in two aspects. Firstly, I will relate his 
notion of the hierarchical operation of extra-linguistic and linguistic knowledge, 
which is congruent with Husserl’s notion of thought-language relation, to 
explaining the SLA of the participants occurring when producing text. Secondly, I 
will also employ his concepts of SG and CG as a framework for considering in 
what ways developing extra-linguistic elements of academic English competence 
is important (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4 & Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3). In doing so, I 
will further examine the issue raised immediately above: the possible autonomy of 
logic from the discoursal conventions of English as a particular language.   
3.2.4 Competence in learning and using language in academic contexts 
This section reviews Widdowson’s (1983) concept of the language user’s capacity 
and Bruce’s (2008a, 2011) clarification of discourse competence in order to 
develop a framework for understanding the competence in using and learning 
academic English in relation to developing academic knowledge.  
Firstly, Widdowson (1983) introduces the concept of the language user’s capacity, 
seeking to overcome a problematic issue of Hyme’s (1972) concept of 
communicative competence that he perceived. When Chomsky first used the term 
of competence, the concept that Chomsky intended was not a speaker’s actual 
ability to use language, but the underlying grammatical knowledge as an innate 
linguistic disposition. Later, proposing the concept of communicative competence, 
Hymes (1972) sought to account for the actual ability to use language with the 
construct of competence. That is, as Widdowson (1989) notes, Chomsky regards 
competence as a potential quality, while Hymes sees it as actual capabilities 
involving both knowledge of language and ability for using it. In relation to this 
concern with the speaker’s knowledge and ability for actual linguistic 
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performance, Widdowson (1983) himself as well as other scholars (see Brown, 
2007; Lightbown & Spada, 2006) have acknowledged the significant contribution 
of the concept of communicative competence to studying second language 
teaching and learning.  
Nevertheless, Widdowson (1983) argues that the concept of communicative 
competence still retains the “analytic character” that Chomsky’s competence 
problematically has, as “it refers to an analyst’s construct and not a user’s” (p. 23). 
He suggests that its four parameters (possibility, feasibility, appropriateness and 
actualising ability in real performance) are intended to describe “a person’s ability 
to make judgements about the extent to which a linguistic expression conforms to 
pre-existing norms for language activity” (p. 24). As a response to this issue of the 
analytic character of Hymes’ concept of competence, Widdowson (1983) 
suggested that the notion of capacity is the knowledge of and ability to use 
systemic (i.e. rhetorical and linguistic) resources in meaningful and creative ways.  
After his 1983 book, he did not use the term of capacity anymore. Instead, he 
appears to use his concept of capacity to refer to the language user’s competence. 
For Widdowson, therefore, the language user’s competence is being able to utilise 
schematic and systemic knowledge in the negotiation of meaning “whereby 
schematic knowledge is recurrently projected and modified” (p. 67) (see Section 
3.2.3). As outlined in Section 3.2.2, Widdowson (1983, 1990) considers that the 
undertaking of the negotiation of meaning leads the language user to acquire new 
systemic knowledge, and thus his/her competence “is a principle of both language 
use and language acquisition” (p. 67). That is, the language user’s competence 
should be understood not just as an ideal objective to achieve but as actual 
capability to acquire more systemic resources through exploiting current systemic 
knowledge.   
In addition, Bruce (2008a, 2011) has drawn on the concept of discourse 
competence from a number of different models of communicative competence, 
such as those developed by Bachman (1990), Canale (1983), Canale and Swain 
(1980), Celce-Murcia, Dörnyei, and Thurrell (1995). Along with Celce-Murcia et 
al. (1995), Bruce (2008a) argues that discourse competence is the most central 
element of communicative competence. Particularly he proposes discourse 
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competence as the competence essentially required in using language to carry out 
academic tasks. He states: 
Common to the concept of discourse competence…is the idea that it relates 
to the appropriate arrangement of both content information and language in 
order to create extended spoken and written discourse. …[I]t is a central 
component of communicative competence in a language and…it involves a 
number of elements, often grouped under terms such as cohesion and 
coherence, reference, rhetorical organization, all of which relate to creating 
or interpreting connected, functioning, extended units of language. (p. 4) 
As reviewed in Section 3.2.3, with the concept of cognitive genre (CG), Bruce 
suggests that using language in academic contexts involves not only systemic 
knowledge but also the knowledge of thought-structuring or ideas-organising 
rhetorical patterns. Discourse competence is thus knowledge of both areas and the 
ability to use them in creating and comprehending extended academic text or 
discourse.  
Therefore, competence in a language in an academic context can be considered as 
being able to use rhetorical/systemic knowledge to interpret extended academic 
discourse, through which the user acquires extra-linguistic knowledge as well as 
new rhetorical and linguistic resources. It also centrally involves the ability to 
create “extended prose that is both accurate and appropriate” (Bruce, 2008a, p. 2), 
in order to communicate one’s own knowledge. After the social turn (Block, 
2003), the language user’s competence, as is the case with other mental properties, 
tends to be understood not as “individual, intrapsychological property” but what 
exists within interpersonal relations and processes (Kasper & Wagner, 2011, p. 
118). However, as seen thus far, the language user’s competence that Widdowson 
(1983) and Bruce (2008a) suggest, and this present study employs is a mental 
property of individual cognitive striving and processing accountable for the 
behaviour of engaging with social communications.  
The overall concept of the language user’s competence in academic contexts that 
this section suggested will be discussed in Chapter 6, in relation to explaining the 
academic English competence of the participants of the study.    
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3.2.5 Issues in critical thinking of second language speakers of English   
Critical thinking or criticality is emphasised as one of the most important qualities 
in developing and demonstrating knowledge through reviewing the literature (e.g., 
Creswell, 2012; Feak & Swales, 2009; Hart, 1998; Holbrook, 2007; Kwan, 2005; 
Paltridge & Starfield, 2007; Ridley, 2008). This final section of Section 3.2 briefly 
discusses issues relating to criticality of second language speakers of English to 
provide a framework for discussing the relevancy of critical thinking to SLA in 
English-medium academic contexts.  
A number of scholars have suggested that there is no clear, commonly accepted 
definition of the concept of critical thinking (e.g., Atkinson, 1997; R. H. Johnson, 
1992; Jones, 2005; Moore, 2011; Ridley, 2008; Tian & Low, 2011). For example, 
Ridley (2008) notes, in undertaking the LR, “it is not always straightforward to 
articulate what is meant by ‘being critical’” (p. 117). Nevertheless, there are 
certainly overlapping ideas about critical thinking; such as, it is accountable for 
making evaluative, rational judgements of things, states of affairs or arguments, 
and attaching values to them (Davidson, 1998).  
Controversy over whether or not second language users find critical thinking to be 
difficult was initiated by Atkinson (1997), who argues for the position of critical 
thinking as culture-specific practice. Underpinned by the Vygotskyan 
cultural/linguistic relativism (see Section 2.2.3 for a review of this particular 
epistemology), he suggests that criticality is a non-overt virtue and practice, which 
is embedded in the English language of individualistic Western middle-class 
culture. In this line of thinking, he argues that non-Western second language 
speakers of English tend to have difficulty, not just in expressing critical thinking, 
but also in thinking critically itself. He then proposes that this group of second 
speakers of English thus need to learn critical thinking as apprentices of English 
teachers (probably Westerners, considering his overall argument in the article). 
This notion of Atkinson that critical thinking is challenging for some second 
language speakers of English seems to be accepted by some scholars in applied 
linguistics (e.g., Paltridge & Starfield, 2007).  
However, the claim that second language speakers of English are not so critical 
due to their cultural backgrounds can be challenged in the light of some notions 
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concerning critical thinking. Firstly, the assumption that critical thinking is the 
preserve of Western culture has been questioned. For example, Davidson (1998) 
and Tian and Low (2011) point out that there is no clear evidence that criticality is 
a product of the individualism of Western culture while being incompatible with 
collectivism. Interestingly enough, the way that Japanese mothers discipline their 
children, which Atkinson (1997, p 80) illustrates to show that criticality is 
discouraged in collective Japanese culture, seems to rather indicate that these 
mothers critically evaluate their children’s behaviour based on their collectivist 
value. In addition, Paton (2005) and Kumaravadivelu (2003) point out that in the 
history of other cultures, such as China and India, patterns of scientific and 
philosophical thinking are found which are considerably similar to those of 
critical thinking. Thus, they suggest that criticality may be not just an asset of the 
Western mind but also that of any cultures. Such a suggestion echoes in Benesch 
(1999), Davidson (1998) and Gieve (1998), particularly Benesch’s argument that 
critical thinking “is a powerful tool for dissent across cultures and classes” (p. 
576). Moreover, from their research studies or teaching experiences, Jones (2005), 
Paton (2005) and Kumaravadivelu (2003) found that when subject content 
knowledge is limited, not only English second language speaking students but 
equally first language speaking ones were not successfully critical. Then they 
concluded that contextual rather than cultural elements more crucially influence 
critical thinking ability of L2 speakers (as well as L1 speakers) of English.  
The issues relating to the criticality of second language speakers of English will 
be examined against the findings of the study (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3), which I 
will draw on for discussing the relation between SLA and critical thinking in 
English medium academic contexts (Chapter 6).   
Summary and implications of Section 3.2 
Section 3.2 sought to establish theoretical bases for investigating the SLA of the 
participants of the present study. Section 3.2.1 defined the undertaking of the LR 
as gaining textual experiences, through which the researcher develops his/her 
academic knowledge and language required to undertake his/her research project. 
Then Section 3.2.2 reviewed Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) concept of language 
learning through the negotiation of meaning encoded in text as a framework for 
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understanding SLA occurring while comprehending academic texts. The 
following Section 3.2.3 reviewed Bruce’s (2008 a & b, 2011) theory of genre 
knowledge that informs the areas of knowledge and their operations involved in 
language learning and use in English medium academic contexts. The review was 
intended to establish a framework for identifying the types of knowledge one may 
develop through the process of acquiring academic English and understanding 
SLA occurring while composing academic texts. Lastly, Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 
reviewed the literature relevant to discuss the language user’s competence and the 
relation between critical thinking and SLA in the same contexts.  
3.3 Conclusion 
In Chapter 3, I sought to establish the research paradigm and the theoretical bases, 
with which I understand data and identify critical issues while discussing the 
findings of the study. The central focus of this chapter has been on anticipating 
how the nature of the participants of the study as second language speakers and 
that of their SLA would be explained from the phenomenological realist 
perspective. Since very little SLA research seems to be underpinned by the 
particular philosophical orientation, the chapter sought to describe its ontology 
and epistemology at length. In addition, I reviewed concepts and issues related to 
SLA in academic contexts involving the discussions of some concerns in 
incorporating them into the conceptual framework of the study.     
The review and discussion of this chapter will be reflected in presenting the 
findings in Chapter 5 to a certain extent, and then will be substantially drawn on 
while discussing them in Chapter 6.  
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4 METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Overview 
This chapter reports on the methodology of this study, the purpose of which is to 
explore the SLA of eight PhD students occurring while they were undertaking the 
literature review (the LR) in English as a second language during their first six-
month conditional enrolment period. Section 4.1 presents the research questions. 
In Section 4.2, I briefly restate the phenomenological realist paradigm of this 
research discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to expressing the principles for my 
methodological choices and practices. Section 4.3 introduces Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (hereafter IPA), which this study employed as the 
methodological framework. There I firstly describe the theoretical aspects of IPA, 
and discuss how I used the methodology in accordance with my research 
paradigm. Section 4.4 then reports the actual undertaking of the field research, 
including an overview of the research context and description of the data 
collection and analysis procedures. Finally, Section 4.5 discusses the quality of 
the study and then Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.   
4.1 Research questions 
The overall research question is: 
What is the nature of the second language acquisition (SLA) of eight PhD 
students while undertaking the literature review (LR) in English, their 
second language, during the period of preparing the research proposal at a 
New Zealand university? 
The four subsidiary questions are:  
1. What are the central cognitive dispositions and processes that 
characterise the participants’ approaches to developing academic 
knowledge while undertaking the LR?  
2. To what extent is the SLA of the participants understood in relation to 
their cognitive dispositions and processes characterised in reviewing the 
target literature and research planning?  
 
 
82 
 
3. To what extent is the involvement of the participants’ communities 
facilitative of their SLA? 
4. In what ways is the use of prototypical thought-structuring patters 
important and (thus) is indicated as part of academic English competence?  
4.2 Research paradigm  
I stated in Chapter 1 that this present study is based on phenomenological realism 
as the research paradigm. Then in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, I reviewed Husserl’s 
clarification of the human mind, cognition and knowledge through which the 
realist perspective was manifested. This section articulates the realist principles 
that I exercised throughout the research processes including those of data 
collection and analysis.     
The first paradigmatic principle that I have applied to my methodological 
approach is the ontological and epistemological relationship between the knower 
(the researcher) and the object of knowledge (the object of enquiry) that Husserl 
(1970) proposes. Specifically, I consider the object of this study – the participants’ 
SLA experience – exists objectively and independently of me, the researcher, and 
thus it is not changed or transformed by my act of researching. Therefore, the 
findings of the study are considered as what I as the researcher found out or 
uncovered, rather than what the participants and I co-constructed by means of 
language use. Secondly, in the process of performing the research I have sought to 
meet the three conditions of knowledge that Husserl suggests – transcending 
towards the object of knowing, applying logic, and achieving intersubjectivity 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4). I have sought to actualise these three conditions 
chiefly by means of iteratively returning to the data, sufficient conceptualisation 
of their SLA involving theoretical knowledge and reasoning deductively, and 
ensuring that my understanding is checked by others, centrally by my supervisors. 
(The discussion of the extent to which this study has met the three conditions of 
knowledge is presented in Section 4.5 in terms of considering its validity and 
quality.) In addition, the decisions for choosing the methodology of the study and 
applying it in a critical way have been made with reference to both the 
paradigmatic principles stated above and to the nature of the research object, the 
nature of the SLA of the participants.  
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In Section 4.3 following, I review the theoretical background and principles of 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (hereafter IPA) and discuss how this 
study has used it.  
4.3 Application of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) 
This section presents a review of IPA, and then discusses the directions and 
decisions made in the course of applying the methodology to the present study.  
4.3.1 Overview of IPA 
4.3.1.1 Philosophical and theoretical backgrounds 
IPA is a qualitative methodology “concerned with the detailed examination of 
personal lived experience, the meaning of experience to participants and how 
participants make sense of that experience” (Smith, 2011b, p. 9). It was first 
introduced to the field of medical psychology in the middle 1990s (Smith, 1996). 
Since then it has quite rapidly formed its own philosophical and theoretical 
orientations, data collection and analysis procedures, and scheme of structuring 
reporting papers (Smith et al., 2009). IPA, as indicated in its name, seeks to 
inherit the traditions of both phenomenology, the study of experience, and 
hermeneutics, the study of interpretation, drawing on thinkers from the two fields, 
such as Husserl, Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. The ontology 
and epistemology of IPA is manifested in its concept of the double hermeneutics. 
This concept refers to an overall situation in which the participants engage in their 
cognitive acts (experiences/understandings of the world), of which the researcher 
undertakes his/her own interpretative analysis (Smith, 2004). Thus, IPA is 
claimed to share “a broadly realist ontology” (Reid, Flowers, & Larkin, 2005, p. 
21), which considers what is being researched as independent of the cognition 
(mind) of the researcher, and is found or uncovered by him/her.  
According to Willlig (2008), any methodological choices and approaches can be 
considered as case studies when the research object is a particular case. In this 
regard, IPA, by looking at particular individuals’ experiences, to some extent 
assumes the nature of case study. The ‘cases’ in IPA are the experiences of a 
single individual or a group of people who shared similar experiences (Smith et al., 
2009). Specifically, an IPA study can be thus considered as a type of 
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psychological case study that explores individuals’ mind-sets governing their 
behaviours, learning processes, memories and cognitive structures (Merriam, 
1998, pp. 36-37) rather than that of anthropological and sociological cases studies, 
the focus of which is on “society and culture” and “social relations and the roles 
played by individuals in society” (Hood, 2009, p. 67). 
IPA contrasts itself with descriptive phenomenology (hereafter DP) as well as the 
postmodernist and social constructivist (constructionist) approaches. Firstly, IPA 
questions the DP approach supressing “all past knowledge (both lay or everyday 
knowledge as well as expert knowledge and theories) about the phenomenon 
under investigation”, in order to understand the experience of the participant as it 
is (Willig, 2008, p. 55). Rather, IPA encourages the researcher to incorporate 
his/her theoretical knowledge in examining the participants’ accounts. The 
researcher’s knowledge sometimes allows her or him to see some deeper 
meanings of the experience of the participant that the participant himself/herself 
may not be aware of, although the knowledge used for interpretation should be 
relevant to the themes inductively emerging from data (Smith et al., 2009).  
IPA also distinguishes itself from the postmodernist and social constructionist 
approaches, which appear not to incorporate sufficiently authorship and authority 
of the participant in accounting for his/her own experience. For example, Smith et 
al. state (2009): 
Readers will notice that this [an IPA perspective] opens up a very different 
position to the interpretative stances which are offered by post-modern 
literary theory (where the author is typically either irrelevant or inaccessible) 
and by the social constructionist strand of qualitative psychology (where 
analysis focuses on the effects of the language used by a person, rather than 
on the meanings of that language for the person herself). (pp. 22-23) 
That is, IPA argues against the postmodern idea that only credits the researcher’s 
subjective interpretation while not fully acknowledging the meanings intended by 
the participant herself/himself or his/her actual experience. It also contends 
against the social constructionist consideration that the experience of the 
participant is constructed through language use between the participant and 
researcher. These two notions are in fact considerably different from the 
perspective of IPA that the researcher (reader) can access the experience of the 
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participant (the author) manifested through the participant’s own accounts (texts) 
(Smith, 2004).  
4.3.1.2 Principles of IPA 
The three theoretical principles of IPA are phenomenology – valuing the 
participants’ own perspective in researching their experiences, idiography – 
focusing on the particular, and double hermeneutics – the researcher’s 
interpretative approaches to the participants’ own accounts of their experience.  
Firstly, following Husserl’ s phenomenology, IPA values the participants’ own 
perspectives on their experiences. It aims to examine carefully personal 
experience “from the point of view of those who experience them” (Willig, 2008, 
p. 66). Experience is always experience of something. IPA looks at this as 
experience “of particular moment or significance to the person”, which is the 
totality and unity of meaning- and sense-making cognitive acts (Smith et al., 2009, 
p. 33). That is, as a phenomenological approach, IPA is concerned with how the 
person binds and integrates discrete elements of perceptions, memories, 
judgements, assumptions, and beliefs of something into one unified, meaningful 
experience (Husserl, 1970). The IPA researcher does not treat individuals as 
isolated beings, considering that they are situated in particular social, cultural 
circumstances. However, IPA does not seek to identify social, cultural factors that 
influence the experience of the participant, but to understand how individual 
participant respond to these social cultural factors (Smith et al., 2009).  
As regards the second point, focusing on the particular, IPA is essentially 
committed to examine closely the unique, particular experience of each individual 
participant, from which themes that respond to the research question(s) emerge. In 
order to achieve this, it stresses the importance of careful, close, line-by-line 
examinations of data and considerably detailed and elaborated reports that 
uncover the subtlety and nuances of different single cases (Eatough & Smith, 
2008). It therefore contrasts with the practice of nomothetics, the outcome of 
which consists of numbers and statistics that do not allow one to trace back to the 
personal, unique experiences of the original informants of data (Smith et al., 
2009).  
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The emphasis of IPA on the uniqueness of the experience of each individual 
participant is not to dismiss the universality realised in such unique, individual 
experience (Smith et al., 2009). Rather IPA takes the insight of Warnock (1987) 
that the universal human nature can be understood rightly through a meticulous 
examination of individual cases. Similarly, it also draws on the notion of 
Schleiermacher (1998) “that everyone carries a minimum of everyone else within 
themself” (pp. 92-93), and proposes that “the insightful case study may take us 
into the universal because it touches on what it is to be human at its most essential” 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 38). This IPA notion of the universality in particularity is 
the basis for justifying the identification of communal themes and patterns across 
different participants (Eatough & Smith, 2008). In addition, it also gives rise to 
suggesting the possibility of applying the implication of a research study to wider 
populations (Smith, 2004). However, IPA cautions the danger of hasty, careless 
claims of the generalizability of a case study without considering specific social, 
cultural contexts (Smith & Osborn, 2003).  
Thirdly, it was mentioned previously in this section that IPA is in the line of the 
interpretative (i.e., hermeneutic) tradition rather than the descriptive one within 
phenomenology (Smith et al, 2009). This is implied in the concept of double 
hermeneutics that indicates that the IPA researcher eventually achieves his/her 
knowledge or understanding of the experience of the participants accounted for 
from their own first person perspective. The two tenets of interpretation that IPA 
suggests are as follows.  
First, it is acknowledged that data analysis is, by nature, an interpretive process 
into which the researcher reflects his/her own theoretical knowledge and life 
experiences as the analytic framework (Smith, 2004). However, IPA argues 
against using the conceptual framework in a deductive manner to classify data 
into pre-identified themes or categories (Smith et al, 2009). The researcher should 
not allow her “fore-conception to be presented to [him/her] by fancies and popular 
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out the 
fore-structure in terms of the things themselves” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 195). Thus, 
the researcher engages with data inductively, seeking to understand the meanings 
of the accounts, but the understood meanings involve the researcher’s theoretical 
and experiential knowledge (Smith, 2007). This essentially requires the researcher 
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to undertake the hermeneutic turn between theories and data iteratively as the 
process of data analysis (Smith et al, 2009). Such an inductive as well as 
interpretative approach to data leads the researcher’s knowledge to be reshaped by 
the data, possibly arriving at a new “theoretical formulation and hypothesis” 
(Willig, 2008, p. 75).  
Secondly, IPA seeks to consider the intentions of the participants when analysing 
their accounts. In this regard, it diverges from Gadamer, one of the 
phenomenologists that IPA centrally draws on (Smith et al., 2009). In particular, 
IPA is opposed to the idea that “when reading a text we are not concerned with 
the intention of the author” (Smith, 2007, p. 4). According to Smith et al. (2009), 
Gadamer is concerned with text that was written “in a previous historical age”, but 
“[t]he texts examined by IPA researchers are usually contemporary”, and thus 
through the analysis the researchers can, and should understand the intention of 
“the person providing the account” (p. 37). Meanwhile, since the IPA researchers 
are also informed by theoretical knowledge, it is possible for them to have “an 
understanding of the utterer [participant] better than he understands himself” 
(Schleiermacher, 1998, p. 266).  
4.3.2 Interviewing method and data analysis in IPA 
In general, “the interview is often seen as a core method in qualitative research, 
where the focus is on the nature of experience” (Richards, 2009a, p. 183). Since 
IPA attends to the particular experience of the participants from their own 
perspective, the data of an IPA study are collected centrally through interviewing 
each individual participant (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006).  
The principles with which an IPA researcher would carry out an interview are 
exhibited in the concept of double hermeneutics. The participant is considered as 
the expert knower of his/her own experience, thus the researcher accesses and 
finds out the experience of the participant as he/she accounts for it (Smith et al., 
2009). That is, IPA considers the actual experience of the participant, which is 
expressed by the participant in language and thus is known to the researcher. This 
IPA principle of interviewing is distinguished from the social constructivist notion 
in using interviewing method, which claims that the findings are constructed as 
the products of language effect during the interview process (Eatough & Smith, 
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2008; Smith, 1996). Therefore, Smith et al. (2009, p. 57) state, “[T]he aim of an 
interview is largely to facilitate an interaction which permits participants to tell 
their own stories, in their own words. Thus, for the most part, the participant talks, 
and the interviewer listens.”  
IPA uses both semi-structured and unstructured interview methods. In both cases, 
the language of interview questions should be adjusted into language that the 
participant is familiar with (Smith et al., 2009). In addition, the researcher should 
encourage the participant to lead the interview as long as what he/she says is 
relevant to the research questions. A semi-structured interview should be flexible, 
although the researcher prepares an interview schedule, “the series of questions” 
for the interview (Breakwell, 2006, p. 237). Thus, the researcher does not need to 
follow the exact sequence of the prepared questions. Some questions can be even 
omitted or modified, and new questions can be asked promptly when there is 
contextual need (Eatough & Smith, 2008). When conducting unstructured 
interviews, the researcher begins from some focused topics or “one single core 
question” and the rest of the interview depends on “how the participant answers 
the question”, which allows the research to explore the topic more inductively 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 68). Unstructured interviews should be employed with the 
caution that the method would challenge the researcher when attempting to 
identify converging patterns across different participants during data analysis.  
A potential factor that can weaken the validity of interview data is that, for several 
reasons, the interviewee may not tell the truth and may deliberately hold back 
some information that the researcher seeks (Breakwell, 2006). However, this issue 
is not particular only to interviewing but “tend[s] to be common to many methods 
(p. 247). Nevertheless, this drawback needs to be addressed, particularly in an IPA 
study that seeks to elicit major themes and patterns of the findings from interview 
data. Breakwell suggests that such a potential disadvantage of interviewing can be 
overcome to some extent if the researcher checks whether or not what the 
interviewee has said is consistent, in the sense that inconsistency could be a sign 
of inaccuracy. Regarding the same issue, Richards (2009a) proposes that the 
researcher needs to triangulate interviewing with other data collection methods. In 
addition, Mackey and Gass (2005) suggest interviewing the same participant 
multiple times to increase the credibility of interview data. Within IPA research, it 
 
 
89 
 
is recommended to contextualise the data collected through interviews by means 
of additional data sources, such as those collected through observation or the 
participants’ personal documents (Smith et al., 2009).  
Meanwhile, concerning data analysis, Smith et al. (2009) suggest the eight 
strategic considerations of IPA for data treatment, which are succinct, step-by-step 
guide lines, showing the big picture of how analysis proceeds: 
 the close, line-by-line analysis of the experiential claims, concerns and 
understanding of each participant; 
 the identification of the emergent patterns (i.e. themes) with this 
experiential material, emphasising both convergences and divergences, 
commonality and nuance, usually first for single case, and then 
subsequently across multiple cases;  
 the development of a dialogue between the researchers, their coded data, 
the their [theoretical] knowledge about what it might mean for participants 
to have these concerns in this context, leading in turn to the development 
of a more interpretative account;  
 the development of a structure, frame or gestalt which illustrate the 
relationship between themes;   
 the organisation of all this material in a format which allows for analysis 
data to be traced through the process, from initial comments on the 
transcript, through initial clustering and thematic development, into the 
final structure of themes; 
 the use of supervision, collaboration, or audit to help test and develop the 
coherence and plausibility of the interpretation; 
 the development of a full narrative, evidenced by a detailed commentary 
on data extracts, which takes the reader through this interpretation, usually 
them-by-theme, and is often supported by some form of visual guide (a 
simple structure diagram or table); and, 
 reflection on one’s own perceptions, concepts and processes. 
(pp. 79-80)  
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These strategic guidelines for data analysis in fact manifest the three principles of 
IPA reviewed in Section 4.3.1, which are researching experience from the 
person’s own perspective, focusing on the particular and the double hermeneutics.  
4.3.2 Rationale for the application of IPA to the study 
This section discusses some reflections that I gathered in the process of adapting 
and practicing IPA for the present study.  
There are several reasons that led me to choose IPA as the methodology of the 
present study, over the research approaches already practiced in applied linguistics, 
such as the ones in Duff (2008a), Heigham and Croker (2009), Hinkel (2005) and 
Richards (2003, 2009b). Firstly, the IPA approach to data was able to be applied 
in the study because it resists the principle of the social constructivist qualitative 
approaches in which data are “accounts of truths, facts, attitudes, beliefs, interior, 
mental state, etc., constructed between interviewer and interviewee” (Talmy, 2010, 
p. 132). Secondly, this study examines SLA in relation to the aspects of the 
cognitive experiences of particular individuals rather than to those of social, 
cultural systems or relations, and IPA was appropriate for this focus of the study. 
Relating to this, the IPA notion about the relationship between the universal and 
the particular also accords with that of this present study that a universal is in the 
particular instances of it as their essence (Moreland, 1989). Moreover, its 
hermeneutic principles informed me of how I could incorporate the conceptual 
framework of the study into interpreting the data and in discussing the findings.    
Particularly, in relation to the last reason for using IPA, I may need to elaborate 
slightly more why I have chosen IPA instead of descriptive phenomenological 
(DP) approaches that claim to inherit from Husserl (e.g., Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003), 
whose philosophy is central to this study. It is true that Husserl proposes that 
knowledge is the knowledge of the object as it is, and thus, it is necessary for the 
researcher to return to data iteratively and seek to understand precisely the 
meanings intended by the participants as DP approaches propose. However, with 
equal emphasis, Husserl also argues that knowing (i.e., researching for the 
researcher) requires sufficient conceptualisation of the object of knowledge (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4). Willard (2011) puts it: 
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Certainly the mind according to Husserl is not “without categories and 
concepts.” Far from it. Such a vacuous mind is precisely the ‘mind’ of the 
‘realism’ that he regards as ridiculous. The mind of his view, on the other 
hand, is evermore fully loaded with structures of intentionalities and types 
of acts as his career progresses (para 21)   
Thus, I consider that the way that IPA encourages the researcher to use his/her 
theoretical knowledge for interpreting data is closer to Husserl’s epistemology 
than DP approaches that require the researcher to supress his/her previous 
knowledge when analysing data.  
However, there is a divergence in the epistemologies of IPA and this study, which 
has led the application of IPA to the study to be cautious and selective. As 
reviewed in Section 4.3.1, IPA broadly employs a realist ontology (Reid et al., 
2005, p. 21), acknowledging that the ontological independency of the research 
object from the researcher and the universality in the particular, to a certain extent. 
However, aligning with Heidegger and Gadamer, IPA proposes the 
epistemological subjectivity of the experience of the participants and the 
interpretation of the researcher. That is, while not completely dismissing the 
universality in individual experiences, it stresses the subjective, particular nature 
of the participants’ and the researcher’s meaning- and sense-makings (Smith, 
2004). By contrast, based on Husserlian realist epistemology, this study considers 
that both the participants and researcher have the potential to achieve objectivity 
(and thus universality and generalizability) in their knowledge and experiences 
despite the subjectivity of their cognitive processes, when the three conditions of 
knowledge are met (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4 for a review of the three 
conditions).  
Moreover, in applying the data collection and analysis strategies and procedures 
that IPA suggests, I have sought to maintain flexibility when appropriating them 
to the context and nature of the study. For example, I have realised that the 
accounts of the participant this study are not sufficient for investigating certain 
aspects of the nature of their SLA. Thus, while still using the interview data as the 
main source from which I elicit important themes and patterns that address the 
research questions, I did not treat other data sources as merely supplementary 
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ones that support interview data, but I also derive important findings from them, 
particularly from the LR drafts of the participants.  
The actual exercise and operation of IPA will be reported in following Section 4.4.  
4.4 Research procedures  
This section reports the actual undertaking of the field research of this study. 
Section 4.4.1 describes the research background, participants and researcher of the 
study. Then Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 present the procedures of the data collection 
and analysis respectively.  
4.4.1 The research background, participants and researcher 
4.4.1.1 The research background 
Since 2006, the New Zealand Government has had a policy of encouraging 
international doctoral students to enrol in NZ universities. As a result of this 
policy, the number of international PhD students (most of whom are second 
language speakers of English) reached 1,839 in 2008, which represents a six-fold 
increase from 310 in 2001 (Gerritsen, 2010). This recent surge in the number of 
international PhD students has also been apparent at the university, where I 
collected data from my participants from March in 2011 to January in 2013. 
At the university, overseas applicants are advised to correspond with potential 
chief supervisors via email for a considerable time, from several weeks to even 
more than one year before commencing their PhDs. During this time, these 
applicants negotiate their potential topics with their potential supervisors, working 
on their initial research proposals. Once an applicant has been accepted and the 
staff have agreed to offer supervision, a supervision panel consisting of a chief 
supervisor and one or two co-supervisors is organised, and he/she is required to go 
through a formal application process, which has to be approved by the 
Postgraduate Studies Committee. This is the official procedure at the university, 
through which an applicant becomes a PhD candidate. However, at one of three 
faculties where my participants are from, applicants are required to contact the 
faculty first and after they are accepted, the faculty organises their supervision 
panels. Thus, in this faculty, PhD candidates have not had personal interactions 
with their supervisors until they arrive at the university, although they also have to 
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submit their initial proposals as do other PhD candidates from different faculties. 
This series of steps of admitting a PhD candidate has the function of verifying if 
he/she is qualified enough to do a PhD, and especially in the case of an 
international PhD student, if his/her English is at a level to be able to undertake a 
PhD in English. All of the participants of the study have been through this process, 
presenting their academic competence sufficient to commence PhD research in an 
English-medium academic context. 
Regardless of whether they are domestic or international, the university requires 
all new fulltime PhD students to complete their full research proposal within the 
first six-months (extendable up to one year) of the conditional enrolment period. 
A candidate is confirmed for a full enrolment after the Postgraduate Studies 
Committee of the university has approved the full research plan, to which the 
supervisors’ recommendation report for confirmation and evidence of ethical 
approval were attached. The context of a conditional enrolment period during 
which a new PhD student has to complete their research plan in fact gives the 
student a clear idea of what to strive for, operating as a ‘necessary pressure’ that 
makes her work hard. However, for international candidates who also go through 
culture shock in a new environment and may already feel somewhat unstable, the 
status of being a ‘conditional’ student with the quite daunting task of completing 
their research plan is both difficult and stressful. Some of my participants even 
have told me that they were suffering from some emotional difficulties or not 
sleeping well during their conditional enrolment period.  
There is no strictly prescribed format for a full research plan and specific 
requirements for the proposal depend on the regulations of different faculties. 
However, the university suggests the headings of the sections that PhD students 
are required to include in their research plan. They are:  
1. A working title for the thesis  
2. A statement of the research topic/problem  
3. An outline of the significance of the topic (for example, its importance for 
advancing knowledge in the field, discipline or region and/or implications 
for methodology or understanding)  
4. A review of the literature  
5. A statement of research questions or hypotheses  
6. The methodologies by which the questions or hypotheses will be 
investigated  
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7. The forms of analysis proposed  
8. A thesis outline  
9. The resource requirements including the impact of timing of resource 
availability  
10. A timetable for the total project and thesis writing  
11. Ethical approval from the appropriate committee 
 
The Postgraduate Studies Committee also provides the criteria that PhD students 
are expected to meet by the end of the six-month up to one year conditional 
enrolment period. They are:  
 Technical skills  
 Conceptual or theoretical knowledge of field of study  
 Ability to evaluate literature critically  
 Ability to design appropriate methods of investigation  
 Ability to develop and present coherent arguments 
 Ability to focus on the research topic 
                             (Student & Academic Services Division, 2010)  
In the proposal guidelines, Section 4 requires a literature review, but most of other 
sections also need to be underpinned by the knowledge of the target literature. 
One of the criteria that PhD students are required to demonstrate in their full 
research proposal is technical skills. The university does not specify what these 
are. However, it appears that these skills relate to academic work with which PhD 
candidates display and communicate the necessary disciplinary and rhetorical 
knowledge described within the other criteria. The enrolment period can be 
roughly divided into three stages, although the time allocated to each stage seems 
to vary from student to student. The first stage is for engaging in extensive 
reading of the literature. The students then move on to the second stage during 
which they write a review of literature. Finally, based on what they have done at 
the first and second stages, they complete their full research proposal and ethical 
application. Therefore, carrying out the LR in this context of the provisional 
enrolment period seems to relate to all of what a candidate does in developing the 
types of knowledge and skill required to complete the full research plan.  
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4.4.1.2 The participants  
The participants of the study were new, conditionally enrolled international PhD 
candidates at the university by the time I was collecting data from them. They 
were from three different faculties of the university: the Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences, the Faculty of Education and the Management School. Among eight 
participants, seven were female and one was male. One was from China, three 
from The Maldives, two from Sri Lanka, and two from Vietnam. Their PhD 
commencing dates were different, so I began my data collection in March, 2011 
and ended it in January, 2013.  
Among the eight participants, four were core participants from whom I collected 
interview data from their first or second month to the last month of their 
conditional enrolment. I made idiographic (individual) analyses of the interview 
data from these four participants prior to identifying intersubjective themes and 
patterns. The superordinate and subordinate themes for the research topic –their 
SLA occurring while undertaking the LR – primarily emerged from the data 
collected from them. 
The other four were peripheral participants from whom I collected data for two to 
four months of the conditional enrolment. At first, I used their data to strengthen, 
enrich, modify, change, or discard the superordinate and subordinate themes 
intersubjectively emerged from the data of the four core participants. However, as 
the data analysis progressed, I realised that the distinction between the core and 
peripheral participants was not so significant in reporting the findings. This is 
because I found that the data extracts that were from the both core and peripheral 
participants supported my interpretation in an equal manner (see Section 4.4.3 for 
the data analysis process).  
When I commenced data collection, all of the participants were already advanced 
users of the language. They either had achieved scores higher than overall 6.5 for 
the IELTS test which is the minimum level to be able to undertake postgraduate 
studies, or, had been exempted from the test because they had earned their 
bachelor’s, master’s or postgraduate degrees from the UK or Australia. They also 
proved their academic writing skills by means of their initial proposals and email 
correspondence with their supervisors, academic staff members in their faculties. 
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The degree of competence in using English for spoken interactions varied among 
the participants, and some of them expressed difficulties in communicating with 
their supervisors at the early stage of their conditional enrolment period. Some of 
the participants had published articles in English, and most of them had 
experience in presenting their papers at conferences in English.   
In relation to their professional backgrounds, none came straight from their 
master’s programme to doctoral study. All of them were in their 30s or 40s, and 
they had established their professional careers in their own areas. Six of them 
were university teachers before starting their PhD projects, and two had worked in 
industry. Because of the time gap between their master’s and PhD, sometimes 
they struggled to deal with academic work, especially with the overwhelming 
amount of reading. Nevertheless, most of time, they appreciated their professional 
experiences, from which they had found their research topics that they were 
genuinely interested in.  
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the biographical information and data collection period 
of the core participants and peripheral participants. I use a pseudonym for each 
participant. Then Table 4.3 presents the previous positions of the participants that 
they used to work for before commencing their fulltime PhDs, and their 
preliminary research topics.
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Table 4.1: The bibliographic information and data collection period of the four core participants 
Name Nationality Gender Former Profession First Month of PhD Data Collection Period 
Shu China female university teacher August, 2011 6 months 
Nada Maldives female government officer April, 2011 5 months 
Padma Sri Lanka female university teacher March, 2011  5 months* 
Hai Vietnam female university teacher March, 2011 6 months 
*Hai and Padma provided most of data including interview data for five to six months from the date on which I commenced data collection from then. Then in Oct 2012, I collected 
additional data from them through email correspondence.  
Table 4.2: The bibliographic information and data collection period of the four peripheral participants 
Name Nationality Gender Former Profession First Month of PhD Data Collection Period 
Fadila Maldives female teacher trainer December, 2010 3 months 
Mubin Maldives male director at a firm January, 2011 4 months 
Kusum Sri Lanka female university teacher June, 2011  5 months* 
Tram Vietnam female university teacher July, 2011    3 months** 
*In the case of Kusum, although the data have collected for 5 months, but the data collected from her were not enough to be a core participant 
**Tram provided most of data including interview data for three months from the date on which I commenced data collection from her. Then in January 2013, she additionally sent 
me her final research proposal.
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Table 4.3: The comparison between the participants' professions and preliminary 
research topics 
Names Former Professions Preliminary PhD Thesis Research Topics 
Hai university teacher of 
English  
Self-efficacy in teaching: The case of EFL teachers 
at a universty in Vietnam 
Padma university teacher in the 
management of 
technology 
Network collaboration and the role of leadership 
Nada government officer in 
the health sector 
Well-being and social connectedness of older 
people in the small island developing state of 
Maldives 
Shu university teacher of 
English  
Teachers’ understanding and practice in fostering 
student autonomy and cooperation: A case study in 
a Chinese secondary school 
Mubin head of the Maldives 
Customs Service 
Adaptive optimal supply chain network modelling 
Fadila teacher trainer Understanding lecturers’ perceptions and practices 
related to integrating ICT within their teacher 
education progrmmes: A case study in the Faculty 
of Education, Maldives 
Kusum university teacher of 
English  
An activity theory analysis of mediational 
engagement with e-learning activities in tertiary 
level education in New Zealand 
Tram university teacher of 
English  
The factors of emotions affecting Vietnamese 
learners’ English oral communications 
(Sources: the participants’ CVs and full research proposals)  
4.4.1.3 The researcher 
“[T]he production of knowledge cannot be understood apart from the personal 
histories of the researchers” (Norton Peirce, 1995b, p. 570). The need for this 
section is based on the particular meanings that this general statement has, in 
relation to this study. I am from South Korea. I completed my MA at TESOL in 
2010 in my country, and commenced my PhD in July of the same year. I went 
through the first six months of my conditional enrolment period, which is the time 
when my research topic – the SLA of international PhD students that they would 
experience while undertaking the LR as my research topic – emerged from my 
personal experience.  
By the time I began my data collection, I was in my ninth month of doctoral study, 
and started to work with my participants one-by-one around during the six months 
of their conditional enrolment period. The study context of my participants was 
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familiar to me as I had just experienced the same challenges. In addition to this, as 
a peer, I was able to spend a considerable time with my participants beside formal 
data collection, such as interviews. My status of being the researcher and a peer of 
my participants created mostly positive outcomes, enriching and deepening my 
understanding about the research topic, participants, and data that they were 
providing. However, I was also aware of the possibility that my own experience 
of undertaking the LR might have become a too strong preconception about what 
I was looking at, and sometimes might have prevented me from perceiving my 
participants’ own experiences.  
As for the notion of the researcher as an insider versus outsider (Richards, 2003), I 
considered myself as both an insider and outsider, depending on which criteria I 
applied. When externally identifying my participants’ status and situations in 
relation to undertaking the LR for the research proposal of a PhD project, I was 
definitely one of the insiders of this group of people. As Husserl (1970) and 
Schleiermacher (1998) note, intersubjective understanding grows out of having 
empathy toward others, and the first and foremost condition that people can have 
empathy to each other is that they live in and perceive the same world. 
Considering that intersubjectively knowing and understanding is the key tenet of 
this study, my position as an ‘externally conditioned’ insider is definitely a 
vantage point. However, I acknowledge that, from the viewpoint that the 
experience of a particular person is the person’s own and cannot be completely 
shared or understood by others, I am inevitably an outsider of the realm of each 
individual participant’s own experience.  
4.4.2 Data collection  
Case studies in general employ multiple data collection methods, and triangulate 
them to gain more holistic, balanced understanding (Merriam, 1998; Willig, 2008). 
On the other hand, an IPA case study is based on the notion that the best way to 
access to the participants’ experiences is to “invite participants to offer a rich, 
detailed, first-person account of their experiences” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 56). This 
study, as an IPA case study, involved monthly interviews with each participant as 
the primary data source to obtain the participants’ own accounts of their SLA. 
Simultaneously, other sources, such as their research proposal drafts (including 
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the LR texts) or summaries of supervision meetings were collected to triangulate 
the findings. Prior to reporting the data collection in specific terms, I describe the 
overall procedure of data collection.  
4.4.2.1 Data collection procedure 
My full research plan was approved by the university in December 2010. Two 
months later, in early February 2011, I began to recruit participants. I spent the 
two months between the date of enrolment confirmation and of the 
commencement of data collection refining my research design. In addition, prior 
to the interviewing of the actual participants, I conducted a pilot study with six 
international PhD students. Two of them were still in their conditional enrolment 
period, and the rest were in their second or third year of their PhDs. The pilot 
study provided some useful insights, particularly for evaluating my interview 
techniques and attitude as an interviewer (Richards, 2003). For example, while 
talking with these PhD students, I began to see that the purpose and function of 
the undertaking the LR for preparing a research proposal would be somewhat 
different from those of the LR chapter(s) in an actual doctoral thesis. In addition, I 
learned that, to listen to interviewees, I should minimise interruption as much as 
possible. This experience of piloting interviews, overall, allowed me to feel more 
confident and get ready for actual interviews.   
The first step of the data collection was to specify carefully the boundaries within 
which I was able to recruit participants. I followed three critical when recruiting 
participants: 
 the disciplinary field to which a potential participant belong should not be 
too different from my own subject field; 
 the topic of a potential participant should not be beyond my understanding; 
and, 
 a potential participant should be in the first or second month of his/her 
conditional enrolment.  
The reason for the first two considerations was to design manageable research. I 
decided on the third condition with regard to my core participants. The number of 
participants that I was going to recruit was still flexible between three, which is 
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the default size recommended by Smith et al. (2009) for a single researcher, and 
six core participants, and the same range of peripheral ones, but I planned to have 
no more than nine in total.  
In recruiting participants, most help and support came from other PhD students. 
One of my departmental peers introduced a new student from his home country, 
and she became my first participant. Then through her, I was able to meet two 
more participants. Another colleague suggested emailing the entire population of 
PhD students in the university through the Postgraduate Students’ Union mailing 
list, and through this I met a peripheral participant. This person introduced me two 
more participants. Later, through another colleague, I came to know one more 
new student and she agreed to be a peripheral participant. The last participant was 
introduced by one of my supervisors in July, 2011. Finally I had four core and 
four peripheral participants and I stopped recruiting any more participants. The 
participants had commenced their PhDs at different times, so the data collection 
period for each participant was different. The first month of interview data 
collection was March, 2011 and the last month was January, 2012; the total period 
for interviewing individual participants was eleven months. However, as I 
mentioned early in Section 4.4.1, some participants offered me additional data 
afterwards, thus the actual data collection was terminated in January 2013.  
With the eight participants, I followed the formal procedure that was approved by 
the Ethics Committee. An initial person-to-person contact to potential participants 
was made via email and face-to-face meeting, during which I described the 
research project and invited them to participate in the research. Regardless of 
contact methods, a letter of information and a consent form (Appendices B, C & 
D) explaining the nature of their involvement and seeking for the participation 
was given to those who were contacted to help them to understand thoroughly the 
purpose of the research and the ways of participation. Following this, a face-to-
face meeting was arranged to go through the consent letter orally, and to address 
any questions or comments that potential participants may have. After they agreed 
with the specifications in the consent letter and signed two copies, one for 
themselves and one for me to keep, I arranged the first interview.  
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Each participant was usually interviewed at monthly intervals from time that they 
decided to participate, no matter whether they were core or peripheral participants. 
However, sometimes I had to miss a monthly interview when certain participants 
were preoccupied with their own work. The first and last interviews were semi-
structured (see Appendices E & F for the first and last interview schedules) and 
took between 30 minutes and one hour, and the rest of the interviews between the 
first and last were unstructured and took between 20 minutes and 40 minutes. 
Each interview date was negotiated via email and all the interviews were audio-
recorded. The audio-recorded interview data were immediately imported into my 
NVivo 9 research project and I tried to transcribe and add some pre-analysis 
thought before the next interview. I was able to manage this pattern at the early 
stage of data collection, but as the amount of interview data increased when I had 
more participants, the workload sometimes did not allow me to follow this data 
management method. A summary of the first interview was sent to each 
participant. I was going to make summaries for the following interviews too, but 
again, due to workload I could not continue this plan.  
Throughout the conduct of the monthly interviews, I collected the documents and 
more personal, verbal accounts as data that my participants agreed to provide. The 
first two documents given by each participant were their CVs and initial proposals 
that they had made before they came to New Zealand. I had originally intended to 
collect them before the first interview, but in the event I requested them after the 
first interview. I thought that I needed to establish rapport with my participants 
(Richards, 2003) before requesting personal documents although they had 
previously agreed to provide their documents before the first interview. 
Subsequently, I collected other documents relevant to interview data, and at the 
end of data collection, each participant provided me with the final draft of their 
full plan including the literature review text. Usually, these documents were sent 
to me in an electronic form, then I imported them to my NVivo project. When the 
documents were a paper version, I scanned and made them into PDF files and 
again stored them in the NVvivo project, returning the original ones to the 
participants.  
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4.4.2.2 Monthly interviews with each participant 
In the present study, the participants’ own first person understandings of their 
experiences constitutes the first layer of the double hermeneutics, central to which 
were the interview data. Interviewing individual participants multiple times over a 
period provided me with rich data and sufficient opportunities to probe and 
elaborate on findings to a certain extent, particularly when these findings emerged 
during a data collection period. These multiple interviews with the same 
participants also helped me to enhance the reliability of data (the participants’ 
accounts) (Mackey & Gass, 2005).         
With the four core participants whom I have worked with from the first or second 
month to the last month of their conditional enrolment period, I conducted four to 
seven interviews usually one month apart. Meanwhile, I interviewed the four 
peripheral participants from two to four times. As mentioned previously, the first 
and last interviews were semi-structured and the questions of these two interviews 
were asked to each individual participant (see Appendices E & F for the schedules 
of the first and last interviews) and the rest of interviews between the first and last 
were unstructured. These unstructured interviews were conducted with the 
intention to uncover inductively the occurrence of the SLA of the participants 
while undertaking the LR from their accounts of how they were carrying out the 
task. They also allowed me to clarify some of their answers that they gave at the 
previous interviews. In addition, when interesting issues emerged while 
interviewing one participant, I was able to discuss these issues with the other 
participants through such unstructured interviews.  
The interview dates, times, and places were decided by the participants. Interview 
places and times always changed. I met my participants, at their homes, offices, or 
outdoor benches in the university campus. I tried to interview them when they 
were not busy, and the most preferred times by my participants were before or 
after lunchtime and late evening when they relaxed at home. Interviewing them 
where they worked and kept their study materials was convenient because I was 
able to collect supplementary data during or right after interviewing. Although I 
tried to keep the intervals between the interviews with each participant regular, 
because of my participants’ busy schedules I had to be flexible with interview 
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intervals. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the dates of the interviews I had with the four 
core participants and four peripheral participants respectively.  
Table 4.4: Interviews with the four core participants 
Interviews Shu Padma Nada Hai 
1st Aug 15, 2011 Mar 21, 2011 May 12, 2011 Mar 13, 2011 
2nd Sep 20 Apr 19 Jun 10 Apr 20 
3rd Nov 12 May 13 Jul 7 Apr 28 
4th  Dec 16 June 8 Sep 7 May 22 
5th  Jan 11, 2012 July 6  June 6 
6th   Aug 10  July 2 
    Sep 18 
 
Table 4.5: Interviews with the four core participants 
Interviews Fadila Mubin Kusum Tram 
1st Apr 13, 2011 Apr 12, 2011 Jun 16, 2011 Aug 21, 2011 
2nd Apr 28  Jul 5 Aug 13 Sep 15 
3rd May 26  Sep 20 Oct 26 
4th  Jun 7  Nov 30  
 
The majority of difficulties that I struggled with throughout interviewing seemed 
to arise from the fact that both the participants and I were from different cultural 
backgrounds. For instance, in most of the first interviews, my participants and I 
experienced communication difficulty to some extent, because we were not used 
to each other’s accent or speech style yet. I could not get used to a particular 
participant’s accent and I always had to ask her to repeat what she had just said, 
which might have embarrassed her and negatively affected the conversation that 
we were having. Besides the issue of cultural diversity, I had to struggle with 
some other dilemmas in relation to interviewing. For example, one of the 
participants became reserved and shy when we started a formal interview although 
in our informal conversations she talked more and provided me with very useful 
insight and information. Nevertheless, overall, by meeting multiple times over 
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several months, I came to understand each participant more and more. The 
participants and I observed that we were becoming able to communicate with each 
other better and better, which contributed to strengthen the intersubjectivity 
between the participants and me about the issues that we discussed. This is further 
discussed in Section 4.5.  
4.4.2.3 Collecting documents and additional verbal accounts 
The purpose of collecting additional data was initially to contextualise and 
triangulate the findings emerged from interview materials (Richards, 2009a). In 
addition to this, the LR sections in the final research proposals of five participants, 
Hai, Nada, Mubin, Tram and Fadila were used as the main data for identifying the 
importance of some extra-linguistic elements of academic competence, which did 
not emerge from the interview data.  
My initial plan was to collect only the participants’ CVs, initial proposals, one or 
two different versions of full proposals to which the literature review texts were 
attached, but I came to collect a variety of documents besides the initially planned 
ones. For example, I participated in a workshop session about doing the literature 
review with some of my participants, and then collected their notes that they made 
during the session. The participants also gave me different kinds of document and 
materials that they produced in order to help themselves to better understand and 
summarise what they were reading, synthesise different concepts or theories into 
conceptual models, and share their understandings with their supervisors. I also 
asked them to provide me with the summaries of their supervision meetings 
related to doing the literature review and most of them gave them to me.  
In addition, I recorded some informal conversations, between some of the 
participants and me, or between them. Opportunities for such additional 
conversation data mainly arose through attending different sessions and meetings 
for PhD students held by the university. For example, five participants and I went 
to a meeting organised for doctoral students every Friday morning. My 
department (Applied Linguistics) also held a research meeting every other Friday 
afternoon. The personal accounts of the participant in recorded conversations were 
eventually classified with other interview data and treated as interview data. 
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Tables 5 and 6 present the supplementary materials provided by the core and 
peripheral participants respectively.  
Table 4.6: Supplementary data from the four core participants 
Shu - Supervision meeting summaries (Jul 12 & 19, Aug 11, Sep 1, Oct 21 in 2011) 
- CV (Jul 18, 2011) 
- Initial proposal (Jan 12, 2012) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (Jan 12, 2012) 
- The literature review framework (Aug 31, 2011) 
- Annotated reading (Sep 1, 2011) 
- A reflecting conversation after a session (Sep 2, 2011) 
- A note during a session (Oct 7, 2011) 
- Sample of manual note while reading (Jan 16, 2012) 
Padma - Supervision meeting summaries (Jan 27, Feb 24, Apr 8 in 2011) 
- CV (May 13, 2011) 
- Initial proposal (May 13, 2011) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (Sep 1, 2011) 
- Reference table (Apr 20, 2011) 
- Action plan (May 13, 2011) 
- Two pages of a literature review draft (May 13) 
- Network dynamics (May 13, 2011) 
- Concept map (May 13, 2011) 
- Network paradigm (Jul 6, 2011) 
- A literature review draft (July 8, 2011) 
- A picture to explain the conceptual framework (Jul 8, 2011) 
- An email correspondence (Oct 30, 2012) 
Nada - Supervision meeting summaries (Apr11, 20 & 28, May 2, 11, 18 & 24 in 2011) 
- CV (Jul 7, 2011) 
- Initial proposal (Jul 7, 2011) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (Sep 26, 2011) 
- A map of the research site (Aug 18, 2011) 
- A draft of the research proposal (Aug 18, 2011) 
Hai - Supervision meeting summaries (Mar 1 & 24, May 5 in 2011) 
- A draft of research proposal (Apr 20, 2011) 
- Concept maps (Apr 15, 2011) 
- A draft of the literature review (July 2, 2011) 
- CV (May 14, 2011) 
- Initial proposal (May 14, 2011) 
- A reflecting conversation after a session (Sep 2, 2011) 
- A literature review just before the full proposal completion (Oct 24, 2011) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (Nov 30, 2011) 
- An email correspondence (Oct 30, 2012) 
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Table 4.7: Supplementary data from the four peripheral participants  
Fadila - Supervision meeting summaries (Four times in 2011, dates unknown) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (June 30, 2001) 
- A draft of the literature review with her peer feedback (June 30, 2011) 
- A draft of the final proposal (May 16, 2011) 
- Audio-record of an informal chat with Tram (Aug 21, 2011) 
Mubin - CV (May 14, 2011) 
- Initial proposal (May 14, 2011) 
- A draft of the literature review (May 14, 2011) 
- A draft of the literature review (Aug 18, 2011) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (Aug 18, 2011) 
Kusum - Supervision meeting summary (July 18, 2011) 
- A draft of full research proposal including the literature review (date unknown)
Tram - Supervision meeting summaries (Jul 6, Aug 24, Sep 7, 12 & 14) 
- Audio-record of an informal chat with Fadila (Aug 21, 2011) 
- A copy of the initial proposal(Aug 27, 2011) 
- A reflecting conversation after a session (Sep 2, 2011) 
- Final proposal including the literature review section (Jan 20, 2013)  
4.4.3 Data analysis 
This section reports the data analysis of the study. Here, I first briefly describe my 
experience with NVivo 9, a qualitative data management software tool, and then 
illustrate the data analysis procedures that were adapted.  
4.4.3.1 Experience with NVivo 9 
From the beginning of the data collection, I used NVivo 9, and created an NVivo 
project in which I stored all the data. NVivo helped me with managing and 
organising data at the early stage of data analysis. Firstly, I created a folder for 
each participant and kept all the data from one participant in that folder. Interview 
audio-records were imported and transcribed in the project, and each interview 
audio-recording and its transcribed text were kept in one file. Electronic 
documents that were sent via email were also imported into the project. In 
addition, paper documents were scanned and converted into PDF files and they 
too were imported into the project. By the time I had around 80 per cent of data, I 
started to engage in the coding process. I created subordinate theme files when 
themes emerged, and later superordinate theme files by grouping and organising 
subordinate themes. With NVivo, data manipulation, such as discarding, 
modifying, merging, or reorganising themes, was relatively easy, which helped 
me to search freely for themes. With NVivo 9 it was convenient to access data 
that were kept in holistic and original forms. It also allowed me to trace back to 
any stage of theme development process, any of my comments and notes left 
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intact with original sources.  
However, I encountered serious issues that eventually led me to stop using the 
software. That is, the NVivo project did not allow the table format that Smith et al. 
(2009, pp. 93-95) suggest for theme development. I had to create my theme tables 
using Microsoft Word, then import them into my NVivo project. Later when I 
tried to identify convergences and divergences of the themes emerging from each 
of the four core participants, I realised that my knowledge of the software was not 
sufficient to undertake the task. After considering for some time whether or not 
further learning about how to use it would help, I decided not to use it for the 
purpose of data analysis but only for data storage, which was still important.  
4.4.3.2 The procedure of the analysis of the interview and supplementary 
document data  
As stated in Section 4.3.1, IPA encourages the researcher to utilise his/her 
theoretical knowledge in analysing data, while having to make the analysis 
inductive. This was centrally exercised in the present study through a hermeneutic 
turn between my own theoretical knowledge (conceptual framework) and the data.  
As I collected data from different participants at different times, this incremental 
approach allowed time to pre-analyse data before the later actual analysis. During 
this stage, I made notes and comments while transcribing interview data, and 
arranged supplementary documents data to be linked to the relevant interview data. 
After the pre-analysis period, I moved on to actual data analysis for which I tried 
to appropriate the six steps of data analysis suggested by Smith et al. (2009), 
which are:  
1. reading and re-reading 
2. initial noting 
3. developing emergent themes 
4. searching for connections across emergent themes 
5. moving to the next case 
6. looking for patterns across cases (pp. 82-107).  
These steps guided my approach to the data analysis. At the beginning, the focus 
of the data analysis (and thus steps) was on the four core participants’ transcribed 
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interview data and documentary data that I collected to contextualise the interview 
data. I started from Hai’s case and moved onto Padma, Nada and Shu in turn. 
When working on the data from Hai, wishing to be rigorous, I was carefully 
checking these steps all the time, not to miss any step. As the analysis proceeded 
and moved onto the other participants one by one, I was able to go through the 
steps more smoothly. Although these steps were initiated one after another, they 
needed to be engaged with continually and concomitantly throughout the data 
analysis process. In addition, the whole analysis process also involved my 
supervisors’ constant feedback and guidance. 
Steps 1 and 2 involved getting closer to the original data from Hai. This process 
enabled the discovery of new information not noted on the initial reading. As 
Smith et al. (2009) predicted, these first two steps merged naturally. At this stage, 
three kinds of comment were made as they had suggested: descriptive comments, 
which were the rephrasing of the participant’s account; linguistic comments, 
which included paying attention to the words and expressions that the participant 
used; and conceptual comments that involved my knowledge from the literature 
and life experience. For different kinds of comment, I used different fonts or 
underlinings (see Appendix G for an example of the three-column tables of data 
analysis). For this step, I exported the four core participants’ interview texts from 
the NVivo project and converted them into Microsoft Word files. For each 
interview text, I made a three-column table: in the middle column, I put the 
original data, and in the last column I made the three kinds of comment, and left 
the first column empty for the next step. 
Step 3 involved identifying emergent themes, referring to the three kinds of 
comment that had been made from the previous steps; the data reading then 
became more focused and interpretative. While checking with the linguistic and 
descriptive comments and the original source, I developed themes centrally from 
conceptual comments, mostly in the form of a phrase and sometimes even in the 
form of a sentence. Following the advice of Smith et al. (2009), I tried to make the 
themes concise and compressed, but at the same time still expressive enough to 
remind me of the original sources from which the themes had emerged, rather 
than using abstract codes. On one hand, I retained the original data sources and on 
the other hand, I allowed myself to be informed and guided by the research 
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questions and literature, to be certain that these themes are addressing the research 
questions. For this step, I imported the three-column table where I kept the 
original source, three types of comments and emergent themes into my NVivo 
project in order to prepare for the next step.  
Step 4 involved searching for connections across emergent themes. Firstly, I 
divided the emergent themes under the overarching research question. Then I 
grouped the themes into different superordinate themes. The superordinate themes 
were based on subordinate themes, but at the same time, they were guided by my 
theoretical knowledge to some extent. Under each of the superordinate themes, 
subordinate themes from the interviews were organised chronologically so that I 
could trace from which interview a particular subordinate theme came (see 
Appendix H for an example of the tables of grouping of subordinate themes into 
superordinate themes). For this step, I created a node tree in my NVivo project 
that has allowed me to organise the themes hierarchically. On top of the node tree 
there were the research questions, under which there were the superordinate 
themes, and under the superordinate themes were the subordinated themes. I also 
made another Microsoft Word table following the hierarchy of the node tree, 
where I organised data extracts that were firstly detached from their original texts.  
Step 5 involved analysing the data from the other core participants, Padma, Nada 
and Shu. Thus, Step 5 was actually repeating the previous four steps that I 
followed with the case of Hai for the other core participants one by one. First I 
followed Steps 1 to 3 almost the same way, but, I provisionally recycled the same 
superordinate themes identified from Hai’s case for the other three. Thus, instead 
of identifying new superordinate themes for each core participant, the subordinate 
themes of the other three participants were grouped into the same superordinate 
themes. The reason that I organised different cases under the same superordinate 
themes is to allow each case (the part) to be connected with each other, 
contributing to shaping a united theme structure (the whole). The part (the 
subordinate themes of each case) and the whole (the same superordinate themes) 
started as incomplete; they developed together while closely interacting with one 
another. When there were considerable resistances and disagreements between 
superordinate themes and subordinate themes from a particular participant, I 
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tracked back to the origin of the superordinate theme and checked its validity. 
With this process, some superordinate themes, and subordinate themes that had 
previously emerged were discarded or altered, and sometimes new superordinate 
themes were added as the analysis proceeded into next participant. This step 
allowed me to undertake numerous hermeneutic dialogues, such as between 
themes and sources, between superordinate and subordinate themes, between the 
data from different participants, and between the whole theme structure and a 
particular case.    
Step 6 involved looking for patterns across cases (see Appendix I for an example 
of the tables of communal pattern identification across the four core participants). 
At this step, I was able to have fairly fixed superordinate themes that were shared 
by all the four core cases. These superordinate themes acted as the boundary 
within which I was able to observe the patterns of convergences and 
commonalities, and those of divergences and nuances across the four core 
participants. These patterns had become ‘grouping themes’ which were situated 
between the superordinate and subordinate themes. I created a Microsoft Word 
table in which I organised the superordinate, grouping, and subordinate themes, 
and another Microsoft Word table in which I included the grouping themes and 
the locations of the relevant interview and supplementary data. I imported the 
tables to my NVvivo project for the purpose of traceable data storage. This step 
enabled me to be ready for the writing of the findings chapter, during which I 
engaged in more focused, further analysis of the core participant’s data, also 
incorporating the data from the four peripheral participants.  
In fact, Step 6 was not the last step of data analysis and the analysis continued to 
the process of writing the findings chapter. Smith et al. (2009) state, “[There] is 
not a clear-cut distinction between analysis and writing up. As one begins to write, 
some themes loom large, others face, and so this changes the report” (p. 110). By 
undertaking the data analysis following the six steps, I was able to develop some 
sort of indexical knowledge of data, which allowed me to reach easily the contents 
that I needed. I also came to identify the parts that closely addressed the research 
questions and communal patterns across the participants. However, I was not able 
to satisfy myself with the structure and themes of the findings that I obtained from 
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the analysis, even after I already had made several drafts of the findings chapters 
according to this analysis. This was mainly because they seemed not to 
correspond closely to what I had been sensing or intuiting from the data: the 
nature of the mind, cognition and knowledge of the participants and their SLA 
patterns in relation to the development of their knowledge of the target literature 
and research project.  
This somewhat intuitive realisation led me to review Husserl’s (1970) theory of 
knowledge more carefully. Eventually, I decided to undertake a further data 
analysis, through which I re-identified themes and rewrote the findings chapter. 
This further analysis was both top-down (deductive) and bottom-up (inductive) 
processes. That is, on one hand, I structured the findings chapter from main 
sections to sub-sections, and on the other hand, I re-read and bestowed new or 
modified meanings to superordinate themes, and classified them under the 
subsections of the findings chapter. In so doing, I sometimes moved data extracts 
from one superordinate theme to another. As a result, the organisation and 
sections of the final report (the findings chapter) that began to be developed after I 
went through the six steps of data analysis considerably evolved from the themes 
that had been attained through such steps. Moreover, the distinction between the 
core and peripheral participants became less important. I sometimes presented 
data extracts from the peripheral participants to support the themes that were 
derived initially from the core participants for the reason that they better portrayed 
such themes. Some new themes even emerged from the data of the peripheral 
participants and then were further supported by those of the core participants.  
Willard (1995) notes, “[A] representation finds its fulfilment not immediately, but 
only by passing through other representations that are closer to the ultimate object 
[of knowledge].” (p. 146). I consider that the process, through which all the 
discarded themes prior to the final themes were identified, was not only 
unavoidable but in fact was meaningful and necessary for the final findings of the 
study.  
4.4.3.3 The procedure of the analysis of the final LR text 
The analysis of the final LR section was aimed at addressing the fourth subsidiary 
question (see Section 4.0).  
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The initial intention for analysing the LR texts of the participants was to examine 
the changes in their procedural and linguistic knowledge as the outcome of their 
SLA, which may have occurred during the data collection. For this objective, I 
decided to analyse and compare the initial and final LR texts of five participants, 
Hai, Nada, Mubin, Fadila and Tram, for the reason that there were observable 
differences between their initial and final LR texts, in terms of structure, volume 
and the breadth and depth of the content, and such differences would signal 
changes after their SLA.  
However, as the analysis proceeded, I encountered some issues while attempting 
to achieve initial purpose of this document analysis. First of all, my chief 
supervisor pointed out that I should not assume that all new linguistic/rhetorical 
features that did not appear in the initial LR text but in the final one were the 
result of the SLA during the data collection period. This is because, for example, 
some linguistic/rhetorical features that did not appear in the initial LR but in the 
final LR may be what the participants had known even before commencing their 
PhD projects; their final proposals may have been revised by a third person and 
contained elements that were not part of the participants’ own linguistic and 
procedural knowledge. Moreover, my research did not trace the acquisition of 
certain linguistic or rhetorical items selected prior to data collection, while 
seeking to clarify the overall SLA mechanisms and patterns which could be 
detected from the acquisition of any systemic and procedural resources. Therefore, 
I came to think that seeking to identify changes of certain features in the language 
of individual participants by means of contrasting their initial and final LR drafts 
would be not only problematic but also somewhat irrelevant to the overarching 
topic of the study.  
While doubting the possibility of and necessity for achieving the original purpose 
for the document analysis, I began to see that analysing the LR texts of the 
participants was still very important for another reason as follows. One of main 
objectives of this study has been to suggest expanding the scope of SLA to 
embracing the acquisition of extra-linguistic knowledge and ability that is crucial 
for using language. Then from the interview data, it was indicated that using (and 
thus acquiring) English language in an academic context must involve developing 
the knowledge of and ability to use extra-linguistic thought-structuring patterns as 
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well as linguistic systems. However, a clear identification of the extra-linguistic 
elements did not emerge from the accounts of the participants. This dilemma 
seemed to be resolved to some extent by identifying the importance of the extra-
linguistic elements of competence in using language from the LR texts, which I 
have incorporated into the conceptual framework of the study. Specifically, for 
the document analysis, I drew on Bruce’s (2008a) theory of genre knowledge, 
particularly the concept of the four academic cognitive genres (CG): Explanation, 
Recount, Discussion and Report. In his framework he included Crombie’s (1985) 
concept of interpropositional relations and Hyland’s (2005) concept of attitude 
markers (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 for a review of these concepts).  
From the moment when I decided not to examine the changes in the knowledge of 
the participants, it also became unnecessary to compare and contrast initial and 
final LR texts. Therefore, I decided to use only final LR texts for the newly-set 
purpose, which was finding out and report to what extent the two core extra-
linguistic abilities – using genre knowledge as critical elements of academic 
English. Then in accord with this revised objective, I modified the fourth 
subsidiary research question. As the analysis proceeded, I realised that it would be 
ideal then to analyse the final LR texts of two other participants, Shu and Padma, 
who provided me with their final LR texts as well. However, the timeframe did 
not allow me to do so, and thus I could only use the final LR texts of the five 
participants that were originally chosen.  
The analysis of the five participants’ final LR sections was as follows. Firstly, I 
did a preliminary analysis of the texts to identify elements of the SG and CG 
model. My initial analysis was checked by my chief supervisor who performed 
further analysis of the texts in terms of the writer’s use of cognitive genres, 
including how closely their use of these textual patterns conformed to the features 
of the model (degree of prototypicality). Then based on this analysis, I made a 
more detailed description of the importance of using SG and CG elements as 
revealed in the participants’ texts. That is, the focus was on finding out in what 
ways competence in using conventionalised thought-organising patterns is 
important. In doing so, I kept consulting with my chief supervisor to check the 
validity of my interpretation. I also undertook an iterative process through which 
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the analysis of the participants' LR texts was verified, questioned and corrected by 
my supervisors.  
4.5 Assessing the quality of the study  
As suggested in a number of research methodology resource books, standards and 
criteria for evaluating the quality of qualitative research reflect different 
philosophical orientations, based on which they were established (e.g., Duff, 
2008a; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Richards, 2003). In applied linguistics, it seems to 
be a current, pervasive practice to apply checklists based on the social 
constructivist paradigm, such as the one suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985), 
to accessing qualitative research (see Richards, 2009b). However, those social 
constructivist criteria, despite their widespread acceptance among researchers in 
the area, would not be suitable for evaluating the present study, due centrally to its 
deviation from that particular research paradigm. That is, I am reluctant to discuss 
the quality of this study in terms of how successfully it has constructed the reality. 
Instead, I wish that the quality of this study, as those of any other research studies, 
is assessed in reference to the extent to which it has uncovered the reality existing 
objectively.     
In this section, I discuss the quality of the study in terms of Husserl’s (1970) three 
conditions for knowledge reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4 (Section 4.5.1), 
and in terms of the criteria for assessing IPA research suggested by Smith (2011a) 
(Section 4.5.2).  
4.5.1 The quality of the study in terms of Husserl’s three conditions for 
knowledge  
Husserl’s (1970) three conditions for knowledge reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 
3.1.4 are applying logic, transcending towards the object of knowledge (data) and 
achieving intersubjectivity. They are all essential for knowledge to be the 
knowledge of the object itself. Here I discuss the extent to which the present study 
has met these conditions in the process of developing knowledge of the research 
topic.  
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4.5.1.1 Transcending towards data 
The expression that “data do not speak for themselves” is often stated to 
emphasize the importance of having a clear worldview and conceptual framework 
in understanding data (e.g., Willig, 2008). However, no conceptual framework 
would help the researcher to find out things that do not exist in data.  
Bearing this in mind, I sought to achieve this first condition of knowledge – 
transcending towards the data in several ways. For example, before actual data 
analysis, I tried to read the data (texts) several times to become familiar with the 
content. I engaged in this type of data reading while analysing data as well, 
realising that it helped me to uncover new things and also find more suitable 
extracts that support themes that had been identified already. In addition, I tried to 
check thoroughly how clearly and precisely my interpretations reflect the data 
extracts by comparing my written analyses and the corresponding extracts. When 
dissatisfied, I focused on the extracts themselves and tried to see what I had 
missed or misunderstood. In such a case, I also put the extracts back into the 
original text where they came from so that I could read them in the whole context.  
4.5.1.2 Applying logic 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4 discussed that the laws of logic that Husserl (1970) 
suggests are a priori, universal beyond any culture or language, which guide a 
person’s thinking to take place in accordance necessities and possibilities, 
eventually leading the person to arrive at truth. Willard (1982) explains logical 
thinking as following necessities and possibilities as follows: 
When snow…is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and 
heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or 
perish…Now the same general ontological structure of necessities and 
possibilities determined for subjects by their properties also governs within 
and between cognitive acts. The forms of the thought that all men are 
mortal and that Socrates is a man, along with their truth, necessitate truth in 
the possible thought that Socrates is mortal…The necessities and 
possibilities in the relevant individual cognitive events follow from the 
qualities and relations embedded in those events. (pp. 396-397)  
Geisler and Brooks (1990, pp. 166-179) suggest that, in undertaking an inductive 
research study, applying universal logic in understanding data would help the 
researcher to avoid eight logical fallacies “in which confusion can arise about 
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what should be considered a cause and what should not” (p. 166), such as the post 
hoc fallacy or the fallacy of reversing cause and effect. In the course of analysing 
data, I sought to apply logic in the way that these philosophers propose. For 
example, when examining the relationships between the SLA of the participants 
and social processes, I strove to see whether or not the influences of social 
processes on the processes of their SLA directed indicate that such social 
processes were actually conducive to their SLA as the social, cultural approaches 
claim. In addition, I also struggled not to overlook the accounts of the participants 
that seemingly contradicted some potential findings, knowing that to do so is the 
fallacy of neglecting negative evidence. In fact, such struggling, although difficult, 
rather helped me to develop a better understanding of their SLA experience 
eventually. Moreover, by being aware that ambiguity is a fallacy of logic in a 
research study, I sought to think and write as clearly and precisely as possible, 
which was able to be achieved to a greater extent with the help of my supervisors 
(see the following discussion of achieving intersubjectivity).  
4.5.1.3 Achieving intersubjectivity   
What allows a group of people to experience intersubjectivity is to be in, and 
perceive the same world. When understanding the concept strictly in the context 
of attaining knowledge, intersubjectivity takes place when the cognitions of 
people converge onto the same object of knowledge (Willard, 1982).  
Intersubjectivity in the present study was firstly achieved between my participants 
and me (the researcher), and among the participants, by exploring the same 
research topic that I brought to them. The participants provided their accounts 
based on their own personal experiences, but they were all undertaking the LR in 
the same context, which allowed me to uncover communal patterns from their 
individual, unique experiences. Then intersubjectivity also took place between my 
supervisors and me. My supervisors understood the research topic and research 
questions, and they read my research reports (the chapters of this thesis) a number 
of times, carefully checking, revising and validating my understandings of data 
and the research topic. They directed me to refine my thinking and language more 
logical, clearer, and more accurate, which in fact pushed me to meet the other two 
conditions of knowledge more satisfactorily.  
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4.5.2 The quality of the study as IPA research 
For assessing the quality of a study as IPA research, Smith (2010, p. 17) suggests 
criteria, such as:  
 clearly subscribing to the theoretical principles of IPA; 
 being transparent and coherent so that the reader can see what was done; 
and, 
 undertaking sufficient sampling from corpus to show density of evidence for 
each theme.  
In what follows, I briefly discuss the quality of this study in relation to these three 
criteria.   
4.5.2.1 Practice of the theoretical principles of IPA 
The central theoretical principles of IPA are, as reviewed in Section 4.3.1, 
researching experience from the person’s first perspective, focusing on the 
particular and interpretative approaches to data. Practising these principles was a 
complex processes in different stages of research procedures, and the judgement 
of the extent to which this study successfully achieved the task should be made by 
the reader. Here I present some actions that I took to implement them. Firstly, I 
sought to identify most of themes that address the research questions from the 
interview data that contained the participants’ own accounts for their experiences. 
Then in the findings chapter, I will present ample verbatim interview extracts, so 
that the voice of the participants could be shared with the reader. Then I tried to 
understand communal traits of the SLA experiences of the participants by fully 
exploring individualities and subjectivities. That is, as I reported in Section 4.4.3, 
I initially analysed the cases of the four core participants individually, and then 
looked at both convergences and divergences among the participants within a 
particular theme, as ways to make sure that themes or descriptions of themes 
could embrace the uniqueness of each participant. In addition, I allowed myself to 
make interpretations of data informed by the theoretical framework to grasp the 
meanings of the comments of the participants, some of which they themselves 
might not be aware of.    
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4.5.2.2 Transparency and coherence 
As Smith et al. (2009) note, transparency is concerned with “how clearly the 
stages of the research process are described in the write-up of the study” (p. 182). 
To meet with the criteria, I tried to illustrate the procedures of data collection and 
analysis clearly and specifically in this methodology chapter. In an endeavour to 
achieve coherence, I strove to achieve alignment and consistency in my argument 
from the literature review to the findings to the discussion, fully incorporating the 
phenomenological realist paradigm.   
4.5.2.3 Sufficient sampling from corpus 
Smith (2011a) suggests that, when the number of participants is between four and 
eight, each theme is considered as valid when supported by extracts from a 
minimum of three participants. The findings chapter demonstrates that I have 
sought to meet this criterion. I corroborated themes initially derived from the core 
participants’ accounts with data from the peripheral participants. Sometimes 
themes emerged from the peripheral participants. Then I went back to the data of 
the core participants for the verification of such themes. However, the sampling 
for the document analysis of the final LR text was exceptional, not following this 
guideline. Instead, I tried to carefully describe instances selected to examine 
certain aspects subject to the analysis, and then have the analysis checked by my 
supervisors.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodology of the present study, including the 
research questions, the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings, the actual 
research procedures and the discussion of the quality of the study. In essence, this 
study applied the qualitative approach, IPA, to collecting and analysing data in 
accordance with the realist paradigm. In the line of the overall resistance to the 
social, cultural SLA stream, this study disputes the social constructivist approach 
that claims the research findings are co-constructed as the products or effects of 
discourse (language use) between the participants and researcher. Instead, it 
approached to the SLA experience of the participants as the object independent of 
my (the researcher’s) cognition and act of researching. Therefore, it is claimed 
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that the findings of the study were revealed by the participants, and then were 
uncovered or found out by me, the researcher, through the analysis process.  
In the following chapter, Chapter 5, I will report on the findings, the outcome of 
the methodological practice presented in this chapter.
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5 SLA IN DEVELOPING ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE 
5.0 Overview 
Chapter 5 reports the findings of the present study. The findings emerged from a 
double hermeneutic, phenomenological understanding of the first person accounts 
of the participants. They were then triangulated with supplementary data, 
including supervision meeting summaries, personal notes or memos and concept 
maps (see Table 4.6 in Section 4.4.2), and a document analysis of the research 
proposal drafts. The overarching research question addressed in this chapter is:   
What is the nature of the second language acquisition (SLA) of eight PhD 
students while undertaking the literature review (LR) in English, their 
second language, during the period of preparing the research proposal at a 
New Zealand university? 
Drawing on Widdowson’s (1989) concept of the language user’s competence as 
knowledge and ability for using a language, I consider the SLA of the participants 
refers to acquiring knowledge and developing ability required to use academic 
English, their second language (see Chapter 1, Section 1.5). The overarching 
question is addressed by answering the four subsidiary questions, which are: 
1. What are the central cognitive dispositions and processes that 
characterise the participants’ approaches to developing academic 
knowledge while undertaking the LR?  
2. To what extent is the SLA of the participants understood in terms of their 
cognitive dispositions and processes characterised in reviewing the target 
literature and research planning?  
3. To what extent is the involvement of the participants’ communities 
facilitative of their SLA? 
4. In what ways is the use of prototypical thought-structuring patters 
important and (thus) is indicated as part of academic English competence?  
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Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 respond to each of the four subsidiary questions 
respectively. Section 5.1 identifies the cognitive features in the approaches of the 
participants to reviewing the literature and attaining academic knowledge. Section 
5.2 then examines their SLA – the development of their competence in academic 
English, in relation to the cognitive dispositions and processes identified in 
Section 5.1. In the following Section 5.3, I seek to understand the extent to which 
their academic communities played a facilitative role for their SLA. Section 5.4 
considers in what ways genre knowledge is revealed as a critical element of 
academic English competence by analysing the LR texts of five participants. 
Lastly, Section 5.5 concludes this chapter by briefly summarising the findings and 
introducing the following discussion chapter.  
In presenting data extracts, I have sometimes underlined some parts that I intend 
to emphasise, and inserted square brackets […] to indicate glossing of participants’ 
meaning. I also have numbered the data extracts so that I can refer to them in 
further analyses and discussions.  
5.1 Cognitive dispositions and processes in undertaking the LR 
Section 5.1 addresses the first subsidiary question: 
1. What are the central cognitive dispositions and processes that 
characterise the participants’ approaches to developing academic 
knowledge while undertaking the LR?  
Firstly, Section 5.1.1 considers the meaning of undertaking the LR in the research 
context, prior to examining the cognitive characteristics of the participants 
manifested while performing the task. In Section 5.1.2, the findings suggest the 
intentionality of the participants as the necessary condition for both their 
knowledge and language development. Then Section 5.1.3 reports the accounts of 
the participants that suggest that thought and language in their academic 
knowledge seem to be two separate entities although they were interrelated and 
closely cooperated for undertaking the LR. Finally, Section 5.1.4 presents data 
that seem to reveal the epistemological tendency and strategies of the participants 
in carrying out the LR.  
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5.1.1 Undertaking the LR during a conditional enrolment period 
As explained in the previous methodology chapter, I collected data from the 
participants when they were at the stage of preparing a full research proposal for 
their PhD projects. Thus, for them undertaking the LR did not yet involve writing 
the LR chapters for their theses. Hai, a core participant, was aware of this from the 
first month of her PhD, noting, “I guess it’s for the working title [of a full research 
plan]. I just have the working title, after do my literature review” (Mar 13, p. 8). 
Then in her final month of her conditional enrolment period, she provided me 
with an account for why she thought that the LR of the research proposal is 
different from that of an actual thesis.   
# 1 
The literature review for my proposal is little bit different from the literature 
review for a PhD thesis. Because, I think that for the proposal, the literature 
review is a kind of argument for you to say why your study is worthy to do, 
based on the literature review. You know the gaps in the literature and you 
develop your research question. But, for the PhD thesis it is a little bit 
different because at the end the literature review is perfect. I mean it covers 
all the things you have in the later part in the discussion and then findings. 
(Hai, Interview, Sep 18, pp. 1-2) 
In addition, although there is the LR section in the required research proposal, the 
participants did not narrowly define undertaking the LR as just writing the LR 
section, but preparing the whole research project. For example, Nada, a core 
participant, when she had finalised her proposal, pointed out, “You need the 
literature review [for] all other sections. I think that the literature review section is 
more or less to explain your other parts, when you write the other parts of your 
proposal” (Sep 7, p. 8). Similarly, Hai thought: 
# 2 
It (the literature review) is very important. If you don't understand theory, 
how can you design a good data collection methodology, I mean how can 
you design good question guideline…you would get nothing. you will 
understand the theory…and then .. you relate [it] to your research topic and 
you turn it into the questions.(Hai, May 22, p. 8) 
The comment of Hai above suggests that undertaking the LR is the overall process 
of developing her knowledge of the target literature (in her own words “theory”) 
for different aspects of her research project, such as her methodology. This was 
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also stated by Shu, another core participant, at her last interview when asked the 
purpose of the LR done during the six-month conditional enrolment period:  
# 3 
Ok, I think the purpose is very obvious that is you know to familiarise 
yourself with the area you're working in and now how much other 
researchers have done and what areas they have covered. (Shu, Jan 12, 2012, 
p.1)  
However, obviously, for a successful undertaking of the LR, developing academic 
writing competence was still very important for the participants to communicate 
their knowledge with their supervisors (and eventually the postgraduate 
committee members). Mubin, a peripheral participant, shared his somewhat 
painful, hard experience through which he learned the importance of developing 
this competence:  
# 4 
I started to write first few months… so I took my first few months and my 
co-professor, he's very blunt, he told me that this (his proposal including the 
LR section) doesn't make any sense to me. This looks like a wall paper, you 
can put it on the wall and people will look at it, but never give their second 
thought…it has to have some structure it has to have a some kind of picture 
you know clear picture of what you have read, and should be able to be 
understandable. it should have some sense … so I went back and sat down 
and listened to his comments [that I recorded] to see if I exactly understood 
what he said…then I changed my literature to this, this is kind of my second 
literature review…and my supervisors said ok this looks good. (Mubin, July 
5, pp. 3-4)  
Thus, the participants’ undertaking of the LR during the conditional enrolment 
period could amount to the process of developing knowledge of the target 
literature for planning their research as well as competence in composing text in 
accord with academic conventions. The rest three subsections of Section 5.1 
explore the cognitive and epistemological features of the participants manifested 
during this process of undertaking the LR.  
5.1.2 Intentionality as the fundamental condition for knowledge and language 
development 
For the participants, undertaking the LR essentially involved engaging with a 
range of social interactions and processes, including the reading of the literature 
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or having formal and informal conversations with their supervisors. The findings 
of this section suggest that it was the intentionality of the participants that 
motivated and directed their knowledge development while engaging with such 
processes. 
Firstly, in the following data, Shu mentioned informal conversations that she 
seemed to undertake purposively in the context of carrying out the LR, while 
Nada described her selective way of reviewing the literature:  
# 5 
I think people learn when you talk when you listen. This is for me. I meet a 
lot of people and I talk a lot … I benefit from my talking with people so 
either colleagues or other PhD candidates …you can learn I mean you pick 
up things easily…from talking and listening and talking …when people talk 
they just come to the point. (Shu, Aug 15, p. 8)  
# 6 
Ok, the way I was doing my literature review is, I did it simultaneously. As 
I was writing first, I sort of write what I want to say and then look for the 
literature on that, and then, for example I was writing about wellbeing, for 
example, one specific domain … I want to do this and this is what I want to 
find this type of thing (Nada, Sep 7, p. 4)  
On the surface, the experiences of these two participants here appeared to differ. 
However, it emerges from the both accounts that they intentionally initiated the 
engagement with messages from other people (including texts), and the 
consequent attainment of knowledge could occur because they were purposefully 
directed at the sources of such knowledge.  
The role of the cognitive directedness and intentionality towards knowledge 
sources that they intended to learn from during social processes was also indicated 
in the following data from Shu, Hai and Tram (another peripheral participant) 
gathered on September 2, 2011, when we all attended the same session for PhD 
students about successfully completing the full research proposal. After the 
session, I interviewed them separately. To my question of how the session helped 
them, they responded:  
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# 7 
I think that the experts go to the workshop to share their idea, to share their 
experience, but experience that based on the questions of the students …I 
mean, all the things that need for me. I have a question so I just asked… for 
me, [if] I don't have question, I don't go to any workshop…I go to the 
workshop when I have purpose. (Hai, after a session on Sep 2, p. 2)  
# 8 
I found this one (session) was really helpful … sometimes maybe you do 
have a question but … sometimes you're shy or you don't think you're not 
that brave or confident enough to say if it is a good question but maybe 
question like that could be asked by others. (Shu, after a session on Sep 2, p. 
1)  
# 9 
I don’t think it’s (what was discussed in the session) new at all because 
sometimes I mentioned the problems with my supervisor and we also share 
with my fellow friends… and I also think something every similar with 
what you and others say and what the supervisor talk about. That is, we 
have to share with other people not only just with our supervisors but also 
any people inside and outside of field. It is quite a big communication. 
(Tram, after a session on Sep 2, p. 1)  
Firstly, attendance at the session was not compulsory, so participation was 
initiated by the three participants themselves, indicating their intentional, selective 
engagement with social processes. During the session, Hai asked questions and 
shared with other participants about how she was preparing her research proposal 
while Shu and Tram were quietly listening. Whether or not they were actively 
participating, they were all inwardly responding to the sharing of other 
participants. Consequently, their attention to what was shared during the event 
was directed at certain issues that they wanted to know about or had an interest in.  
In contrast with the directedness and intentionality in the previous accounts, a lack 
of direction is evident in the following accounts of Tram, Fadila (a peripheral 
participant) and Shu. They all reported that, at an earlier stage when they had 
lacked focus or direction, input from reading the literature (social process or act), 
a lack that appeared to result in little or no knowledge attainment: 
# 10 
I think doing literature review is very stressful (laugh). I just read, I just 
write down some main ideas, but, because, as I told you before, my topic is 
so broad. So I have no focus. I'm very confused. I don't know what I should 
write about. (Tram, Aug 21, pp. 10-11)   
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# 11 
It is not easy to achieve, because you could find many relevant resources, 
many, there are huge amount of research done in your area, but when 
reading a particular research, you find many ideas, literally too many 
scholars' research findings…. But the point is how you're going to form 
your literature, it is quite difficult so far. (Fadila, Apr 13, p. 10)  
# 12 
You read one article of this author he could mention ten, or twenty or thirty 
other authors … you want to read them and sometimes reading can get 
maybe a little bit of off the trace…I may go here and there and then there 
are a lot of things tangled in your mind…I think that is most difficult. (Shu, 
Dec 16, p. 6)  
Then in following interviews, Fadila and Tram pointed out the problems that they 
had previously in engaging in process of the written communication:  
# 13 
At the beginning, when I first came, I started reading just reading merely 
reading. At that time, I was not forming any idea of collecting, selecting any 
particular part, interesting point to my area. But … I started thinking that 
focusing on my research question … So, when reading, I have a focus in my 
mind. Every time I select, search for something about ICT, still that point of 
the research question is in my mind. (Fadila, Apr 28, p. 8-9)  
# 14 
My supervisor just asked me to keep reading log. But I can't do so. You 
know, I tried sometimes but I read a lot and if I just summarise and criticise 
it takes time but later on I don't use the most of them. So now I change my 
way. I just think of the outline of my literature review, and then I read and 
what I can get I think it is appropriate for my literature review. I just put 
them in the categories and organise ideas (Tram, Oct 26, p. 4)  
Thus, it appears again that the directedness or intentionality of the participants’ 
minds was what enabled them to access and engage with their knowledge sources, 
such as concepts or theories of other academics in spoken and written 
communications. Then in the following comment of Padma, I could identify two 
very crucial features of her intentionality that allowed her to undertake the highly 
complex task of the LR:   
 
 
 
 
128 
 
# 15 
My mind is always … toward that. Two and a half months my mind was 
always there. I remember I was dreaming and even when I sleep I was 
thinking about literature review, and always when I go to sleep, I spent about 
half and an hour or even an hour in the bed, thinking, ok what's the flow… 
always it's there in me. In daytime, my work had really me. Even though I 
don't have time to attend, really in my mind, I was processing thinking. I 
remember trying to remember the articles that relate then I tried to link all 
that it's just it's all that. (Padma, Aug 10, pp. 11-12)  
Firstly, Padma indicated that the personal directedness towards the sources of her 
knowledge was constant and on-going so that such knowledge sources that she 
perceived from texts were present in her mind even when she did not physically 
engage with them by reading or listening. Secondly, it emerges that her mind was 
intentionally putting pieces of information together into a body of knowledge, 
which must be about her research topic.        
However, it should be noted here that having recourse to the intentionality of their 
minds for selective, purposive development of their knowledge does not 
necessarily indicate that the participants were not influenced by external social 
factors. In fact, social factors influenced the participants in relation to their 
knowledge development. For example, the current trend of their own subject 
fields seemed to be one of these influential factors, as displayed in the accounts of 
Hai, Padma and Kusum:   
# 16 
It must be current and I think that it's not against the current trend of other 
researchers. It shouldn't be that old. It shouldn’t be back 20 years ago and 
[then] it's outdated, I mean, it's outdated yeah. (Hai July 2, p. 4)  
# 17 
You have to learn how to do research and for that, you first have to learn 
about the discipline that you’re going to be in…[And] the best way of 
learning about the discipline you are going to be in is reading journal 
articles which will give you the information about happening in your 
discipline. (Padma, March 21, p. 5)  
# 18 
You can learn from others past studies and definitely methodologies in that 
particular area you can see what trends are going on, you know, so in my 
opinion that's the purpose of the literature review .(Kusum, June 16, p. 14)  
 
 
129 
 
In addition, obviously, at the early stage of their PhDs, the comments and 
opinions of their supervisors were also considerably influential to the participants. 
This was acknowledged by Hai, Padma, Shu and Fadila when they explicitly 
expressed that they expected their supervisors to check if they were “on the right 
track” (Hai, Mar 13, p. 15 &16; Padma, Apr 19, p. 4, Shu, Nov, 12, p. 1 & 2; 
Fadila, Apr 28, p. 1). In the same vein, Tram and Kusum remarked: 
# 19 
T: In fact not only social, it should be the combination between the 
cognitive and social perspective in second language acquisition, 
because she [her supervisor] says that some people who just focus on 
cognitive perspective, some on social perspective. 
I : But she [her supervisor] wants you to have balance between them.  
T: Yes of course. There are some researchers who investigate 
both…cognitive and social framework. (Tram, Oct 26, pp. 3-4)  
# 20 
I wrote first and then sent my supervisor and they told me about blended 
learning. Are you sure to put this part and, if you do this you know what's 
gonna happen? Let's think about it you don't need to change just think 
about it. And then when I came back I think about it. Yeah maybe I should 
not include that because I am leading myself to, I mean, what should I say, 
when I say blended learning, when I came, I looked at online learning, you 
know environment. So, I took it out. (Kusum, Nov 30, p. 3) 
An interesting aspect that emerged from the five accounts of the participants 
above is: the academic trend and their supervisors’ comments could be influential 
because these participants actively responded to and accepted them. That is, the 
state of being influenced by social surroundings would not be something that the 
participants could have control over. However, their responses to such social 
influences seemed to centrally involve their particular volitional choices and 
decisions. This seems to be more clearly revealed by the case of Padma following, 
in which she decided not to take her supervisor’s suggestion:  
# 21 
One time with my model, my second supervisor wanted me to add some 
elements of power to it. But I felt that it should not be added…I thought it is 
not going to be relevant…I went back home, and I read the literature again, 
and then, I was convinced this is not coming here. And with that backup 
information, I went to the meeting and he asked me, he said, “Can you 
defend yourself? Can you tell me why this is?”  Of course I explained to 
them clearly and he said, “In that sense, ok it's fine. You don't need to take 
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it.” … He has a different perspective in looking at my model but I have 
some different perspectives. (Padma, Aug 21, p. 12)  
Throughout the interviews with her, Padma told me how much she trusted in her 
supervisors, and it might not be easy for her not to agree with her supervisor’s 
suggestion. Nevertheless, when she thought the power element that her supervisor 
suggested was irrelevant to her conceptual framework, she expressed her 
disapproval of his suggestion. Thus, again, people in their academic context and 
other social factors influenced the participants, but when carefully considering, 
the participants actively dealt with these influences, making decisions for whether 
to accept or resist them.  
Overall, the intentionality of the participants at a number of levels appeared to 
create the fundamental condition for the development of their knowledge and 
language, helping them to engage with social processes and to be directed at 
knowledge sources in a focused way during this social engagement. 
In Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1, I will argue that the intentionality of the participants 
appears to be a crucial indicator of the ontology of their minds, which in turn 
sheds light on how the nature of their SLA can be understood.  
5.1.3 The relation between thought and language in knowledge development  
This section presents the accounts of the participants that appeared to reveal the 
ontological relation between thought and language in the process of developing 
and demonstrating their knowledge of the target literature.  
An understanding of the ontological states and relational structures of thought and 
language among my participants emerged from negating one of the assumptions 
that I had held at the outset of data collection. At that time, although I already had 
the concept that SLA must be related to the development of overall academic 
knowledge, my research was still narrowly focused on language. With this focus, 
I presumed that for the participants, improving their English would be their 
central concern and interest.  
At first, a comment of my first participant, Hai, from her first interview seemed to 
support my presumption:  
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# 22 
One more thing that I worry is, sometimes it's very difficult to understand 
the books, all the articles I read. I got high mark in IELTS test, I got 9 
actually, but when I'm reading some articles, I don't understand what they 
are talking about…. I don't understand, meaning of some articles, their 
intention, because my supervisors expect me to be critical in reading. But 
you cannot be critical when you don't understand the articles. (Hai, Mar 13, 
p. 17)  
Prior to this comment, she also mentioned on the same interview day:  
# 23 
In the meeting [with my supervisors], actually I couldn't understand 
everything of what they say, just, I mean, one third of that. So, because I 
cannot understand everything, so, it wasn't very helpful for me. Because if I 
understand what they are saying, I then, I then can ask them questions right 
away. (Hai, Mar 13, p. 6)  
With the two comments of Hai above, I anticipated that I would easily collect 
ample data that explicitly displayed how the participants acquired English 
language. However, unlike my initial expectation, findings from my subsequent 
data collection showed that, except for Shu, the other participants including Hai 
appeared to be little concerned about this matter. For example, whenever I 
conducted unstructured monthly interviews with each participant, it was not easy 
to induce them to talk about their learning and progress in this area. Even when I 
explicitly addressed the issue, the participants tended to redirect our conversations 
back to what they were centrally concerned with: developing the academic 
knowledge necessary for their research projects. This overall tendency of the 
participants that I found is summed up in a conversation with Hai as follows:  
# 24 
I: Hai, when you came to New Zealand to do a PhD, to improve your English 
is one of the purposes to come here? 
H: No. 
I: Or, did you expect that?  
H:No, not at all…my first priority is not English. I just want to be a 
researcher. That's all. Actually I don't know how to do research (laugh)…If 
you can understand what other people are talking about … I mean, if you 
have the same knowledge as other people, and then listening is no longer 
become a problem. Yeah. It's enough for us to survive to be a researcher. 
(Hai, May 22, pp. 7-8)  
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Thus, although she was concerned about her English competence reported in 
Extracts # 22 and 23, improving her English appears not to be what she centrally 
intended to achieve. I once even felt frustrated with the overall attitude that the 
participants displayed, not knowing how to unravel it. I repeatedly revisited the 
first two comments of Hai relating to her English competence. I also reflected on 
the accounts of Shu and Tram as follows, which show that they also struggled 
with the same issue that Hai had:  
# 25 
You know that academic reading it is not that easy, so it took me much 
longer time to read…maybe in Chinese in your language you can pick up 
those ideas while you're reading, but in English you need to read it, and yes 
you also do that while you're reading but for some you have to re-read it to 
get those important ideas …even if you spend a lot of time still you didn't 
quite catch the point, maybe there's misunderstanding. (Shu, Aug 15, p. 13)  
# 26 
I : How about doing the literature review in English? 
T: It is difficult to because when I read some articles I don't really think I        
can understand correctly or not. Yeah so it is just from my understanding 
but I don't know how exactly it is, if it is. (Tram, Aug 21, p. 11)  
The remarks from the three participants seem to suggest that their concerns about 
English related to the fact that important sources of the knowledge that they 
sought to develop were encoded in language that they found difficult to 
understand. That is, the consideration that the target literature was written in 
English was an obstacle in undertaking the LR appeared to lead them to be 
worried about their level of English. This similar attitude of the three participants 
obviously suggested that, although they might think they needed to improve their 
English, the ultimate purpose of such need was to better comprehend the content 
of the target literature. Significantly, such an attitude provided me with an initial 
clue to consider the possibility that the content of the target literature was 
delivered by means of English language, but the content (consisting of the authors’ 
thoughts) and language were in fact two separate entities. This inference was also 
underpinned by the fact that some participants sometimes re-encoded some 
meanings embedded in English texts in their own first languages in order to 
understand them more clearly (see Extract # 40 in Section 5.1.4 & Extract # 46 in 
Section 5.2.1). This, for me, seemed to have been possible because these 
 
 
133 
 
participants firstly separated the meanings from the English language that 
originally encoded them.  
The ontological separateness of language and thought in knowledge that seemed 
to be implied in the accounts of Hai, Tram and Shu emerged more clearly in two 
other comments of Hai relating to expressing her thoughts in writing. Firstly, at 
her second last interview, when I asked what she was doing, she replied:  
# 27 
I’m looking at analysing data, yeah because nothing serious with that part 
(her LR draft) I think it's ok it's ok now I just change the styles of , writing 
style yeah the writing style to make it look more professional. (Hai, Jul 2, p. 
1)  
Again her comment, apparently trivialising of linguistic styles, seemed to suggest 
that, in her mind, her extra-linguistic content (thoughts) and linguistic resources 
existed as two separate systems. In addition, she also seemed to consider that the 
former is more central and important while the latter is somewhat subservient to 
the former. Then, another comment from Hai on the same day confirmed the 
above notion, which was her response to my question if her “Vietnamese English” 
shapes her thinking. For the question, I referred to a published Vietnamese scholar 
called Ha, whose book Hai considers as an ideal example of academic English 
writing. She argued:  
# 28 
Language is just a tool to express ideas and …she [the Vietnamese scholar] 
is Vietnamese but I also read what others write… I mean that her ways of 
writing is not unique but it's very, it's very personal and I mean, [as] the 
author of qualitative book …I think that language is the way to express your 
ideas. For some people, they can be very good at language but they have no 
idea. I mean, one reason that Ha can write such beautiful writing is that she 
has some very excellent ideas and you know her ideas are unique I mean she 
is very intelligent she has some knowledge to tell you about, and the 
language is just a tool for you to express your idea. (Hai, July 2, pp. 9-10)  
In addition to her consideration that thought and knowledge of language are two 
separate systems, the argument of Hai above also seems to suggest that, in the 
process of being expressed, thought either already exists or is formed first, and 
then it is encoded in language.  
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The accounts of the participants thus far appeared to suggest the relation between 
the content of thought and language as two distinctive knowledge areas; the latter 
encodes the former. In addition, some accounts from the participants seemed to 
suggest that the knowledge for academic writing involves some sort of procedural 
knowledge required for structuring the content of thought above and beyond 
linguistic knowledge. For example, this is evident in the comment of Fadila: 
# 29 
I think we need to learn actually really learn how to write a literature 
[review]. It's not [just] about English... It’s [also] about strategies of writing 
literature review. It's different. That’s what I found, because you could be 
good in English, but you could not be good in writing literature review. 
(Fadila, Apr 13, p. 9)   
The idea that academic writing requires more than just having good knowledge of 
and ability to use language (as linguistic systems) was indicated earlier in the 
narrative of Mubin in Extract # 4 in Section 5.1, and again in the comments from 
Mubin, Nada and Kusum (a peripheral participant) as follows. They stated that 
they were generally confident about their English level, but not in composing text 
in the more academic style required when writing a PhD thesis. That is, in terms 
of English language skills, They said “[my English] in general sense is alright” 
(Mubin, July, 6, p. 4), “I can’t find difficulty [with using English]… because…I 
was schooling in English” (Nada, Apr 9, p. 11), and “I’ve been using English all 
the time…English is definitely more comfortable” (Kusum, Jun 16, pp. 9-10). On 
the other hand, their remarks relating to writing the LR or research proposals for 
their PhD projects suggest that they were less confident in that area: 
# 30 
I don’t think, um… when you are doing masters, it’s like you make a 
draft…because it's just masters’ thesis, so itself, it's very small… my 
literature review was not that extensive. (Mubin, Apr 12, p. 6) 
# 31 
I have some kind of experience in that, but I feel now when I look at PhD, 
it's kind of shallow research papers. You just, I get probably ten articles, you 
know, you just write what has been happening or what people have done, 
but PhD, I have come to realisation that it has to be deeper than that, and I 
need to improve my skills in that area. (Kusum, June 16, p. 2)  
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# 32 
I guess the initial proposal, that is not good at all. After I talked to my 
supervisor, [she said my initial proposal is] not adequate at all, not focused 
also (laugh). (Nada, Apr 9, pp. 6-7)  
As will be seen in Section 5.2.2, the competence required for extensive academic 
writing that the three participants above seemed to think that they needed to 
develop includes the knowledge of academic vocabulary. However, their 
comments seemed to signal more centrally that their awareness that, for academic 
writing, they should know how to structure and compose extended, substantial 
academic text besides having a fundamental linguistic competence in English 
language.   
Overall, the findings of this section seem to suggest that, in the minds of the 
participants, more specifically in their academic knowledge, the content of 
thought and language are two separate areas. Then, in composing an academic 
text, such as a LR text in academic English, knowledge of academic English 
means not just the knowledge of linguistic systems that manifest thought in the 
form of written text but also that of organising and structuring text (thought). The 
ontological structure of thought and academic English in the academic knowledge 
of the participants that seemed to be revealed in their accounts can be diagrammed 
as in Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1: Thought and academic English in academic knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ontological relation between thought and language and its operation will be 
explored in greater detail and related to the SLA of the participants in Sections 5.2.  
5.1.4 Understanding meanings intended in the target literature  
This section reports the participants’ epistemological approaches to reviewing the 
target literature that emerged from their accounts.   
Clarifying this issue began by considering two competing notions of the nature of 
knowledge. One is the idea broadly shared by scholars from the social, cultural 
SLA stream, which suggests that knowledge is, by nature, relative, cultural and 
linguistic (e.g., Duff, 2002; Kramsch, 1993, 2004; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). On 
the other hand, the other notion is from the realist philosophers, Husserl (1970) 
and Willard (1984, 1995), which argues that knowledge is a set of mental 
representations consisting of thought relations, which can be precise 
understandings of what is known as it is.  
To begin with, I present Fadila’s response to my question of whether or not being 
a second language speaker influences her understanding of the knowledge of 
others written or spoken in English:   
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# 33 
Just let's put it in a situation like a person knows only her mother tongue, 
right? I think we are very different from that person, because our mind is 
open to different, we hear different thing. When we hear different things we 
tend to reflect back so when reflecting it will be creative … the reflection 
different from the one who is working in her mother tongue. (Fadila, Jun 7, 
pp. 2-3)  
Here she appears to claim that, if someone can speak more than one language, the 
different languages that she speaks allow her to hear different things and then 
think creatively. Her idea was interesting, but her exact meaning was not clear to 
me, so I asked her to give an example of what she meant by hearing different 
things and (then) becoming more creative than the one speaks only one language. 
She added: 
# 34 
Other languages you've been already exposed, you have some input in your 
mind because if you ask me 'salt' in different languages I know what is salt 
in different languages so meaning that we have that ability to put many 
things in one. (Fadila, Jun 7, p. 4)  
Thus, Fadila’s two above accounts seem to display two important points. Firstly, 
creativity from her perspective does not involve deriving different interpretations 
of a thing or concept when using different languages, but rather having more 
linguistic resources to encode the same thing or concept. In addition, her idea of 
the cognitive ability of the multilingual that she mentioned seemed to suggest that 
the mind of a person can stretch beyond his/her cultural/linguistic frames. These 
two points implied in her thinking appear to be congruent with the realist notion 
of the capability of the human cognition, while not exactly matching the culturally 
relativistic view, which claims the person’s thought is completely bound to 
culturally acquired schemata (e.g., M. Johnson, 1987).  
Corresponding to the latter point emerging from the preceding comments of 
Fadila, Padma’s and Shu’s observations about themselves in relation to 
understanding the target literature seemed indicate that their ways of thinking 
were not completely bound to their own cultures.     
#35  
Regards to my exposure (to her own culture), compared to Kiwis (New 
Zealanders) here, it's different, so my culture has contributed a lot in 
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understanding …concepts [from the literature]. My religion has contributed 
a lot. But I always think that it's something very individual. I mean, it's just 
me. (Padma, Jun 8, p. 7)  
# 36  
Of course …there should be big part there is Chinese culture because that is, 
you know, a culture in which I was brought up, so of course there will be 
those influence. But there might be also western philosophy which I think is 
true or is right. (Shu, Jan 11, p. 8). 
Therefore, the two participants seemed to consider that, although they were 
certainly influenced by their own cultures, they also understand the target 
literature outside of their cultural backgrounds. Then the following remark of 
Nada, which was about her realisation that her and her supervisor’s own 
conceptions of family were different, seems to further suggest the cognitive 
capacity for extending the mind beyond one’s own culture is critical to understand 
others’ ideas or concepts precisely:  
# 37  
I was talking with my supervisor about wellbeing is conditional. So I was 
telling her in Maldives, if you say living with family, that doesn't mean that 
you're living with your spouse. So it is really meaning that you're living with 
your children [and] parents…if you live [only] with your husband it's not 
really, then you're living alone (laugh) with your husband. Then we are not 
calling this living with family. Because it came up like in that research that 
was done here [New Zealand]. Living with family, living condition what 
they have discussed here is that mostly living alone, living with spouse, 
living with partner so I was talking that is not living with family. For me it 
is not living with family (laugh). I mean, in Maldives, we interpret living 
with family differently, because we mean, in our concept, living with a 
family is extended family not nuclear family. So if I was with my nuclear 
family it is not living with my family. My sister, my parents should be 
there….yeah for me for us it's very different. (Nada, Jun 10, p. 16)  
On the surface, Nada seems to suggest that a person from a different culture 
would interpret the same concept differently from what was originally intended to 
be meant by her supervisor. However, when carefully considered, her concept of 
family and that of her supervisor are in fact two different types of family 
(extended and nuclear) corresponding to the reality of her country and that of New 
Zealand respectively, differences which Nada understood correctly and formed 
part of her existing knowledge. Therefore, her experience of dealing with the two 
different concepts of family seems to accord with the notion that acquiring or 
 
 
139 
 
developing specialist knowledge centrally involves arriving at an accurate 
understanding of the object of knowledge beyond cultural, linguistic influences.  
In the same vein, her realisation of the need for different concepts and theories to 
account for the well-being of elderly people in small countries like hers (her area 
of research) seemed to come after precisely understooding existing concepts and 
theories of well-being from the previous research conducted in relatively large 
countries:  
# 38  
The context which I came from is different even in the literature even in 
what they have been studying, I put a new perspective to my supervisor and 
everybody who is working in this area. I think I have broadened this 
important area and saying why this has not been studied. And I want to 
research it. In that way, bringing in new ideas on your own knowledge is 
that is coming from outside I think that is the main advantage. The other 
thing is the way of doing things is also different from how they are doing. 
(Nada, Sep 7, p. 9) 
In addition, in the following data extracts, Hai and Padma explicitly disagreed 
with the idea that their cultural and language background would somehow 
influence them to change the meanings of what they read from what the writer 
originally intended: 
# 39 
The author of the articles, I mean, can be native speakers or non-native 
speakers. They mention a thing, a word, and explain things in the context. 
But when we read the term, and when we use it in our own context, and it 
can be understood in different ways. But the, I mean, the meaning, I don't 
think the meaning itself changes. (Hai, Sep 18, p. 5)  
Here Hai seems to suggest that, although the writer uses a specific context to 
explain the meaning of a certain abstract concept, and the reader’s (researcher’s) 
reflects his/her own research context as another instance of the same concept to 
understand it, the writer’s intended meaning of the concept still remains intact. 
Meanwhile, after telling me that she sometimes experiences mental translation 
between English and her first language when she reads, Padma added: 
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# 40 
I've never read any academic books in Sinhala [her first language] and all 
that. So even if I read books in English which have all theories in 
them...when it comes to talking with my husband, right?, whatever I read in 
English…I just ask him in Sinhala…Yeah, even though I read and get all in 
English…I transfer that to Sinhala ideas and then I talk to my husband in 
Sinhala in most of times… What we read, the same thing what is there… 
when you get it in Sinhala I suggest I don't see any difference to that 
meaning of the thing we read in English that we try to convert in Sinhala. 
Nothing is added more by doing it. (Padma, Jun 8, p. 8)  
Thus, she regarded that the meaning of what she reads is the same regardless of 
whether she understands it in English or in her first language.  
In fact, a number of data extracts presented in this chapter indicate the participants 
strove to understand the content of the target literature precisely as the authors 
intended (e.g., Extracts # 22, 23, 25 & 26 in Section 5.1.3, Extracts # 42 & 47 in 
Section 5.2.1 & Extracts # 76 & 77 in Section 5.2.3). Shu’s following statement 
about how she would examine the validity of research-based articles seems to be 
one that represents this overall intention of the participants in comprehending the 
target literature:  
# 41 
You know once you know those procedures of doing research and methods 
and you would say, are their research questions and research methods and 
research objectives clear? And what methods have they used? How have 
they used their methods and how have they come up with the conclusion. 
(Shu, Dec 16, p. 4)  
Overall, the accounts of the participants considered in this section seemed to 
suggest that academic knowledge that the participants developed through the LR 
did not consist merely of relativistic interpretations influenced by cultural, 
linguistic backgrounds. Rather, it seemed to involve more centrally understanding 
the concepts, theories and research reports as intended by the authors of the 
literature beyond such cultural influences. In fact, as the reference lists in the 
participants’ research proposals reveal, undertaking the LR required the 
participants to deal with texts written by authors who seemed to be from a number 
of different cultures. Thus, if the participants had had to depend on their own 
cultural resources to understand culturally diverse texts, developing valid 
academic knowledge by undertaking the LR may not have been possible.  
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Section 5.2.1 following reports the SLA of the participants in relation to their 
approached to comprehending the meanings encoded in text that emerged from 
the findings of this section.  
Summary and implications of Section 5.1 
In Section 5.1.1, I firstly reported that the participants considered the undertaking 
of the LR as a central part of the overall process of developing their academic 
knowledge. Clarifying the meaning of undertaking the LR is important because 
the central agenda of this study is to investigate their SLA occurring through such 
knowledge development.  
Some common epistemological characteristics emerged across different 
participants in their ways of approaching what they intended to know, such as the 
target literature or the areas of knowledge required in academic writing. The 
findings in Section 5.1.2 suggested that the intentionality and directedness of their 
minds enabled the participants to acquire academic knowledge while engaging in 
social processes. Section 5.1.3 reported the findings that suggested a possible 
hierarchy of the content of thought and language (procedural knowledge and 
linguistic systems) as separate entities that constitute academic knowledge. Lastly, 
in Section 5.1.4, I projected the possibility that the knowledge of the participants 
might emerge from accurate understandings of the meaning intentions of the 
authors of their target literature, despite the influence of their own cultural, 
linguistic backgrounds.  
The cognitive dispositions and processes of the participants reported in Section 
5.1 are significant in two aspects. Firstly, in Section 5.2 following, the SLA of the 
participants will be explored in terms of these dispositions and processes. In 
addition, in Chapter 6, they will be drawn upon for rethinking the mind, thought-
language relation and knowledge, which are essential concepts in understanding 
second language learning and use.  
5.2 The occurrence of SLA through cognitive processing 
This section examines the SLA of the participants in relation to their 
epistemological dispositions and processes reported in previous Section 5.1, 
 
 
142 
 
which they applied in acquiring knowledge by carrying out the literature review. 
The subsidiary research question addressed in this section is:  
2. To what extent is the SLA of the participants understood in terms of their 
cognitive dispositions and processes characterised in reviewing the 
target literature and research planning?  
Section 5.2.1 examines the SLA of the participants occurring through their 
cognitive processes and approaches to understanding the notions, concepts or 
theories of other scholars. Next, Section 5.2.2 considers their SLA occurring 
through the processes of expressing thoughts in the form of academic text. Then 
Section 5.2.3 examines the extent to which the activation and enactment of 
criticality in undertaking the LR was related to the SLA of the participants.  
5.2.1 SLA and seeking accurate understandings of the meanings intended by 
others   
Previously, Section 5.1.4 reported that the knowledge that the participants 
acquired through the LR seemed not to solely consist of relative interpretations 
based on their cultural backgrounds. Instead, they sought to comprehend 
accurately the target literature as the authors originally intended. This section 
reports the findings about the SLA of the participants relating to their cognitive 
striving and processing to understand the target meanings embedded in texts as 
accurately as possible.  
I begin with Padma. As she stated, the task of undertaking the LR required her to 
clearly understand her research-related concepts: 
# 42 
I…have got to…clearly identify concepts [that] he [her supervisor] sent me, 
it comes in this, network concepts, which I am discussing broadly, so that's 
it, so, I have made all this for that, so these are the ones that I have read 
(Padma Apr 19, pp. 2-3)  
Considering another comment presented in Section 5.1.3 (Extract # 40), for her, 
clearly identifying concepts would appear to involve understanding them as 
intended by the authors, not changing or transforming their original meanings. 
However, achieving such accurate knowledge of the target literature was 
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sometimes difficult for her. In another interview, she admitted that “there have 
been many instances there some sentences were not that clear to me” (Padma, Jun 
8, p. 9). Given this apparent knowledge gap, I started to presume that, when the 
meanings of what she was reading were not clear to her, it would be possible that 
she had not known some of the language systems (e.g., vocabulary, syntax or 
rhetorical patterns) that encode the meanings. Then her intention and effort to 
understand clearly and accurately such meanings may have pushed her to learn the 
particular linguistic resources that kept her from comprehending the contents. 
This inference seems to be supported by extracts from an email correspondence 
with Padma, in which I asked her if she had known a term that I found from one 
of her documents before commencing her PhD: 
# 43 
I: Padma…I found the term, “dyadic relationship” from one of your 
documents you gave me. Did you know its meaning before you 
commenced your PhD? 
P: I learnt about the term when I started reading for my proposal and not 
before. Hope this helps. (Padma, email correspondence, Oct 30, 2012)  
In fact, evidence that the participants, as PhD students undertaking the LR, were 
actively engaged in cognitive processing and effort to understand the target 
literature accurately emerged substantially from data. For example:   
# 44 
I will focus on my literature, each section, the number, justification, and 
academic terms. It has to be done. So first my literature review will focus on 
that. Then also finding the gaps why I and that all that, and then the whole 
section of literature review have little bit I'm sure how to go about detail. I 
really need to start. (Nada Apr 9, p. 9)  
Therefore, as emerging from the case of Padma in Extracts # 42 and 43, it would 
be reasonable to consider that most of the participants experienced learning new 
academic English to a certain extent, while striving to understand the target 
literature precisely, What is significant here is that, this language acquisition 
occurring with input seemed to be facilitated by the recursively, intensive 
perceiving of meanings or texts that were not easily understood, for which the 
participants utilised several methods and strategies.  
 
 
144 
 
For example, as she shared in Extract # 25 in Section 5.1.3, Shu struggled with 
reading the target literature due centrally to the fact that it was written her second 
language. To tackle this problem, she wrote down and contemplated carefully 
difficult academic vocabulary words and phrases that hampered her 
comprehension of the target literature: 
# 45 
I still do a lot of manual work and that is reading and writing I mainly do 
handwriting, manual writing or in a word document, but I did find writing 
helps a lot with organising those ideas (Shu, Nov 12, p. 4)  
After the interview was over, I asked her for a copy of her reading notes, Which I 
present in Extract # 46 as follows: 
#46 Shu’s manual note 
# 46: The reading note of Shu  
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On examining her reading notes, I found out that she occasionally wrote Chinese 
words. With my limited knowledge of Chinese characters, I was able to see that 
she defined, described or rephrased certain terms or concepts in Chinese. In an 
unrecorded conversation afterwards, she informed me that she looked up English 
words (or expressions) that she did not know from an English-English dictionary 
first. Sometimes, although understanding the meanings of certain words after 
dictionary consultation, it was not easy for her to associate the English words that 
she looked up with their meanings promptly. Then she wrote down the meanings 
of the words in Chinese to help herself to make connections between them and 
their meanings. By making this series of effort – note-taking, dictionary-
consulting and occasional translation from English to Chinese, she seemed to 
comprehend her research-related concepts and ideas clearly. At the same time, she 
also seemed to engage with the process of taking up and remembering language 
resources that encode these concepts and ideas. That is, the creation and revision 
of her manual notes appeared to help her to attend iteratively to those academic 
vocabulary and expressions at her own pace for processing them, and 
consequently, may have led her to acquire some of those academic language 
resources.  
In addition, the following data from Hai seemed to indicate her language 
acquisition driven by the focused, recursive cognising of meanings embedded in 
texts. As reported in Section 5.1.3, Hai also told me that, as a second language 
speaker of English, it is challenging and difficult to read and comprehend 
academic texts written in the language (Extracts # 22 & 23 in Section 5.1.3). Then, 
in her account below, she emphasised that she read the same materials a number 
of times as a way to develop an accurate understanding of what she was reading.  
# 47 
You know that actually when I read an important article, I have to read it 
about ten times. So if we are not hard working how can we understand 
articles. Yeah...I don't know… because I…read very hard to understand [the 
literature, but still] there is difficulty understanding...I told him [her 
supervisor] that if I am not hardworking I don't understand articles. (Hai Apr 
28, pp. 12-13)  
Then, I noticed that, in the same way that she read the same articles repeatedly 
seeking a precise understanding of them, she repeatedly listened to the 
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conversations with her supervisors that she audio-recorded, until she finally 
understood the conversations at the meetings clearly:   
# 48 
They (her supervisors) asked me to record the meeting, I think that it's quite 
helpful. Because, in the meeting, actually I couldn't understand everything 
so, because I cannot understand everything, so, it wasn't very helpful for me. 
Because if I understand what they are saying, I then, I then can ask them 
questions right away. But at home, I listen again, and again, and I say, ah, 
yes, that' what they expected me to do. But actually, in the last meeting they 
gave me quite useful advice to modify the model. (Hai, Mar 12, p. 6)  
From her two accounts above, I began to infer that, while achieving a more 
complete understanding of messages embedded in spoken and written texts by 
iteratively returning to, and cognising them, she seemed to be acquiring some 
language resources used in encoding the messages, resources that she had not 
known before. This inference was underpinned by her comment at the interview 
on June 6th. She said, “[my understanding of the literature] got better because… 
one of the reasons that I told you that reading is difficult at the beginning, it’s 
because I didn’t have enough understanding of…the way they [the authors of the 
literature] explain” (p. 5). Therefore, she appeared to develop knowledge of the 
rhetorical patterns of academic texts while trying to understand the meanings of 
the target literature precisely. In addition, one of the summaries of the audio-
recorded conversations, which she made to send her supervisors, also seemed to 
support this possibility of her acquisition of some language resources encoding 
meanings through recursive focusing on these meanings.  
# 49: A supervision meeting summary of Hai  
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In the summary, she wrote, “CLEAR NOW”, to indicate that she reached an 
understanding of the academic term “discourse of professionalism”. This 
acquisition appears to have been driven by a focused, recursive meaning 
clarification while listening to, and summarising the particular supervision 
meeting.  
In fact, most of the participants audio-recorded, re-listened to, and made follow-
up summaries of their supervision meetings, in order to understand their 
supervisors’ comments clearly. In doing so, some of them also appeared to 
experience the acquisition of linguistic knowledge. That is, as seen in Hai’s case, 
the audio-recording and follow-up summaries seemed to provide a condition for 
having sufficient time to process language that encoded their supervisors’ 
messages in a focused way. Then this focused, recursive processing of texts 
seemed to facilitate the acquisition of the language encoding the meanings. To 
support this interpretation, I present two more meeting summaries that Fadila and 
Shu provided to me as follows:  
# 50: A supervision meeting summary of Fadila  
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# 51: A supervision meeting summary of Shu  
 
 
 
 
 
As acknowledged in their own summaries, Fadila learned some rhetorical patterns 
that her supervisor wanted to impart to her, while Shu learned some expressions 
that her supervisor used and realised the need to understand some methodological 
terms clearly. These language resources were initially given to, or heard by the 
two participants when they were having meetings with their supervisors. However, 
What made it possible for them to learn these resources seemed to be their own 
cognitive effort and processing to understand and take up these resources, which 
they engaged in while re-listening to and summarising (for Shu, even transcribing) 
their supervision meetings afterwards. That is, like Hai’s case, their language 
learning presented here seemed to be the result of repeated mental focusing on the 
language-meaning association of their supervisors’ utterances (texts).   
As such, iterative perception of, or mental focusing on the target meanings by 
different means seemed to be crucial for the participants to develop their 
understandings of such meanings as intended by their producers, and subsequently 
to experience SLA. Moreover, for this intentional uptake of the target meaning 
seemingly conductive to their SLA, the participants also involved the reality of 
their research context that they perceived. This is exemplified in a narrative of Hai: 
# 52  
For experienced teachers, it (a particular theory) is said that their self-
efficacy remains the same … it is said in the literature. Maybe they need big 
changes in this saying. I read [another] book and they say that the nature of 
self-efficacy is dynamic, it fluctuates, it depends on context. I myself see 
that's true. For example, I'm an experienced teacher but the beginning of 
lesson I feel myself very self-efficacious because I prepared very well home 
for the lesson but then during lesson I see some student you know don't 
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want to learn or some you know my levels of self-efficacy goes down. Or, 
near the end of teaching period I become tired because it's too hungry. Now 
so it's down, so actually within a teaching period it changes, for me, it 
changes, For example I within the week I teach different classes with 
different students so my level of self-efficacy changes too. (Hai, Apr 28, p. 
1)  
In the extract above, Hai was trying to understand the concept of self-efficacy and 
its fluctuating nature by intuiting her own mental and emotional states in her 
teaching context. Such a mental act of sensing or perceiving a specific example or 
instance of the abstract concept appeared to be necessary for Hai to understand the 
concept itself and acquire the English term referring to the concept, which she has 
“not heard…before commencing [her] PhD degree” (Hai, email correspondence, 
Oct 30, 2012). In fact, more instances found in the data of study that indicate that 
other participants also drew on real events or things in the process of 
understanding the target literature (e.g., Extracts # 68, 69 & 71 in Section 5.2.3). 
Thus, possibly, the SLA of the participants that occurred through mental focusing 
and effort to understand target meanings would have involved perceiving or 
drawing on the reality to which these target meanings related to.  
Overall, the participants seemed to experience SLA through striving to understand 
the meanings embedded in texts accurately, particularly through intensive, 
iterative focusing on the language-meaning association or the functions of 
language encoding such meanings. In addition, this meaning-uncovering 
processing, which appeared to be a driving force for their SLA, also seemed to 
involve the cognitive act of drawing on real events or things relevant to the target 
meaning.  
5.2.2 SLA and thought-language operation in encoding thoughts 
This section examines the SLA of the participants as it occurred through the 
related operation of thought and language in their knowledge.  
After I initially perceived the ontological separateness and functional relation of 
thought and language in the knowledge of the participants, which took some time 
(see Section 5.1.3), I realised that they were in fact quite evident in their accounts. 
For example, Kusum mentioned: 
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# 53  
When it comes to academic writing, probably, if I have difficulties, when I 
want to paraphrase something, for instance, I want to get the exact meaning 
then I may think twice. (Kusum, June 16, p. 10)  
From her accounts, it was inferred that she decoded the content of the target 
literature, and then encoded it in her own words, which again seemed to indicate 
the ontological separateness of thought and language. In addition, it also seemed 
to emerge that there were a hierarchical operation between her thought 
(understanding of the literature) and language that she used for paraphrasing.  
This ontological and operational relationship between thought and language 
emerged from some episodes that the participants shared, in which they illustrated 
the imbalance between developed thoughts and insufficient linguistic resources. 
Hai stated: 
# 54  
[My supervisor] told me to look at the words [I used] He said that some 
words are not suitable, not English words, I invented (laugh). So I changed 
that a little bit. And then he said that if I can’t express it more clearly I can 
use direct quote. So I think I should do that. (Hai, July 2, pp. 2-3)  
This comment shows that Hai developed some ideas after reading the literature, 
but did not have adequate linguistic resources to express her thoughts, which then 
led her to resort to “inventing” some words. By changing the “words” invented by 
her into a direct quotation from the original source, she believed that she could 
resolve her problem, while maintaining her intended ideas for the wider context of 
her LR text. Similarly, Nada remarked: 
# 55  
I try to think about [my supervisor’s] comments on my paper and she would 
say it will be better word for this so it is more scientific, more academic and 
now I'm thinking about certain words like ok…she was saying “don't write 
'like ~' ok? Instead, [write] 'in similar smaller islands'”. Very small things, 
the meaning is the same but she wants me to use more general, academic 
language. (Nada, Sep 7, pp. 5-6)  
In Nada’s case, she used language that was too informal in expressing her ideas, 
which her supervisor pointed out, and subsequently advised her to use an 
academic style. As a result, she had to change informal language into academic 
language while still retaining the meanings (thoughts) that she intended. From the 
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cases of Hai and Nada, I perceived the hierarchical function of thought and 
language in their knowledge development arising from the fact that they had 
insufficient linguistic resources to encode their thoughts appropriately.   
A similar reflection arose from a long, reflective narrative of Shu during her first 
interview about her struggle with writing in her second language, which I 
revisited. This interview was conducted before those with Hai and Nada, the 
extracts of which I presented above:  
# 56  
If it is your own language, once you get the idea you can start to write. You 
don't have to, I mean, with word selection, you don't need to think that much. 
I mean, you have some ideas and you just start to write everything just 
comes out. But with English writing, when you write, yes, you also get ideas 
but…it take you much longer time. For example, with preposition choice 
you need to think, ‘Oh is it “in” or “at”?’…I want my writing to be good 
writing, I don't want that much grammatical mistakes, so, then with that 
very simple language problem, it does not affect, I mean, understanding, I 
mean, meaning, conveying the meaning, it does not make that much 
difference on that. But it does demonstrate your whole master of the 
language, and I want my English to be good…[If] I have something that I'm 
not sure, I stop and look up…dictionary or refer to native speaker whatever 
you do it takes time so even if it is just short passage or short paragraph it 
just take much longer time. (Shu, Aug, 15, pp. 13-14)  
The difficulty and challenge in expressing her thoughts in English that she shared 
here emerges from having insufficient linguistic resources to encode her thoughts 
effectively and appropriately. It is quite clear that the reason she wanted to 
improve her English competence for undertaking academic work is not that she 
cannot form her thoughts relating to her subject content. In actuality, she cannot 
express her thought as easily as she does in her first language.   
The remarks of the three participants above seem to reveal that in their knowledge 
development thought and language were hierarchically operating, and their central 
concern was not having sufficient language resources for this thought-language 
operation. In addition to this, Tram’s comments in Extract # 57 below seems to 
imply that expressing thought in language involves quite complex cognitive 
processes, which were not clearly articulated by Hai, Nada and Shu in Extracts # 
54, 55 and 56. Tram stated:    
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# 57  
I listed what they (researchers in the literature) have done into different 
themes, [such as,] what types of language anxiety, how it manifest itself in 
the classroom, in the interrelation between language anxiety and other social 
constructs…for example, passion or willingness to communicate. (Tram, 
Sep 15, p. 3)  
According to Tram, the thought-language operation in undertaking the LR is not 
just encoding a thought into a word, phrases or sentence: it involves interrelating 
and organising thoughts into themes and expressing them in extended propose. 
Her idea can be considered in conjunction with some participants’ comments 
reported previously in Section 5.1.3, which seemed to indicate that the language 
for expressing ideas in text means both thought-structuring procedural patterns 
and linguistic resources. In addition to this, earlier, in her previous interview, 
Tram also mentioned that the process of interrelating and textualizing thoughts 
was difficult.  
 # 58  
When I write the literature review according to the themes, it's very difficult 
to separate the factors in an article [which is present to me] according to a 
researcher or author. It's rather difficult. (Tram, Aug 21, pp. 10-11)  
This difficulty, and the need to learn how to organise and synthesise thoughts 
appropriately were also implied in Extracts # 4, 29, 30 and 32 already (see 
Sections 5.1.1 & 5.1.3).  
Thus, in all of the accounts of the participants presented above, it firstly emerged 
that they found the need to improve their academic English from not having 
enough resources of the language to express thought. That is, these data led me to 
sense clearly the underlying need of the participant to improve their competence 
in using such resources as part of the hierarchical thought-language operative 
process. In addition, it was also importantly found that academic English that they 
needed to improve involved both procedural patterns of organising thought as 
well as linguistic resources.  
Then the following data from Shu, Tram and Fadila reveal the actual efforts that 
they made to tackle the issue of not having sufficient procedural and linguistic 
resources for encoding their thought: 
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# 59  
Sometimes some words are just too informal and I write and think there 
should be some academic writing style… For example, we need a lot of 
verbs like, somebody clarifies, somebody states, somebody claims… when I 
read…I know I need those words so…I highlight those words or put it or 
make my own vocabulary list and that helps. (see her reading note in Extract 
66 ) (Shu, Dec 16, p. 6)  
# 60  
I can see some good ideas and from the literature. They are all saying that 
this one said this and the other one said opposite ideas, or yeah, similar 
ideas. I have the habit of trying to copy… I also write down the words, the 
expressions they used to argue report something yeah (Tram, Fadila & Tram, 
Aug 21, p. 8-9)  
# 61  
Actually good literature put those ideas yes when I was writing my literature 
I tend to check those things is this good or not when I find a really good 
interesting paragraph I used to copy their way to write (Fadila, Fadila & 
Tram, Aug 21, p. 8)  
# 62  
I : Do you think that now you have learned how to do the literature review 
for the last six months? 
H: (quite a long pause) I don't know because actually... at the beginning I 
have a lot of difficulties in understanding what the literature review is 
about and I read.....(long pause) some theses and learned the way to write 
a literature review (Hai, Sep 18, p. 2)  
# 63: Shu’s vocabulary note  
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In the preceding extracts, Shu, Tram and Fadila explained that they tried to attend 
to, and learn suitable academic language or procedural resources from the 
literature materials. In Hai’s case, she appeared to have analysed text-organising 
conventions while engaging in the extensive reading of others’ theses. Then she 
seemed to apply these rhetorical conventions to composing her own LR text. 
Evidently, for the four participants, adopting the systemic and rhetorical resources 
of academic English used by the authors of the literature was not copying the 
content of thought of these authors. This implies that, again, thought (content) and 
linguistic/rhetorical systems are separate areas in academic knowledge. In 
addition, as indicated in the other previous extracts in this section, the participants 
drew on linguistic/rhetorical resources to express their own thought, which, as 
stated previously, appeared to involve a hierarchical operation between extra-
linguistic thought and systemic/procedural knowledge. In so doing, they might 
have acquired some – although not all – of the linguistic/rhetorical resources 
found from the literature and used in their writing.  
Similarly, in the following conversation with Hai, her concept map and 
questionnaire seem to indicate that she was consolidating her vocabulary 
knowledge that she newly attained through similar thought-language processing:  
# 64  
I : So, could you tell me one more time? You have met your supervisors… 
H: Ok, so, um, actually, before this (two proposal drafts that she sent me 
previously), I have another one… and then, like the concept map I gave 
you. Before the concept map I have got one so I will send you. That stuff, 
and after, and this one goes along with the concept map, and this one, 
actually (turning pages)... let me see, no not this one, the concept map the 
one I sent you, 
I : The first one. 
H: Yep, but… I don't know. I have so many stuffs. (Hai, Apr 20, pp. 1-2) 
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# 65: The concept map of Hai  
 
 
 
 
 
# 66: The questionnaire of Hai 
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As reported previously in Section 5.2.1, the term of self-efficacy was new to her, 
and she appeared to clarify and learn its meaning through linking it to a certain 
mental state of Vietnamese English teachers that she had already perceived and 
planned to investigate. Then, the data above show that she actually applied this 
new construct and its sub-constructs to identify the same mentality, for which she 
produced a number of materials, such as the concept map and questionnaire 
presented above. That is, she seemed to engage with the cognitive processing of 
encoding her thought of a phenomenon that she had experienced drawing on 
academic concepts (self-efficacy and its sub-categories) that she had newly 
learned. Through this processing, she appeared to be developing a more 
consolidated knowledge of those academic vocabulary words.   
Similarly, Fadila also seemed to learn some text-organising patterns of academic 
English through a mental process centrally involving hierarchical thought-
language operations:  
# 67 
At the first draft, I prepared, it was like, stating and stating and explaining 
and explaining. So instead this, I put all the similar ideas together…[I was] 
looking at some complexity of ICT integration process. If there are many 
research already mention about this complexity, I need to put them together. 
… What I have done in literature review, they were around fifty pages of 
literature I did at the first draft, but after I finished my full research proposal, 
it's only five pages. (Fadila, May 26, p. 2)  
Over the provisional enrolment period, Fadila professed a marked improvement in 
her writing through reflecting on feedback that her friends and her supervisor 
offered when she already had developed content knowledge of the target literature 
for her LR text, but did not know how to organise and structure it. 
Through the accounts of the participants above describing the process of creating 
their research proposals including the LR sections, a pattern appeared to emerge. 
The acquisition of new procedural and linguistic knowledge seemed to occur 
when the participants looked for necessary rhetorical/systemic resources in order 
to express their own thoughts and ideas. That is, these data appear to provide 
evidence for the hierarchical relationship and operation between thought and 
language and the possibility of SLA through this relationship and operation.  
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5.2.3 Critical thinking and SLA 
Some scholars in the extant literature of applied linguistics have suggested that 
critical thinking is Western-cultural thinking embedded in English language. Thus, 
second language speakers of English may have difficulty with critical thinking 
and they need to learn critical thinking while learning the language (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.4). This section examines the relation between the participants’ 
critical thinking – making evaluative judgement about the object of knowledge – 
and their acquisition of academic English.  
Unlike the belief in the extant applied linguistics literature mentioned above, the 
data of the study revealed that the participants, all of whom were from non-
Western cultures, were critical in reviewing the literature. For example: 
# 68 
When I read the article about language anxiety in speaking, Woodrow says 
that Vietnamese students are quite different from other Confucian heritage 
students from Korea, China or Japan, and according to her, Vietnamese 
students are not anxious but very confident in speaking. And she said we are 
something like westerners I think it is very funny (laugh) I don't agree with 
her. I came from Vietnamese context and I think maybe she's wrong or she 
is overgeneralising. (Tram, Sep 15, p. 5)  
# 69 
In the literature, there are standard instruments that I may have to use. My 
supervisor is pushing me to use them, forcing me. That’s ok, that's better to 
use because people really value these instruments so I can use them for 
comparison but some of them are not really useful. For example… I'm 
thinking what would be then like several steps of stairs in these small 
islands, but I haven't been able to think of any. (Nada, July 7, pp. 5-6)  
# 70 
One time with my model, my second supervisor wanted me to add some 
elements of power to it. But I felt that it should not be added…I thought it is 
not going to be relevant but I didn't say anything at that time. I went back 
home, and I read the literature again, and then, I was convinced this is not 
coming here. (Padma, Aug 10, p. 8) 
# 71 
I : What I really want to know is, when you came here (to the university) 
first, you told me several times that actually you feel like you already 
know [what is in the literature] through your experiences as a teacher  
S: Yes, that's true. 
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I : [Then] is it like, you already know what is happening there but when it 
becomes…academic research, you need some…backing up literature [for 
what you have known already]? 
S: Sometimes I feel, ok, it is a feeling which is hard to describe. For 
example…I think my idea is original because I got the idea from my own 
teaching before I read any literature…I can't use it as my idea because 
someone else has created or they have put the ideas into literature long 
long time before I did it… 
I : [Then] when you read two different arguments or opinions, one is very 
much matching with your experience and then the other is not, do you 
naturally agree with…  
S: Of course of course if it is really something you gained from your 
experience because you experience that oh it is so true, of course very 
naturally I may just turn to the side which I have experienced. (Shu, Jan 
11, 2012, p. 5)  
In Extracts # 68 and 69, Tram and Nada expressed their evaluative opinions about 
the validity of a research finding and a data collection instrument when applying 
them into their own research contexts. Then in the comment of Padma, it appears 
that she checked whether she would need the concept of power for her research 
against her overall conceptual framework (model), and concluded that the concept 
was not relevant to examining her research topic. For me, the critical attitude of 
Tram, Nada and Padma toward the target literature or others’ opinions exhibited 
in their accounts appeared to be a natural reaction arising from finding out 
mismatches between certain publicly-reported notions and what they had 
perceived. That is, for the participants undertaking the LR itself was an academic 
practice within their English-medium academic context. However, their critical 
attitude itself, with which they considered the validity and necessity of the target 
literature, seemed to emerge as a natural disposition that they would activate in 
their day-to-day living, rather than as the application of a particular Western way 
of thinking. This possibility of critical thinking – assessing the value of the target 
literature – being a natural disposition seemed to be more clearly evidenced in 
Shu’s remark in Extract # 71. In the extract, it was quite obvious that she naturally 
assessed the truth value of theories from the literature based on her teaching 
practice.  
The findings of the participants’ engagement with critical thinking presented thus 
far emerged from the interview data in which they and I were not even discussing 
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critical thinking as a topic of our conversations. Then in an extract from Hai, she 
answered my question about how she could be critical: 
# 72 
I think that when you're critical, for example, for me, there are four self-
efficacy [theories]. There are a lot of opinions about self-efficacy I read. 
Yeah, I think that a lot of articles, a lot of researchers write about that one 
and they have different opinions. When you're critical you choose the ones 
that are suitable to your own context your own aims of your study. (Hai, 
July 2, p. 4)  
Thus, the ways of being critical that Hai described above appeared to correspond 
to the critical mind-set displayed by Tram, Nada, Padma and Shu in Extracts # 68 
to 71. Here an important point that needs to be emphasised again is that the 
participants’ attitude and behaviour of critically assessing the target literature 
appeared to be an element of their human nature, rather than what they had 
attained through disciplinary practices in English-medium academic contexts. 
This inference is based on the fact that there seems to be a considerable 
resemblance between the ways of the participants being critical presented here and 
those of any human beings engaging in evaluative thinking for their daily 
concerns, such as shopping, choosing a job, who to have as friends, or even what 
to eat and drink for health. In addition, the naturalness of the criticality of the 
participants is, however, not to imply that their critical thinking was impulsive or 
irrational. Rather, while reading Extracts # 68 to 71 carefully and iteratively, I 
realised that the participants largely involved rational and logical reasoning to 
judge the target literature critically. For example, Tram suggested the possibility 
of overgeneralisation in Woodrow’s argument about Vietnamese English learners. 
Nada pointed out the inadequacy of asking questions about climbing staircases to 
her potential participants who live in a context where there are no or very few 
staircases. The comments of Padma, Shu and Hai also indicated that they analysed 
the target literature in terms of its operability for and applicability to their own 
research projects.   
Meanwhile, unlike other participants, at her first interview Fadila expressed the 
view that she was struggling with making a critical literature review. Apparently, 
some of her comments on the day appeared to be contradictory to the overall 
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finding that the participants’ criticality seemed to be a natural human disposition. 
For example: 
# 73 
I started thinking about, forming my literature review. I started thinking I 
should be much more critical than I was…I think, how to form this voice, 
your voice into your literature, but still I find it difficult to deal. When I, 
when I talk about my literature with my supervisor, she has given me an 
idea, of course, she has stressed to be critical but, how was not really 
explained. How you are going to be critical. And what are the strategies that 
you can follow in your writing…I was thinking, how am I going to be 
critical, I was reading and reading, but I found a lot of ideas from different 
research, but becoming a critical reviewer, is I think still difficult, for, in my 
case, it's difficult, I don't know how. (Fadila, Apr 13, pp. 8-9)  
Her narrative shows that Failda felt unaware of how to be critical in writing her 
LR text. By confronting her case, seemingly diverging from those of the other 
participants, I felt it necessary to clarify if her feeling of not knowing of how to be 
critical actually signalled her inability to be critical. I began to carefully examine 
the reason why she thought she was not able to be critical. Eventually, I realised 
that this was in fact embedded in her comment above: her inability to make a 
critical literature review at that time was directly related to the fact that she did not 
understand what the concept of critical thinking means. In her account, she 
actually made a point that she would be able to be critical if the meaning of the 
concept was clearly explained to her. What was very interesting is, at the same 
interview throughout which her central concern was not being able to be critical, 
she engaged with a type of thinking as follows, which could be considered as 
critical thinking: 
# 74 
There are no enough… students who just get in the university, that they are 
not given full induction of these kinds of things [including how to be 
critical], because, ok, I might know from you, one thing, from my friend, 
another…but it's…in my point, officially it should be given from the 
university… I think, when I first come, I should be given those things right? 
(Fadila, Apr 13, p. 11) 
Thus, she was in fact critically evaluating the system of the university where she 
was undertaking her PhD, in terms of not providing sufficient input and support to 
new PhD students. For me, this seemed to indicate that she engaged with critical 
thinking even though she did not associate her actual critical thinking with the 
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term critical thinking. In other words, she was critical naturally or implicitly, but 
by not knowing what the concept of criticality refers to, she thought to herself that 
she was not able to be critical. Then, only one and half months after the first 
interview, she appeared to have undergone considerable change from the previous 
two interviews. She looked much more confident than before, saying, “my next 
writing…all the literature review chapters will be much better than what I have 
done earlier” (May 26, p. 2). I asked her if she had solved the issue of not 
knowing how to be critical: 
# 75 
I : The question you were asking [one and half months ago] was what it 
means by being critical or by having your own critical voice. What do 
you think about that now? 
F: Yeah I remember telling you that…Later when I started reading it was 
completely different from the way I read earlier because, [before,] I was 
reading to get information rather than criticising or thinking about what I 
want to. But I think later…I started to think yes I might not agree 
sometimes … now when I read I become very critical. [When] I don't 
think it's truthful for Maldives…I am changing my sentence. I think that 
is how now I understand how I can be critical when I write. (Fadila, May 
26, pp. 6-7)  
The drastic change in her self-awareness about her ability to be critical did not 
seem to indicate that she had not had the ability previously, but attained it for such 
a short time period. Rather it would be a more realistic interpretation that she now 
came to understand the concept of criticality more clearly than before, and 
realised that it was an ability that she already exercised.  
Overall, it seemed to be quite evident that the criticality of the participants of the 
study was not what they had to learn in the process of developing their 
competence in using English, but it seemed to be part of their human nature, 
which they had been engaging with, even before understanding the term of 
criticality clearly. Nevertheless, improving competence in using academic English 
appeared to be still very important in undertaking a critical review in the English-
medium context. Firstly, Hai and Tram stated: 
# 76 
My supervisors expect me to be critical in reading. But you cannot be 
critical when you don't understand the articles…Ok writing, I think if I 
understand their (the authors’ of the literature) intentions, I can, I can write 
in my own words. not very good, not very beautiful writing, but express my 
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own idea, That's what I worry. I don't, you know, how can I be more critical 
when I don't understand [the] real intention of [an] article. (Hai, Mar 13, p. 
18)  
# 77 
When I read some articles, I don't really think I can understand correctly or 
not. Yeah. So it is just from my understanding but I don't know how exactly 
it is if it is…if I have ideas I think it's easy to write not very difficult but just 
I can't understand it, or it is not very clear to me, [then] I just still can't write. 
(Tram, Aug 21, p. 11)  
Here Hai and Tram clearly pointed out that a reason for them to find difficulty in 
making a critical review of the target literature is that it is not easy for them to 
develop an accurate knowledge of what they read, because such accurate 
knowledge is the basis for assessing values of the target literature. As presented in 
Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.1, and as indicated in Extracts # 76 and 77, the participants 
considered that this difficulty in understanding the meanings intended by the 
authors of the literature arose from not having sufficient linguistic/procedural 
resources as second language speakers of English. Thus, the intention to evaluate 
the target literature based on a correct understanding of it would have driven them 
to acquire new linguistic/procedural resources. As such, for them, becoming more 
capable in critical thinking by acquiring new resources was not because critical 
thinking is embedded in English language, but because critical evaluation of the 
literature requires an accurate understanding of it, for which a developed 
competence in using academic English is a prerequisite.  
In addition, as was found in Section 5.2.2, in general the participants needed to 
learn new linguistic and rhetorical patterns to express the content of their thought 
appropriately in their academic context. This overall thought-language relation 
and operation in their SLA may have also applied to the area of expressing critical 
thinking appropriately in their LR texts. That is, to encode their critical thinking 
appropriately in their academic context, they might have developed the way to 
textually enact criticality. The interview data of this study did not clearly provide 
evidence for this. However, from the analysis of the final LR drafts of five 
participants, Hai, Nada, Mubin, Tram and Fadia reported in Section 5.4.1, it 
emerged that, to a certain extent, these participants expressed their critical 
thinking appropriately in their English-medium academic context by means of 
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using certain rhetorical patterns. This seemed to indicate the possibility that these 
rhetorical patterns required for enacting criticality may constitute the part of the 
resources of academic English that the participants acquired through their 
thought-language cognitive processing.   
Summary and implications of Section 5.2 
Section 5.2 explored the extent to which the SLA of the participants was 
understood in relation to their cognitive and epistemological processes and 
approaches to undertaking the LR and planning their research projects. The 
findings presented in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 suggested that the cognitive 
processes and approaches in understanding the target literature accurately and 
expressing their thoughts clearly seemed to be conducive to their attainment of 
linguistic knowledge. Then Section 5.2.3 examined the criticality of the 
participants as second language speaker of English and its relevancy to their 
acquisition of academic English. The need for critically evaluating target literature 
based on a developed knowledge of it and expressing criticality appropriately 
seemed to motivate the participants to develop their academic English competence. 
However, their criticality seemed to be an element of human nature that the 
participants already had exercised, rather than what they had to learn as part of 
their acquisition of English.  
5.3 SLA and the communities of the participants 
Section 5.3 seeks to examine the involvement of the participants’ communities in 
the process of their SLA. The subsidiary research question addressed in this 
section is: 
3. To what extent is the involvement of the participants’ communities 
facilitative of their SLA? 
Firstly of all, the meaning of communities in the present study should be clearly 
indicated. As revealed throughout previous chapters and sections in this chapter, 
investigating interpersonal dynamics or social or political issues possibly involved 
in second learning and use is not the central concern of this study. Therefore 
existing frameworks for communities, such as discourse communities (e.g., 
Swales, 1990, 2004) and communities of practice (Wenger, 1998), most of which 
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were developed for sociocultural aspects of language learning and use, seem not 
to be adequate for my study. Therefore, I came to have a somewhat ad hoc 
definition of the communities of the participants as the group of people who 
appeared to contribute to their SLA in different ways, including academics in their 
immediate context, and literature authors or even friends or family members.  
Firstly, as indicated in the findings in Section 5.2, the academic communities of 
the participants provided the participants with their rhetorical and linguistic 
knowledge (as well as subject content knowledge) as the resources for their SLA. 
The authors of the target literature were the ones whose knowledge constituted the 
primary sources of the linguistic and procedural knowledge of the participants 
(e.g., Extracts 59, 60 & 61 in Section 5.2.2). In addition, their supervisors also 
appeared to transmit rhetorical and linguistic resources to the participants (e.g., 
Extracts # 50 & 51 in Section 5.2.1). In this regard, here I present one more 
extract from the account of Padma. At one particular supervision meeting, her 
supervisor informed her of how to structure the LR text: 
# 78 
He (her supervisor) called it brainstorming, because he was asking questions 
and I was asking questions…he actually helped me to structure it (her LR 
text)…ok, this is how he showed to structure it. And actually, he introduced 
triangle downward triangle to me and he said you should first talk about 
general theory and then go down to you specific and that's what he advised, 
and you're synchronising your material. (Padma, May 13, p. 3)  
In addition, other people, such as family members or friends (particularly other 
PhD students) also offered their own rhetorical and linguistic knowledge to the 
participants. For example:  
# 79 
Last time I told you that I prepared my literature review, because even [for] 
that I actually got some advice from my husband. I was, I kind of started 
from the introduction and asked him what kind of things I should put it on, 
and he's telling from introduction. It is very very, very positive thing for me, 
my husband being around…all the advice I get from my husband rather than 
my supervisors (laugh). (Padma, May 13, p. 1)  
Secondly, people in the academic communities of the participants checked, 
revised and validated the linguistic and procedural knowledge of the participants. 
Usually the people who provided such feedback imparted their own linguistic and 
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rhetorical knowledge to the participants simultaneously. This, for example, is 
indicated in the comment of Fadila and her LR draft on which her friend provided 
his feedback as follows: 
# 80 
I : Now you submitted your first draft of the literature review right? 
F: yes.  
I : could you tell me how you have done your literature review? 
F: I think, especially last two months I got a lot of feedback from my friends, 
on my literature review, particularly from some friends in my room. 
After they read that they've given me really really constructive and 
helpful feedback how to change literature in a in a proper manner (Fadila, 
May 26, p. 1)  
# 81: An LR draft of Fadila with her officemate’s written feedback  
 
Obviously, the supervisors of the participants performed the central role in the 
second aspect of the involvement of their academic communities in their SLA. 
This is indicated in the comments of Hai, Nada and Tram, and Hai’s LR draft on 
which her supervisor provided his feedback:  
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# 82 
I think that the feedback for the one (her literature review draft) is, first 
thing is, he (her supervisor) told me to look at the words he said that some 
words are not suitable, not English words I invented (laugh) so I changed 
that. (Hai, Jul 2, p. 2)   
# 83 
[My supervisor] would say it will be better word for this so it is more 
scientific, more academics, and now I'm thinking about certain words like, 
ok, I have written in one of the sentences it is all the populations in 
Maldives it is increasing like other small island in the UN. And she was 
saying don't write 'like' ok instead , ‘in similar smaller islands' … She wants 
me to use more general, academic language. (Nada, Sep 7, p. 5)  
# 84 
I : How about language feedback? Did she (her supervisor) give you 
language feedback correcting your grammar mistakes or…  
T: Er, for example um yeah just a few, a few grammar mistakes. For 
example, she just say syntax problem…Oh I used one word that is not 
suitable and she just tried to change the word for example I use the word 
primary but she said oh primitive but she said no that is preliminary. 
(Tram, Aug 21, p. 10) 
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# 85: Written feedback from Hai’s supervisor on her LR text  
 
Thus, the involvement of the academic communities of the participants 
contributed to their SLA in two ways: the spoken and written texts of their 
community members provided the rhetorical and linguistic sources for their SLA: 
some of these community members also checked, corrected and validated the 
participants’ developing knowledge of academic English. In these two ways, the 
academic communities of the participants played an important role for the SLA 
(as well as the overall academic knowledge development) of the participants.  
However, despite these contributions of their academic communities to the SLA 
of the participants, as the findings in Section 5.2 suggest, in essence, the SLA of 
the participants appeared to be driven centrally by their own intensive cognitive 
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striving and processing. This interpretation of their SLA as an outcome of their 
own cognitive processing seems to be supported by the accounts of the 
participants following, which evoked the question of whether other community 
members provided them with step-by-step guidance for their SLA: 
# 86 
I : Did you get any language feedback from anybody? 
P: Language feedback… 
I : For your final writing   
P: For final, yeah, I, in fact today my supervisor pointed out three spelling 
mistakes. 
I : Ok three spelling mistakes…you didn't receive any feedback from 
anybody  
P: You mean proofreading 
I: Proofreading 
P: No, no, no.   (Padma, Aug 10, p. 15)  
# 87 
I : Did you get any language feedback from your supervisors? 
M: No, they said my writing was, I mean writing a scholar paper, academic 
paper is hard and it takes time to adjust my writing to academic argument 
or style. But my writing in general sense is alright.  
I : You didn't go to the learning support centre  
M: Nope, nope, nope. (Mubin, Jul 5, p. 4)  
# 88 
I remember that my chief supervisor telling me that, that was only one 
comment that I got. He said that, do you like to use adjectives? For instance, 
“enormous”, you know. He said, you don't need to use a lot of 
“enormous”…He said that, try to minimise adjective…I like to make it, you 
know, I wanna make it rich, but he said, you don't have to continue writing 
(Kusum, Nov 30, p. 8)  
# 89 
I only have two [people] with regard to literature review. One is my 
supervisor, one is K (a person in the learning support centre), Both of, um, 
K has given me, idea, I think, how to form this voice, your voice into your 
literature, but still I find it difficult to deal. When I, when I talk about my 
literature with my supervisor, she has given me an idea…I think still 
difficult, for, in my case, it's difficult, I don't know how, I don't know, 
because I had never, from any students, because they don't talk much about 
their literature [review]. So ideas about how to form literature is still, really 
needs to be explored about, and to conduct workshops, I think it's important 
to conduct workshops or so for us, PhD students form their literature. 
(Fadila, Apr 13, pp. 8-9)  
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As seen in Extracts # 78 to 85, the participants were certainly helped by other 
people in relation to improving their academic writing. However, considering the 
data immediately preceding, this help still might be distant from regular, careful 
guidance. In fact, the feedback that Fadila received from her friends (i.e., some 
other people besides supervisors) that I reported with Extract # 80 was a quite 
exceptional case, which were not found in the data from the other participants. 
Besides, even the help that Fadila’s friends offered was not a consistent, carefully 
planned assistance, but a series of occasional events initiated by Fadila’s own 
request. The important point here is, although not regularly taught or guided by 
others, the data of the study indicated that the participants were developing their 
knowledge of academic English. This, again, made me consider that the SLA of 
the participants was emerging from their own cognitive processing and effort, 
rather than from interpersonal processes with other people. This issue will be 
discussed carefully in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1 that clarifies the mechanisms of the 
SLA of the participants.  
Summary and implications of Section 5.3 
Section 5.3 reported the findings indicating the extent to which the involvement of 
the academic communities of the participants was facilitative of their SLA. People 
in the communities intentionally or incidentally shared their own rhetorical and 
linguistic knowledge with the participants as the sources for their SLA. They also 
checked, corrected and validated the linguistic and procedural knowledge of the 
participants to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the findings suggested that the 
involvement of their academic communities might not be what centrally drove the 
occurrence of their SLA.  
5.4 Extra-linguistic elements of academic English competence: The use 
of genre knowledge  
This section reports the findings from an analysis of the LR sections of the final 
proposal drafts of five participants, Hai, Nada, Mubin, Fadila and Tram. From the 
interview data, it emerged that thought and language elements of academic 
knowledge seemed to be two separate entities that appeared to operate 
hierarchically, and that the SLA of the participants appeared to occur through 
such a hierarchical thought-language operation (Section 5.2.2). In addition, it was 
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also found that the participants were aware of the importance of knowing how to 
organise and structure their thought appropriately for creating academic text (see 
Sections 5.1.3 & 5.2.2).  
Reflecting on these findings, I came to think that clarifying elements of extra-
linguistic knowledge and ability which were involved in their learning and use of 
academic English would be important to understand the nature and scope of their 
SLA. Thus, for the analysis, I incorporated into the analysis frame Bruce’s (2008a) 
constructs of social genre (SG) and cognitive genre (CG) (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.3), which he suggests as essential elements required to composing prototypical 
English academic texts. Then I sought to clarify in what ways genre knowledge is 
a critical element of competence in composing academic prose by examining both 
developed and weak areas of the LR texts of the participants in the light of the 
framework (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3 for the analysis of the final LR texts of 
the five participants). Each of Sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 therefore reports 
aspects that suggest the importance of thought structuring genre knowledge.  
The subsidiary research question that this section addresses is: 
4. In what ways is the use of prototypical thought-structuring patters 
important and (thus) is indicated as part of academic English competence?    
5.4.1 Achieving textual coherence   
Overall, the LR texts showed that having awareness of an LR text as a SG, and 
having the knowledge of and ability to use English academic CGs are essential for 
creating an LR text considered as appropriate and coherent in an English-medium 
academic context (Bruce, 2008a). Table 5.1 presents the numbers of sections 
headings, instances of metatext in the final LR texts, and CGs of the participants, 
which indicate the extent to which the participants implemented the elements of 
the LR text as a SG and those of CGs. 
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Table 5.1: The numbers of CGs, section headings and instances of metatext 
Participants Number of words 
Number of 
paragraphs
Number of 
headings 
Number of 
instances of 
metatext 
Number of 
CGs 
Hai 6039 37 10 x 
2 (1 
Explanation & 
1 Discussion) 
Nada 6258 42 4 4 3 (2 Reports & 
1 Discussion) 
Tram 4696 29 9 3 
13 (3 Reports, 
7 Explanations 
& 3 
Discussions)  
Mubin 4193 46 18 2 3 (2 Reports & 
1 Discussion) 
Fadila 2604 22 5 3 2 (1 Report & 
1 Discussion) 
*Tables and figures were excluded from the word count.  
Firstly, the use of section headings appeared in the LR texts of all the five 
participants, and metatext was found from the LR texts of Mubin, Fadila, Tram 
and Nada. Extracts # 90 and 91 present the titles of the section headings of 
Mubin’s LR section in the content table of his research proposal and a segment of 
metatext from Nada’s LR text respectively.  
# 90: Section headings of the LR text of Mubin  
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# 91 
The research questions (see section ‘statement of research questions’ of this 
proposal) of this study arose from an interest in understanding the existing 
practice of ICT use in teacher education programme. This section provides a 
review of the literature relevant to this perspective along with an 
understanding of ICT, ICT integration in teacher education, factors affecting 
ICT integration in teacher education, teacher education for effective 
pedagogical practice with ICT, and finally the technological pedagogical 
and content knowledge (TPACK) framework. (A meta-text from Fadila’s 
final LR section, p. 9)  
The use of section headings and metatext seemed to indicate that the participants’ 
knowledge of their LR text as a social genre (a section of a research proposal), 
which appeared to helped them to incorporate necessary content and organise it 
appropriately. That is, their use of section headings and metatext seemed to allow 
their LR texts to meet the expectations of readers in academic contexts about what 
a LR section would cover to a certain extent, aiding them to comprehend the 
intentions and purposes of their LRs. For instance, the section headings informed 
me as a reader of the areas that the participants were planning to investigate, and 
concepts and theories that they sought to use as the conceptual frameworks of 
their research studies. Then the segments of metatext provided me with more 
specific ideas about the information that I noticed from the titles of the section 
headings.  
In addition, Extracts # 92 to 96 following present the writing of the five 
participants in which the participants achieved CG elements– prototypical 
cognitive or rhetorical patterns that commonly appear in academic texts (Bruce, 
2008a).  
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# 92: A Discussion CG from the final LR text of Hai  
 
*A= Amplification, B=Bonding, Concess/Contra= Concession-Contra-expectation 
interpropositional relations, M/R=Means-Result, M/P=Means-Purpose, R/R= Reason-Result and 
GC=Grounds-Conclusion interpropositional relations 
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# 93: A Report CG from the final LR text of Nada  
*B=Bonding and R/R=Reason-Result interpropositional relations 
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# 94: A Report CG from the final LR text of Fadila   
 
*A= Amplification and B=Bonding interpropositional relations 
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# 95: An Explanation CG  from the final LR text of Mubin  
*B=Bonding, R/R=Reason-Result and S/C=Simple Contrast interpropositional relations 
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# 96: A Discussion CG from the final LR text of Tram  
*A= Amplification, B=Bonding, M/R=Means-Result, M/P=Means-Purpose and GC=Grounds-
Conclusion interpropositional relations 
As shown in Table 5.1, regarding the extent of incorporation of CG elements, 
Tram appeared to be most advanced, while in the cases of the other four 
participants the ability to use CG elements was emerging. Comparisons both 
within and across individual participants suggest that their writing appears to be 
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much more coherent and appropriate as academic text when elements of CGs 
were found. The ways of organising propositional thoughts in the passages of the 
participants in Extracts # 92 to 96 signalled their intentions to explain, report or 
discuss certain concepts or research findings in relation to their research projects, 
permitting the content of their writing to be communicated quite clearly.  
The significance of employing CG elements for the organisational ideas seemed 
to be more clearly identified by considering some instances in which the cluster of 
interpropositional relation was not built up in the form of CGs. When the features 
of CGs did not emerge, ideas and propositions expressed in sentences were only 
loosely, or even hardly interrelated with each other, so that without the aid of 
section headings, it was often not easy to comprehend the content or main points. 
In such a case, their writing is read as just an enumeration of pieces of information 
either irrelevant to, or only very loosely associated with each other. Therefore, 
such pieces of information do not converge into a certain issue or topic, for which 
a rhetorical purpose can be assigned, and around which coherent prose with CG 
elements can be constructed. This is exemplified in an extract from the LR text of 
Nada (see Extract # 97).  
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# 97: An extract from the final LR text of Nada  
*B=Bonding, R/R=Reason-Result interpropositional relation and Concess/Contra=Concession-
Contra-expectation interpropositional relations 
In the extract above, Nada covered a certain area of her research topic in the 
literature, but it is not evident how the coverage or review is meaningfully related 
to her research topic. That is, she chained a number of sentences with the Bonding 
interpropositional relation, but without the framework of a CG with a clear 
rhetorical purpose or intention for this part being apparent, the messages that she 
might try to communicate with her reader in relation to her own research purpose 
were not clearly known.  
Sometimes, the participants managed to communicate the messages that they 
intended, typically by stating explicitly their intentions for presenting certain 
information from the literature although CG elements were not successfully 
incorporated. In such cases, however, by not following prototypical rhetorical 
patterns operationalised here as CGs, their text did not appear to be a well-written 
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piece of writing. This is exemplified by a paragraph from a section of the LR text 
of Hai in Extract # 98, which she titled as “EFL/ESL teachers and self-efficacy”.  
# 98: An extract from the final LR text of Hai 
*B=Bonding, M/R=Means-Result, T/S=Temporal-Sequence, G/C=Ground Conclusion and 
C/C=Contrastive Coupling interpropositional relations 
In the section from which the passage is from, she presented several paragraphs 
similar to the one presented above, each of which introduced a research study on 
the self-efficacy of English teachers in a certain context, and stated the 
implications of the study meaningful to her own research. As seen from the 
extract, she was able to demonstrate the purpose of the section and the paragraph. 
Nevertheless, little CG development was found from the paragraph above as well 
as the rest part of the section, and the whole section did appear to be a 
prototypical text in English-medium academic contexts.  
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5.4.2 Expressing criticality  
Thus far, I reported the overall importance of the SG and CG knowledge in 
creating coherent, appropriate text in an English-medium context, which emerged 
from the LR texts of the participants. In addition to this, it was also found that the 
participants appeared to fulfil a central function of a LR text – critically evaluating 
the extant literature – through the use of particular devices (Bruce, 2014). Two of 
these devices that the participants employed to express criticality were the use of 
the Concession- Contraexpectation interpropositional relation (Crombie, 1985) 
and attitude markers (Hyland, 2005). Thus, as Bruce (2014) suggests, the use of 
these two devices seemed be elements of genre knowledge used to critique or 
evaluate.  
Firstly, to express the evaluative judgements that they made about the target 
literature, the participants used attitude markers, such as “attitude verbs (e.g. agree, 
prefer), sentence adverbs (unfortunately, hopefully) and adjectives (appropriate, 
logical, remarkable)” (Hyland, 2005, p. 53). Table 5.2 presents the attitude 
markers used in the final LR texts of the five participants.  
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Table 5.2: Evaluative attitude markers in the LR texts of the five participants 
Participants Attitude verbs Sentence Adverbs Adjectives 
Hai overlook, emphasize, 
argue, assert, believe, 
expect, be concerned 
about, consider, 
regard, confirm, 
expect, claim, value, 
over-simplify, would 
like, am aware, 
assume 
ultimately, basically, 
still, largely, 
successfully,  
privately, 
independently, 
specifically, 
effectively, 
unquestionably, 
indirectly, solely, 
recently, closely, 
nearly, positively,  
simple, complex, reciprocal, 
important , general, context-
specific, weak, low, necessary, 
independent, difficult, 
competent, dynamic, 
convincing, powerful, best, 
self-efficacious, negative, clear, 
vicarious, academic, 
widespread, influential, 
individualistic, detailed, 
specific, classical, managerial, 
quite similar, practical, 
valuable, effective, therapeutic, 
useful 
Nada believe, assume typically, indeed, 
universally, widely, 
specifically,  
absolute, accessible, particular, 
prevalent, obstructive,  
adequate, affordable, 
communicable, beneficial, 
vulnerable, advanced, isolated, 
strong, comprehensive, 
essential, basic, clear, complex, 
acceptable, subjective, 
objective, appropriate, 
insufficient, good 
Mubin reveals, promote, 
claim, recommended, 
help, refuse  
essentially, 
effectively, 
reasonably, especially
catastrophic, overwhelming, 
flurry, ambiguous, appropriate, 
right, significant, robust, 
resilient, competitive, 
advantageous, preventive, 
inevitable, normal, uncommon, 
evident, inaccessible, obvious 
Fadila believe, emphasise poorly, adequately, 
still, successfully, 
early 
disappointing, successful, 
significant, positive, effective, 
attracting, complex 
Tram assume, consider, 
regard, believe, 
ignore, reveal, 
highlight, support, 
seek, rely on, be 
restricted, attempt 
specifically, readily, 
particularly, 
potentially, culturally, 
directly, still, 
indirectly, minimally, 
seriously, passively, 
entirely, negatively, 
generally, typically, 
reluctantly, narrowly, 
predominantly, 
simultaneously, 
historically, heavily, 
internally, 
significantly, 
thoroughly, originally, 
gradually, merely, 
traditionally, largely, 
dominant, strong, subjective, 
non-scientific, inferior, popular, 
central, negative, influential, 
measurable, emotional, 
cognitive, individualistic, 
social, cultural, indirect, self-
perceived, general, overt, 
anxious, interpersonal, vicious, 
silent, unwilling, advanced, 
low, significant, debilitative, 
facilitative, motivating, 
internal, individual, unpleasant, 
productive, particular, positive, 
decontextualized, experimental, 
homogeneous, integrative, 
constructed, legitimate, 
peripheral, desirable, reticent, 
inactive,  
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When reading these attitude markers in their LR texts, the evaluative judgements 
that they convey were sometimes those of the authors of the literature that they 
were reviewing and sometimes those of the participants themselves. In both cases, 
by using attitude markers, the participants were able to convey values that the 
participants intended to attach to certain issues or states of affairs.  
Secondly, I present examples of the enactment of criticality through the use of 
Concession-Contraexpectation interpropositional relations found in the LR texts 
of the participants.  
# 99: A Concession-Contraexpectation interpropositional relation from the final 
LR text of Mubin 
 
# 100: A Concession-Contraexpectation interpropositional relation from the final 
LR text of Nada 
 
# 101: A Concession-Contraexpectation interpropositional relation from the final 
LR text of Tram 
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# 102: A Concession-Contraexpectation interpropositional relation from the final 
LR text of Hai 
 
The use of the Concession-Contraexpectation interpropositional relation appeared 
to allow the participants to express their critical evaluations of certain notions or 
issues, particularly which they sought to argue against. Often an argument using 
this proposition led to identifying gaps in the literature that their research sought 
to occupy.  
Thus far, the findings in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 indicated that, the knowledge of 
and ability to use SG and CG elements seemed to be essential for using English in 
academic contexts, particularly creating extended text (including the enactment of 
critical thinking in the LR) coherently.  
5.4.3 Expressing logicality  
Finally, the analysis of the participants’ LR texts also reveals that logical ideas 
can be expressed and communicated effectively when they flow through 
prototypical CG structures. In Section 5.2.3 it was briefly mentioned that the 
participants applied logic for evaluating the literature that they were reviewing. 
Such logicality or application of logic was also identified in the LR texts of the 
five participants. An issue arose at times in these texts was that even though ideas 
expressed in prose were logical, when the prose was not rhetorically structured, 
such as in the way proposed by the CG model, it still appeared somewhat 
incoherent, and thus the writer’s underlying logicality was not successfully 
communicated. An extract from Hai’s literature review text seems to instantiate 
this case: 
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# 103: An extract from the final LR text of Hai  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B=Bonding, R/R=Reason Result, S/C=Simple Contrast and G/C=Ground Conclusion 
interpropositional relations 
In Extract 103, above, the steps of her argument in the first section of her passage 
can be outlined into two statements as follows: 
(a) Some researchers suggest that S influences P and also that C influences P.  
(b) X and Y are researchers who claim that a change in S causes a change in P 
Here she uses Statement (a) as the condition for Statement (b). That is, she claims 
since S influences P, it is reasonable to say that a change in S can cause a change 
in P. This development of her argument seems to be straightforward and 
 
 
186 
 
reasonable. Then the middle section also seems fairly logical. That is, although 
not clearly articulated, it is her implicit point that Vietnamese teachers 
traditionally teach grammar but not oral fluency. Then she argues that students as 
job seekers expect to speak English fluently, but the traditional emphasis on 
teaching morality and focusing on grammar does not meet this need of students. 
This is therefore likely to put pressure on teachers to reconsider their role. Finally 
in the last section of Extract 103, she again presents logically acceptable ideas. 
The emphasis on ‘self’ in the first sentence is used for making a distinction 
between non-EFL teachers in Vietnam who are not exposed to western concepts 
of the self, and EFL teachers who are. If this produces difference conceptions of 
self and self-efficacy as self-belief, there are then possibly differences between the 
two groups of teachers in terms of their belief in their self-efficacy. If this is the 
case it may be relevant to how they respond to the role challenges identified 
earlier.  
Therefore, the overall argument of Hai’s in the extract can be considered to be 
logical. However, despite this, her writing was still not clear and it was not easy to 
follow her line of thinking. In the first and last parts of her extract, she was not 
able to assign proper interpropositional relations for expressing the interrelation of 
her thoughts, the meaning of which, as I reported immediately above, was in fact 
logical. Then overall, she was not able to organise her argument in the form of a 
prototype Discussion CG, and therefore her passage gave impression that it seems 
incoherent. A similar issue was identified in Nada’s LR text:  
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# 104: An extract from the final LR text of Nada
 
A=Amplification, B=Bonding, Concess Contra=Concession-Contra-expectation R/R=Reason 
Result, S/C=Simple Contrast and G/C=Ground Conclusion interpropositional relations 
Firstly, the series of her thoughts expressed in the first paragraph can be stated as 
follows: 
(a) In general, senior people (in the Maldives) are satisfied with the quality of 
their life 
(b) Such satisfaction about their wellbeing seems to be possible because of 
the low aspiration about their life among senior people 
(c) This statement is true in the most domains of wellbeing 
(d) The statement is particularly true in the domains of health, living 
arrangements and social connectedness.  
(e) Empirical research supports (c) and (d). 
Then mainly three ideas seem to be interrelated in the second paragraph, which 
are:  
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(a) Senior people are satisfied with their state of wellbeing although they 
have frailty and chronical diseases, unless they cannot function well or 
their mobility is restricted.  
(b) This tolerance among old people to their health conditions is indicated in 
the data that 45 percent of senior people (high percentage of senior people) 
responded that their health does not affect their daily activities.  
(c) Their little concern about their health is found in their attitude to the 
quality of their diet, although it is one of important factors for their actual 
wellbeing.     
Therefore, the flow and relation of the propositional thoughts that she seemed to 
intend in Extract # 104 is quite reasonable and logical. Nevertheless, in the same 
way that was apparent in Hai’s writing in Extra # 103, Nada was not able to use 
appropriate rhetorical organisation, such as CG genre patterns, for expressing her 
ideas. Consequently her writing appears unclear and the logicality in her thinking 
is not easily communicated.  
The analysis of Hai’s and Nada’s writing extracts in which conventional thought-
structuring patterns were not sufficiently incorporated seems to indicate again the 
importance of having competence in using such conventional patterns. That is, 
although the actual content of thought encoded in text is admittedly reasonable 
and logical, such logical thinking may not be properly recognised or understood, 
when they are not expressed in the form of prototypical text structure.    
Summary and implications of Section 5.4 
Section 5.4 reported document analysis exploring in what ways the use of 
prototypical genre knowledge conventions is important and thus it may need to be 
considered as an extra-linguistic element of academic English competence. This 
question that the analysis sought to address initially emerged from the interview 
data. It seemed that the successful use of SG and CG knowledge elements, when 
both structuring and establishing stance in academic texts (in an English-medium 
academic context), contributes to the overall coherence and communicability of 
the text. The importance of having knowledge of and ability to use genre 
knowledge became evident in the cases where criticality and logicality was 
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present in the content of texts, but was not communicated successfully when 
competence in using academic CG patterns was not underdeveloped. The findings 
of this section are discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3 for considering the scope 
and areas of their SLA.     
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the nature of the SLA of the participants that appeared to 
occur while they were undertaking the LR for planning their PhD research 
projects.   
Firstly, Section 5.1 sought to understand the cognitive and epistemological 
dispositions and processes of the participants manifested in their approaches to 
knowledge sources embedded in texts (mainly written but spoken as well). Then 
in Section 5.2, I examined the accounts of the participants and other 
supplementary data that seemed to exhibit their SLA in relation to their cognitive 
processing while comprehending and composing academic texts, which was 
reported in Section 5.1. In the following Section 5.3, I examined the involvement 
of the communities of the participants in their SLA. Finally, Section 5.4 presented 
the analysis of the final LR texts of five participants that seemed to reveal in what 
ways procedural genre knowledge is a critical element of competence in using 
academic English.  
In Chapter 6 following, I will summarise the findings of the study presented in 
this chapter and discuss them drawing on the conceptual framework established in 
Chapter 3.  
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6 DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
6.0 Overview  
This chapter discusses the findings presented in Chapter 5 in relation to the 
conceptual framework established in Chapter 3. As articulated throughout the 
previous chapters, this present study has aimed to understand the nature of SLA in 
an English-medium academic context from a phenomenological realist 
perspective. Phenomenological realism as a philosophical school of thought is not 
new, but it appears to be new to the field of SLA. This has required me to clarify 
the reasons why I decided to go beyond the existing philosophical beliefs 
practised in the field (Chapter 2), and to explicate concepts and issues critical to 
theorising SLA from a realist perspective (Chapter 3). The discussion of the 
findings here is an expansion and integration of what has been presented in the 
previous chapters. That is, the findings are highlighted and explained in 
conjunction with the concepts and issues already reconsidered once, to which I 
also relate the previously discussed limitations of the existing SLA paradigms, 
particularly those of the social, cultural stream.  
Firstly, in Section 6.1, I briefly review the intentions behind the research 
questions, and summarise the findings sections that address the four subsidiary 
research questions. Although the structure of this chapter roughly corresponds to 
the order of the subsidiary research questions, I do not exactly organise the 
discussion according to these questions. Thus, this section seeks to provide a 
coherent account in order to ensure the integral continuity and relationship 
between the research questions and findings and the discussion of them that 
occupies the rest of this chapter.  
Next, Section 6.2 discusses the implications of the findings as they relate to the 
nature of the cognition of the participants, the thought-language relation and its 
operation in relation to their knowledge, and finally the ontology of their 
academic knowledge and their epistemology. The discussion seeks to 
reconceptualise these mental faculties and properties resisting the social 
constructivist conceptualisations used to theorise SLA.  
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In the following Section 6.3, I discuss the nature of the SLA of the participants in 
terms of the realist concepts of the mind and cognition, thought-language relation, 
and knowledge that I identify in Section 6.2. The clarification is carried out 
specifically in relation to the thought-language operation in the mind and 
Husserl’s (1970) three conditions for knowledge – the transcending quality of the 
mind, applying logic to thinking and intersubjectivity in epistemological 
communities – that I reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4.  
Finally, Section 6.4 concludes this chapter and previews the final chapter.  
6.1 The research questions and a summary of the findings 
The findings of the study converge on the overarching research question, which is: 
What is the nature of the second language acquisition (SLA) of eight PhD 
students while undertaking the literature review (LR) in English, their 
second language, during the period of preparing the research proposal in a 
New Zealand university? 
Centrally, this main question has been posed in order to understand SLA in an 
academic context as well as concepts and issues about the mental faculties and 
properties of second language speakers fundamental to explain SLA.  
Section 5.1 explored the first subsidiary question: 
1. What are the central cognitive dispositions and processes that 
characterise the participants’ approaches to developing academic 
knowledge while undertaking the LR?  
The research question was designed with the realisation that understanding the 
mental faculties and properties and cognitive processes of the participants is 
essential to investigate their SLA.  
Section 5.1.1 firstly suggested that for the participants undertaking the LR meant 
more than just writing an LR text. It was an overall process of developing 
knowledge and competence required to prepare the research project. Sections 
5.1.2 to 5.1.4 then examined their cognitive dispositions and processes displayed 
in the process of developing such knowledge and competence.  
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The findings reported in Section 5.1.2 revealed that the intentionality seemed to 
be the fundamental condition for the participants to be able to develop knowledge 
of the target literature. It enabled them to uptake sources of their knowledge in 
selective, focused ways while engaging in spoken and written social processes. 
Next, the findings in Section 5.1.3 suggested that thought and language in the 
minds of the participants were interrelated and cooperated with each other, but 
ontologically they appeared to be two separate entities. Lastly, Section 5.1.4 
reported that the participants considered that they understood the content of 
spoken and written texts as intended by the literature authors or other scholars in 
academic conversations despite the influence of their own cultural, linguistic 
backgrounds.  
In Section 5.2, I examined the SLA of the participants in relation to their cognitive 
dispositions and processes identified in Section 5.1, in which they engaged in 
while undertaking the LR. The research question that this section addressed is: 
2. To what extent is the SLA of the participants understood in terms of their 
cognitive dispositions and processes characterised in reviewing the target 
literature and research planning?  
The findings in Section 5.2.1 revealed that the cognitive striving and processing to 
understand the meanings that other scholars intend to impart seemed to be 
conducive to the development of the SLA of the participants. Significantly, the 
SLA that occurred through this processing centrally involved iterative perceiving 
the target meaning and drawing on real events relating to the meaning. Next, 
Section 5.2.2 reported that the participants appeared to acquire thought-structuring 
procedural knowledge as well as linguistic knowledge through hierarchical 
thought-language processing in composing texts. Finally, Section 5.2.3 reported 
that the criticality of the participants seemed to be what they already had had, 
rather than they had to acquire while learning English language. Nevertheless, the 
need for critiquing the target literature after understanding it precisely and 
enacting their critical ideas academically seemed to drive them to develop their 
academic English competence.  
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Section 5.3 then addressed the third subsidiary research question: 
3. To what extent is the involvement of the participants’ academic 
communities facilitative of their SLA? 
The intention for this research question was to identify the extent to which the 
academic communities of the participants played a role in the process of their 
SLA. The findings of the section indicated that the academic communities of the 
participants were involved in, and contributed to the SLA of the participants in 
two ways. Firstly, the sources of the rhetorical and linguistic knowledge of the 
participants were provided by people in their academic communities, mainly by 
the authors of the literature. Secondly, the linguistic and procedural knowledge of 
the participants was checked, revised and validated by their academic community 
members, and the ones who centrally took this role were obviously their doctoral 
supervisors. However, it emerged from the accounts of the participants that the 
support and feedback from the communities of the participants (i.e., social 
scaffolding) was not central to the SLA that occurred.  
Finally, Section 5.4 explored the fourth subsidiary research question, which is: 
4. In what ways is the use of prototypical thought-structuring patters 
important and (thus) is indicated as part of academic English competence?  
The last subsidiary research question aimed to understand the participants’ 
competence in writing the LR in terms of their use of genre knowledge (Bruce, 
2008a) by analysing the final LR texts of five participants. The importance of 
developing procedural knowledge to structure extended academic text emerged 
from the interview data, calling for a need to identify specific knowledge areas 
involved in that ability. The findings from the analysis of the LR texts indicated 
that genre knowledge involving social genre (SG) and cognitive genre (CG) 
elements was essential to create extended prose coherently and appropriately in an 
English-medium context. This knowledge appeared to be important for expressing 
both criticality and logicality.  
In the following sections of this chapter, I discuss the implications of the findings 
in relation to the conceptualisation of SLA.  
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6.2 Reconsidering the ontology and epistemology of second language 
speakers 
This section seeks to conceptualise the nature of the mind and cognition (Section 
6.2.1), the thought-language relation and its operation (Section 6.2.2) and the 
knowledge of the participants (Section 6.3.3) by discussing relevant findings from 
a realist perspective.  
Chapter 2 reviewed and problematized the conceptualisations of such areas 
employed by the three SLA schools of thought – behaviourism, cognitivism and 
the social, cultural stream. The review was particularly concerned with the social 
constructivist perspective of the social cultural stream. This is for the reason that, 
while the limitations of the other two have been extensively discussed in the 
literature of SLA theory and research, systematic examination of those of the 
social constructivist conceptualisation of the human mentalities, particularly from 
a realist perspective, seems to be scarce. In the discussion presented in this section, 
I again mostly interact with the social constructivist notions relating to clarifying 
the principal concepts of human mental faculties and properties in SLA drawing 
on the findings from the present study.   
6.2.1 The mind and cognition  
In Chapter 2, I argued against the extant conceptions of the mind and cognition in 
the study of SLA. I contended that we should not presume that the mind and 
cognition do not exist (behaviourism), oversimplify them by using the 
computer/information processing metaphor (cognitivism), or reduce them to a 
social product and internalised social process, or even simply an extension of a 
social process (social, cultural perspective). 
This section discusses the ontological features of the participants and their 
cognition – the operational processing of their minds – drawing on the conceptual 
framework established in Chapter 3. The most relevant section to the discussion is 
Section 5.1.2 that presented the findings about the intentionality of the 
participants. However, since the nature of their minds and cognitions illustrated in 
the section permeates every aspect of their SLA, I also draw on the findings 
presented in other sections.  
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The clarification of the ontological state of the participants’ minds can begin by 
considering the findings that indicate their intentionality. Woodruff Smith and 
McIntyre (1982) define intentionality, the concept coined by Husserl, as “the 
property of a thought or experience that consists in its being a consciousness “of” 
or “about” something” (p. xiii). It is a quality or property of the mind being 
directed at things perceived or thought, irrespective of their being physical/mental 
or real/unreal. The accounts of the participants in Section 5.1.2 exhibited such 
intentionality. That is, they initiated engagement in social processes and 
selectively directed their attention to information that they intended to know 
(Extracts # 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9 in Section 5.1.2). In particular, the narrative of Padma in 
Extract # 15 in Section 5.1.2 suggests that the intentional directedness of her mind 
towards the literature relating to her study is constant and on-going even when she 
was physically attending to some other activities. Then her focused mind 
eventually allowed her to synthesise and bind a number of pieces of information 
into a body of knowledge of her research project.  
Such intentionality of the participants seems to affirm the ontological order of the 
mind and social processes that I argued for in Chapters 2 and 3. That is, their 
minds did not emerge from social processes but existed prior to social processes, 
enabling them to engage in such social processes. Given that the participants of 
this study are adults, clarifying the fundamental genesis of the mind and social 
processes is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it can still be reasoned 
that, to initiate or engage voluntarily with social interactions including written 
textual engagement with the literature, and to be constantly directed at what they 
intended to know, the mind should already exist. The view of the mind as an 
inherent, integral human faculty of a person rather than a social product has been 
proposed by a number of scholars including Husserlian realist philosophers (e.g., 
Chalmers, 2010; Davis, 1983; Eccles, 1982, 1994; Eccles & Robinson, 1984; 
Husserl, 1970; Kelly et al., 2007; Lewin, 1992; Nagel, 2012; Plantinga, 2011; 
Stapp, 2007; Trefil, 1996; Willard, 2007; Woodruff Smith & McIntyre, 1982). 
This ontology of the mind is in fact the axiom of these scholars, based on which 
they explain all human attitudes and behaviours.  
The ontology of the minds and cognition of the participants that I suggest here is 
clearly distinct from that of the social constructivist SLA approaches that claim 
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that the mind and cognition are produced through interpersonal social processes. 
For example, according to the approach of sociocultural theory (SCT), cognitive 
processing “appears twice, first between people…and then within the individual” 
(Lantolf & Thorne, 2006, p. 153). The emergentism approach merely places the 
mind and cognition at the extended end of social, cultural processes (Atkinson, 
2010). Even more radically, the conversation-analytic (CA) approach conjectures 
that cognition occurs and exists not in the mind but at social, public sites (Kasper 
2009; Kasper & Wagner 2011).  
Certainly, social, cultural influences on individuals’ minds should not be 
overlooked. This study in fact found that the participants obtained their 
knowledge sources from different social groups of people, some of whom also 
verified and corrected their knowledge and language (see Section 5.3). However, 
it appears to be logically fallacious to say that because A (e.g., the mind) is 
influenced by B (e.g., social processes), A must originate from or be produced by 
B. There are accounts of the participants that revealed the functions and states of 
their minds, which are hardly explained by presuming that their minds and 
cognitions emerged from social, cultural processes. I state and restate such 
functions and states of their minds as follows:  
 being focused or being directed at knowledge sources that they intend to 
know (Extracts # 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 &15 in Section 5.1.2);  
 taking initiatives when engaging with social processes (Extracts # 5, 6, 7, 
8 & 9 in Section 5.1.2); 
 being selective in appropriating knowledge sources, such as theories or 
concepts from the literature or comments from supervisors (Extracts # 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 13, 14 & 21 in Section 5.1.2);  
 interrelating a number of pieces of knowledge and formulating an 
integrated, coherent body of knowledge for the research project (Extract # 
15 in Section 5.1.2, Sections 5.2.2 & 5.4); 
 seeking clear, accurate understandings of messages as intended by the 
writers or speakers beyond cultural, linguistic backgrounds (Extracts # 22, 
23 & 25 in Section 5.1.3 & Extracts # 39, 40 & 41 in Section 5.1.4); and, 
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 making critical, evaluative judgements on the target literature, based on 
developed knowledge (Extracts # 72, 76 & 87 in Section 5.2.3). 
The intrinsic dilemma of a materialistic, social constructivist understanding of the 
mind and cognition was already revealed early in Vygotsky (1986). To stress the 
developmental process of human cognition and mind from social, cultural 
activities to language to individuals that he hypothesises, he alters the Bible verse 
“In the beginning was the Word” as “In the beginning was the deed” (p. 255). 
However, this approach precludes the necessity that there should be a conscious, 
intentional mind first for the “deed” to occur. A statement of Willard (2007) 
addresses the reason why the view that finds the origin of the mind from social 
processes is inadequate to conceptualise the mental processes and states of the 
participants:  
[O]ne has to be sure to hold to the mental acts themselves, and to how they 
go together to form the larger wholes of mental life, [even] up to the level of 
the whole person or self…Certainly these mental acts have a physical and a 
social context. But how the [mental] acts relate to each other … as a 
memory, a purpose, or a logical inference cannot…be captured by features 
of those contexts…Especially, one can never understand the unity of the 
experiences [and knowledge]… if he or she only takes into consideration the 
objects of mental acts. (Para 5) 
According to Willard, the realist concept of the mind emerges from understanding 
the human being as an integrated self. In relation to the present study, I consider 
that the participants (their minds) were able to develop a body of knowledge by 
integrating a number of pieces of information, because they are human agents 
with unified, integrated self-identities (as opposed to multiple, fragmented 
identities). Social, cultural SLA researchers have acknowledged one’s first person 
perspective of his/her own identity (Norton & McKinny, 2011) and “some degree 
of agency” (Duff & Talmy, 2011, p. 97). Relating to SLA, Dunn and Lantolf 
(1998) argue that “L2 learning is about gaining the freedom to create” meanings 
(p. 427). However, because of the limitation of their own paradigm, they are 
obliged to propose that the sense of identity and agency is essentially a social 
product. Thus, one’s identity is multiple and fragmented as it is differently 
constructed in different social situations (Norton, 2000; Kasper & Wagner, 2011), 
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and the person’s sense of agency is not actual power to exert his/her freewill. 
Lantolf and Thorne (2006) put it:  
We wish to emphasize that agency does not equate with free will or 
ultimate control of one’s actions or destiny. This is an unrealistic 
conception of agency – an impossibility and a misreading of the term…in 
socioculturally oriented research. (p. 237) 
Thus, the approach to human agency without freewill that those social, cultural 
researchers advocate would appear to be contradictory because the term of agency 
itself refers to one’s power to organise and operate his/her own actions. Freewill 
does not necessarily denote limitless freedom, but still allows for the capacity to 
make choices on one’s own within historical, cultural contexts. Moreland and Rae 
(2000) refer to the concept of freewill as categorical ability: 
[Categorical ability] expresses the type of ability possessed by a first-mover 
that can exercise active power…[and it] is a dual ability: if one has the 
ability to exert his power to do (or will to do) a, then one also has the ability 
to refrain from exerting his power to do (or to will to do) a. (p. 125) 
In summary, I suggest that the functions (cognitions) and dispositions of the 
minds of the participants did not merely originate from social, cultural processes. 
Instead, they are inherent faculties that enabled the participants to attend to 
necessary knowledge sources by engaging selectively in social, cultural processes 
and together constitute a united body of knowledge. This accords with a view of 
the participants as agents with integrity and freewill. It will emerge throughout 
this chapter that understanding the minds and cognitions of the participants (and 
their personhood) from a realist viewpoint has considerable implications for 
theorising their SLA and discussing wider issues in relation to their being second 
language speakers of English.  
6.2.2 Thought-language relation 
This section seeks to explain the relationship between thought and language in the 
knowledge development of the participants in terms of the conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter 3. I organise the discussion in accordance with three 
persistent issues emerging from the SCT notion of thought and language, issues 
that also appear to arise in each of the social, cultural approaches. At the 
beginning of this section, I emphasise that my argument for the ontological 
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separateness and order of thought and language throughout this section does not 
dismiss the mutual interaction and influence between thought and language 
(Woodruff Smith, 2002). In relation to this section the findings in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.1.3 are most relevant, but extracts are also drawn on from other sections 
of Chapter 5. 
6.2.2.1 Issue 1: Ontological contingency of thought on a particular language and 
culture 
Drawing on the work of Vygotsky, the SCT approach to SLA claims that thought 
is internalised from external speech (Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). However, there is 
discrepancy between SCT researchers and Vygotsky’ own idea in relation to the 
definition of thought. Vygotsky (1986) proposes the concept of verbal thought as 
thought that has been generated by external speech, but is “still more inward than 
inner speech” that “still remains speech, i.e., thought connected with words” (p. 
249). He further notes that verbal thought consists of pure meanings without 
words, and that “there is no rigid correspondence between the units of thought and 
speech” (p. 249). On the other hand, SCT researchers, such as Lantolf and Thorne 
(2006), do not include the concept of verbal thought in their theoretical system, 
but equate it with inner speech, which has lost its phonetic and syntactic 
properties in the process of internalisation, but maintains its semantic meanings. 
Another Vygotskyan SLA researcher, Johnson (2004), acknowledges the 
existence of verbal thought, but she states that inner speech and verbal thought are 
identical. This subtle difference between the approaches of Vygotsky and those of 
SCT researchers to thought is a critical point that raises questions about the SCT 
approach to SLA. I will return to this issue later in this section. 
Therefore, it seems that Vygotsky’s description (not that of SCT researchers) of 
the apparent status of thought and the discontinuity between thought and speech is 
somewhat closer to the realist perspective. However, there is a major difference 
between Vygotsky’s (and SCT researchers’) materialist view and the realist 
position to how one arrives at such thought and what its content is. For Vygotsky, 
thought is generated from internalising external speech, which itself is created 
through socially, culturally organised activities. Thus, it is not possible for thought 
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to exist outside the frame of a particular language and culture (Johnson, 2004). As 
Vygotsky (1986) states: 
We tried to establish the connection between world and object, word and 
reality. We attempted to study experimentally the dialectics of transition 
from perception to thinking, and to show that a generalized reflection of 
reality is the basic characteristic of words…If perceptive consciousness and 
intellectual consciousness reflect reality differently, then we have two 
different forms of consciousness. Thought and speech turn out to be the key 
to the nature of human consciousness…A word relates to consciousness as a 
living cell relates to a whole organism, as an atom relates to the universe. A 
word is a microcosm of human consciousness. (1986, pp. 255-256)  
By contrast, the realist approach suggests that thought can be generated without 
language, and a direct association and correspondence between the content of 
thought and that of the object of the thought can be made (Willard, 1984) (see also 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1). Thus, although thought is influenced by language and 
culture, it can still transcend them because its existence is not contingent on them. 
From this realist perspective outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1, I argued that 
Vygotsky failed to provide a clear explanation for his claim that a person, while 
possessing a brain and the capacity for cognition, does not activate human 
consciousness and thought until language acquisition. I also doubted the idea that 
a being initially lacking human consciousness can then begin to learn human 
language, after which he/she eventually obtains human consciousness and human 
thinking.  
The findings of the present study appear to contradict the SCT view, providing 
instead evidence for realist notions of thought and language. Firstly, the 
participants appeared to consider thought and language in their minds as two 
separate entities (Extracts # 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 & 28 in Section 5.1.3 &, Extracts # 
54, 55, 60, 61 & 63 in Section 5.2.2). In addition, they also noted that their 
thinking operations transcended language in the way that Husserl (1970) proposes, 
an issue that I will discuss again in the following section about knowledge. For 
example, their thought seemed to reach out to the reality, beyond linguistic 
descriptions or explanations of the reality (Extracts # 52 in Section 5.2.1 & 
Extracts # 68, 69, 71 & 72 in Section 5.2.3). Similarly, they also exhibited meta-
cultural and meta-linguistic awareness (Extracts# 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 in 
Section 5.1.4 & Extract # 69 in Section 5.2.3), which suggest that they were able 
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to think about the frames of their own language and English, with this type of 
metacognitive thinking occurring above such frames.  
Moreover, the SCT notion of thought always in language seems to be incapable of 
explaining the case of the most of the participants, who have developed their 
thought of their research topics in their first language contexts, and then 
undertaking their PhD projects in an English-medium context (see Table 4.3 in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1). Based on their belief that a person’s thought is 
completely contingent on language, particularly on his/her first language, SCT 
researchers consider the processes of expressing thoughts that originally formed in 
one linguistic context in another linguistic context to be language translation 
(Frawley, 1997; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). Particularly, Frawley (1997) suggests 
that such translation is considerably difficult and often even not possible. If this 
idea is applied to the participants of the present study, they would have undergone 
a massive exercise translating their L1-encoded thought into local and specific 
English. In fact, the findings of the study indicated that some participants 
undertook translation between their first language and English sometimes when it 
was necessary to clarify the meaning of the target literature (Extracts # 40 in 
Section 5.1.4 & Extract 46 in Section 5.2.1). Some participants also noted that 
expressing their thought in English was challenging (e.g., Extract # 56 in Section 
5.2.2). Nevertheless, no clear indication emerged from the data that the 
participants underwent constant thought-translation. Rather, the experience of the 
participants can be reasonably understood if one applies the realist idea that a 
thought can be expressed in different languages or even different expressions in 
the same language for the reason that thinking can occur independently of 
language (Husserl, 1970).  
6.2.2.2 Issue 2: Language to regulate thought 
As mentioned previously, SCT researchers suggest that language that consists of 
thought (inner speech, according to them) is without phonetic and syntactic 
properties (Johnson, 2004; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). However, they also have 
attempted to prove that actual language (language with all its linguistic properties) 
regulates thought (e.g., Anton & DiCamilla, 1998; Appel & Lantolf, 1994; 
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Centeno-Cortés & Jiménez Jiménez, 2004; Frawley & Lantolf, 1985; Ohta, 2001; 
Swain, 2006b; Ushakova, 1994; Verity, 2000).  
The findings of the study, however, do not support this idea. For example, the 
participant, Hai, explicitly stated that, in composing text, idea (thought) is 
important, and language is just a tool with which one expresses his/her thought 
(Extract # 28 in Section 5.1.3). Meanwhile, a narrative of Shu in Extract # 56 in 
Section 5.2.2 suggested that what made her struggle by having insufficient second 
language (English) sources was not being unable to think, but rather having 
difficulty in linguistically encoding her thought that she had. Shu (and some other 
participants) thus studied and appropriated language and rhetorical patterns of 
other scholars in order to use them for expressing their own thoughts (Extracts # 
56, 59, 60 & 61 in Section 5.2.2). In addition, some participants replaced certain 
linguistic expressions with other ones without changing their intended thoughts 
(Extracts # 54, 55 & 56 in Section 5.2.2). These instances seemed to suggest that, 
in the minds of the participants, thought seemed to be more highly or centrally 
ordered than language, and their thought seemed to regulate language rather than 
language regulating thought. As reported in Chapters 2 and 3, a number of 
scholars argue for the hierarchical cooperation between thought and language that 
emerged from the accounts of the participants (e.g., Bruce, 2008a; Pinker, 1994; 
Husserl, 1970; Widdowson, 2007; Willard, 1984; Woodruff Smith, 2002).  
However, the discussion of the regulating relation between thought and language 
needs to go further than just invalidating the idea that language regulates thought, 
because it involves a more complex and subtle point. While researchers from the 
SCT approach are largely concerned with how actual language (i.e., language with 
linguistic properties) regulates thought, Vygotsky (1986) himself seemed to 
consider the idea that language regulates thought in another dimension. As 
discussed previously in this section, in relation to the concept of verbal thought, 
Vygotsky proposes the existential separateness and discontinuity of thought and 
language and independency of thought from language in its operation, which is in 
fact very close to what was reported by the participants of this study (Extracts # 
28 in Section 5.1.3 & Extract # 56 in Section 5.2.2), and the views of the realist 
scholars as well. Vygotsky (1986) states: 
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Every thought creates a connection, fulfils a function, solves a problem. The 
flow of thought is not accompanied by a simultaneous unfolding of speech. 
The two processes are not identical, and there is no rigid correspondence 
between the units of thought and speech. (p. 249)…Thought has its own 
structure and the transition from it to speech is no easy matter. (p. 
250)…Because a direct transition from thought to word is impossible, there 
have always been laments about the inexpressibility of thought. (p. 
251)…To understand another’s speech, it is not sufficient to understand his 
words – we must understand his thought. (p. 253) 
Therefore, Vygotsky’s original notion of thought seems to be somewhat 
incongruent with the claim of the SCT approach that thought itself is (inner) 
speech, and that actual language (or external speech) regulates thought. In effect, 
much of the functional relation between thought and language that SCT researcher 
findings propose seems to diverge from Vygotsky’s own expressed understanding 
of thought and its operation.  
However, Vygotsky’s initial perspective relating to the regulation of language on 
thought still requires the clarification of the first issue – whether or not human 
consciousness and thought begin to emerge from acquiring a language, and 
whether or not human thinking can transcend language afterwards. To this matter, 
I have already offered answers: the relevant accounts of the participants (Extracts 
# 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 & 39 in Section 5.1.4, & Extracts # 68, 70, 71 & 72 in 
Section 5.2.3) and Husserlian realist description of thought and language 
previously in this section. In relation to this issue, there appears to be a further 
internal contradiction within Vygotsky’s theory, such as his proposal that we 
sometimes do not have words to express the thoughts that we have formed (1986, 
pp. 249-250). Contradicting this, his theory of internalisation suggests that this 
phenomenon is not possible for the reason that he claims that any thought of a 
person anyhow must be the consequence of the words that he/she has acquired 
already. In relation to this apparent contradiction in the work of Vygotsky, the 
present study presents evidence that suggests that thought is not the consequence 
of language internalisation, and does not need to be completely regulated and 
constrained by language.  
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6.2.2.3 Issue 3: The unlikelihood of second language speakers being able to think 
in L2 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3 reviewed the comments of Lantolf (2011) and Lantolf 
and Thorne (2006) on a series of experimental studies, in which SCT researchers 
have reported that second language speakers appear not to develop the ability to 
think in an L2 (see Centeno-Cortés & Jiménez-Jiménez, 2004; Frawley & Lantolf, 
1985; Lantolf, 2011; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006; Ushakova, 1994). These 
researchers extend the Vygotskyan premise that a person becomes able to think 
only after acquiring language, and assert that developing the mastery of an L2 up 
to the level of thinking in the language hardly ever happens, particularly in the 
case of adult second language learners.  
In relation to this claim of the SCT researchers, I have expressed my concern that 
such a speculation may create a deficit view of L2 speakers of English, 
particularly in English-medium academic contexts (see Section 2.2.3). However, I 
also suggested that it is not so meaningful to examine whether or not one can 
think in his/her L2 as I contended that the notion of thinking only in language 
itself is fundamentally flawed. As mentioned previously in this section, even 
Vygotsky (1986) acknowledges that there is a discontinuity between non-
linguistic thought and verbal speech, and people are often unable to express what 
they think exactly in language (which is, for Vygotsky, even L1). The accounts of 
the participants in the present study also suggest that being unable to think or form 
thoughts in English was not actually what they struggled with. Their principal 
concerns were that, by not having sufficient linguistic sources, they had difficulty 
in expressing their own thoughts properly (Extracts # 16, 17, 19 & 20 in Section 
5.1.2, Extract # 43 in Section 5.2.1 & Extracts # 54, 55 & 56 in Section 5.2.2). 
Then the process that they underwent was not of improving their academic 
English to become able to think. Rather, they searched for language to encode 
their own thought appropriately for their academic tasks (Extracts # 59, 60, 61 & 
62 in Section 5.2.2). Therefore, the problems attributed to the participants of the 
SCT studies mentioned above may have been the result of them having 
insufficient linguistic sources to verbalise properly their own thought, thought that 
could have been more substantial and even different from what they actually said. 
However, driven by their axiom that thinking always occurs in language, these 
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SCT researchers appear to have concluded that their participants were not able to 
think in their second language, a claim that I consider to be flawed.  
To summarise, this section has discussed the relationship between thought and 
language in the minds of the participants, tackling three issues that I relate to the 
SCT notion of language and thought. The ways of understanding the relation and 
operation between the thought and language in developing academic knowledge is 
intrinsically related to how the nature of (academic) knowledge and that of SLA 
are conceptualised. These two matters, central as they are to the present study, 
will be discussed in the following Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.1.  
6.2.3 Knowledge developed through undertaking the LR 
This section intends to explain the nature of the knowledge of the participants that 
they developed by undertaking the LR as having both spoken and written textual 
experiences (Cousin, 2010), by discussing the findings in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.4. 
As reported in the section, the epistemological features of the participants 
revealed in their accounts seemed to accord with the realist view of knowing, 
while diverging from the epistemology of the cultural, linguistic relativist (another 
title for the paradigm of the social, cultural approaches as introduced in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1 and Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). In setting out the intended discussion, it 
may be necessary to summarise first the two competing positions.  
According to the cultural, linguistic relativist perspective that is broadly 
subscribed to by social, cultural SLA researchers, one’s knowledge is culturally 
constructed and (thus) it is contingent on the person’s own language and culture 
(e.g., Donato, 1994; Duranti, 1986; Jacoby & Ochs, 1995; M. Johnson, 1987; 
Kramsch, 2000, 2004; Lakeoff & M. Johnson, 1980/2003; Lantolf, 1996, 2011). 
When a person attempts to understand an extant concept used in different contexts, 
the person appropriates it into his/her own social, cultural context, which is in fact 
creating a new meaning for the concept again, which is framed by his/her 
language and culture (Lantolf, 2011; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006). Then, when the 
same person happens to be in a different context, he/she bestows another new 
meaning to the same concept because no contexts can ever be the same and 
meanings are always context-contingent, unfixed and changing (Kramsch, 2000, 
2004). Similarly, a person’s understanding of a text comprises temporal meanings 
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created or constructed in a particular social, cultural context (Kramsch, 2000). In 
this way, the likelihood of knowledge transmission from the writer (speaker) to 
the reader (hearer) is dismissed (e.g., Donato, 1994; Kramsch, 2000, 2004; 
Lantolf, 1996, 2000). For example, Lantolf (1996) refutes the possibility that “if 
authors are sufficiently careful in constructing their texts, the meaning will be 
there for the reader to unpack in precisely the way the author intended” (p. 715).  
On the other hand, the realist position suggests that the human mind has potential 
to know the object of knowledge as it is, and that it exists independently of the 
mind and thus is not changed or modified by the person’s act of knowing (Husserl, 
1970). This realist notion of knowledge that Husserl suggests includes the idea 
that the mind is capable of transcending linguistic, cultural frames towards the 
object of knowledge, regardless of whether the object of knowledge is a concrete 
thing or state of affairs, or an abstract concept or proposition. When the object of 
knowledge is an abstract concept, the meaning of the concept can be shared by 
many people across different cultures and times. This is because, although 
instances of a concept intuited by different individuals are non-repeatable and 
unique, they share essential properties that bestow a qualification to the concept to 
be not something else but itself (Willard, 1982). When applying this general 
notion of knowledge, a person’s knowledge or understanding of a text is to know 
the meaning of the text intended by the author accurately.  
The data of the present study revealed that the majority of the participants 
appeared to undertake the realist approach to reviewing the target literature, 
seeking to understand the meanings intended by the authors of the literature as 
accurately as possible (Extracts # 22, 25, 26, 36, 39, 40 & 41 in Section 5.1.2). 
This phenomenon may be related to what Willard (1991) notes: one naturally 
takes the realist position in dealing with daily concerns (e.g., knowing when to fill 
the car with petrol), whatever epistemology the person holds in principle.  
However, as Husserl (1970) observes, self-assurance that one knows something 
accurately does not automatically enable one to do so, and the knowledge of the 
object itself is obtained when the three conditions for knowledge are met (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4). Therefore, here I consider whether it is indicated in the 
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findings that the participants had met these three conditions in the process of 
developing their knowledge of the target literature.  
The first condition for knowledge is the transcendence of the mind towards the 
object, which is to perceive the object as it is. The accounts of the participants 
seemed to indicate they experienced this first condition. The participants returned 
to the same texts repeatedly in order to understand the exact meanings intended by 
the writers or speakers (Extracts # 47, 48, 49, 50 & 51 in Section 5.2.1). By 
returning to the same meanings and concepts several times, they strove to achieve 
correct understandings of those meanings and concepts. While developing 
knowledge of abstract concepts, propositions and theories, the participants sought 
to understand them by comparing and matching them with actual state of affairs 
that instantiate them as the participant, Hai, did to understand the concept of self-
efficacy (Extract # 52 in Section 5.2.1 & Extracts # 68, 69, 70, 71 & 72 in Section 
5.2.3). This was the case of transcending to specific instances of an abstract 
concept or theory when the object of one’s knowledge is the concept or theory as 
part of the process of comprehending such notions or propositions (Willard, 1995).  
The same phenomenon would be explained differently when considered in terms 
of the linguistic relativist epistemology. If applying this perspective, the 
knowledge of the participants of the literature consists of temporal, cultural 
interpretations, and the stated goal of the participants of understanding the 
messages as intended by the literature authors would not be considered possible. 
Their intention to achieve clear, shared knowledge of concepts or theories in the 
literature as the basis for developing solid, robust academic knowledge would be 
regarded as unachievable. The data of this study, however, do not support the 
linguistic relativist notion of knowledge. For example, in Section 5.1.4, Nada (and 
probably her supervisor as well) was aware that the concept, “family” meant 
nuclear family in her supervisor’s culture, but extended family in her own culture, 
which indicates that the two concepts of the word “family” that she and her 
supervisor had in their own minds were safely transmitted to each other’s minds 
(Extract # 37). Besides such awareness was possible because her supervisor and 
she shared the general meaning of family – a group of people in kinship 
relationship. This example instead conforms to the realist notion that a concept 
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(message) that what one means can be properly understood by the other person 
when the two people share the same meaning of the concept.  
The second condition for knowledge, applying logic to thinking, also appeared to 
be met by the participants to a certain extent in the process of developing their 
knowledge of the target literature, although not always successfully to do so (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2). For instance, Tram identified the fallacy of 
overgeneralisation from an article about Vietnamese English speakers (Extract # 
68 in Section 5.2.3). Hai and Nada examined the truthfulness of the propositions 
in theories and method instruments (Extract # 52 in Section 5.2.1 & Extract # 69 
in Section 5.2.3). Padma refused to incorporate a concept that her supervisor 
suggested for the reason that it was not consistent with her conceptual model 
(Extract # 21 in Section 5.1.2).  
However, from the cultural relativist perspective, logic is part of the rhetoric of a 
certain language (e.g., Kaplan, 1972, 1987). From this position, the logic that the 
participants employed could be claimed as inherent in English rhetoric, which 
they appropriated by learning and using the language in the English medium 
academic contexts (e.g., Kaplan, 1972, 1987). This idea could appear to be 
plausible considering that the terms that the participants used to address issues 
relating to logic, such as “overgeneralisation”, are English words. However, the 
meanings of those English terms used by the participants to express their logical 
thinking above did not seem to emerge as a consequence of acquiring English 
language (see Section 5.3). In addition, the logical flaws that the participants 
identified in the ideas of others would remain erroneous even if they were 
translated into a different language. Considering these aspects, the logic that the 
participants applied to their thinking seemed to be much closer to the type of logic 
that Husserl (1970) conceptualises than to the logic that the cultural/linguistic 
relativist proposes as a rhetorical function of a particular language.   
Lastly, intersubjectivity, the third condition for knowledge, was realised in the 
knowledge of the participants mainly in two ways. The first is that the knowledge 
of the target literature is, by its nature, intersubjectively shared, communal 
knowledge of concepts, theories or research findings. The second is the 
intersubjective checking and verification of knowledge by other community 
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members (Extracts # 19 & 20 in Section 5.1.2 & Extracts # 81 & 85 in Section 
5.3). One evident phenomenon relating to this condition for knowledge is the 
audio-records and summaries of supervision meetings, which were also read by 
their supervisors (Section 5.2.2). These audio-records and written summaries 
helped participants and their supervisors to achieve meaning clarification. The 
participants were able to incorporate fully their supervisors’ feedback and advice 
into their work and have their knowledge of the target literature checked by their 
supervisors more effectively. Moreover, although regular and consistent support 
and help came from supervisors, the participants also had conversations with other 
people, such as peer PhD students and other academics in their university, 
regarding to their research projects (Extracts # 5, 7, 8, 9 in Section 5.1.2). These 
people were often from different cultural or disciplinary backgrounds, and thus 
they possibly contributed to creating this third condition for the participants’ 
knowledge by helping them to develop a clear, balanced understanding of the 
target literature.  
To conclude, the content of the knowledge that the participants acquired appeared 
not to comprise merely culturally relative or context-bound temporal 
interpretations of the literature that they reviewed. Rather, it appeared to consist of 
gradually developing understandings of the meanings intended by the authors of 
the literature, which they were able to relate to specific aspects of their own 
research topics.  
The nature of the developing knowledge of the participants discussed here will be 
related to explaining the nature of their SLA in Section 6.3.2. 
Summary and implications of Section 6.2 
Section 6.2 discussed the findings of the study in a way to clarify the ontological 
and epistemological nature of the mental faculties and properties of the 
participants.    
In the study of SLA, the social, cultural approaches have emerged as an influential 
stream, and consequently their materialist concepts of the mental faculties and 
properties of second language speakers have become accepted in the field with 
few obstacles. The general direction of these approaches in their challenge to the 
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behaviourist and cognitivist notions of the mental world of second language 
speakers may have appealed to SLA researchers who were developing 
dissatisfaction with these two approaches (e.g., Flawley, 1997). However, as 
manifested in the discussion of this section, the social cultural perspective has also 
exposed issues that are no less serious than those relating to behaviourism and 
cognitivism.  
Alternatively, this study has employed Husserlian realist philosophy as a basis for 
examining the nature of the mental properties of the participants. As a result, it 
became clear that the mental world of the participants were not reduced 
exclusively to the products of social processes. In addition, it could also be 
clarified that their thoughts, the products of their minds, although being 
influenced by language and culture, were not contingent on them. Moreover, the 
realist perspective enabled me to see that, the participants’ knowledge of the target 
literature did not consist merely of subjective, cultural interpretations: it involved 
achieving accurate understandings of the meaning of the target literature as 
intended by the authors, which they participants were developing progressively.  
6.3 Understanding the nature of SLA in an English medium academic 
context  
This section discusses the nature of the SLA of the participants in relation to their 
epistemological processes including the thought-language relation and its 
operation in their knowledge development which was clarified previously in 
Section 6.2. Section 6.3.1 discusses the mechanisms of the SLA of the participants 
based on the findings presented in Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.3. 
Section 6.3.2 then discusses the academic English competence and criticality of 
the participants in relation to their SLA. Lastly, Section 6.3.3 considers the 
importance of developing two extra-linguistic properties – genre knowledge 
(Bruce, 2008a) and logicality (Husserl, 1970) for using English in an academic 
context.  
6.3.1 Mechanisms of SLA occurring with knowledge development 
This section consists of three subsections. In the first two subsections, I discuss 
the mechanisms of SLA by the participants in relation to their cognitive 
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processing while undertaking the LR. The last subsection discusses the extent to 
which the participants’ involvement with people contributed to their second 
language development in reference to Husserl’s concept of intersubjectivity.  
6.3.1.1 SLA and transcending cognitive acts in the process of negotiating the 
meaning 
Previously in Section 6.2.3, it was discussed that the participants took a realist 
approach to understanding text, centrally the target literature, in the sense that 
they sought to understand accurately meaning embedded in text. This subsection 
seeks to explain the mechanism of the SLA of the participants that occurred 
through this epistemological processing for understanding the meaning of text, 
presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.  
Primarily, it needs to be noted, in the extant literature, the type of SLA that this 
section discusses has been considered as incidental learning, indicating that 
language learning takes place where the primary focus is on meaning rather than 
language (Hulstijn, 2003). A potential issue is that, since incidental learning is 
often described also as unintentional learning (J.C. Richards & Schmidt, 2010), 
conceptualising the SLA of the participants as incidental learning could obscure 
the important role of the intentionality and cognitive effort of the participants of 
this study that resulted in this type of SLA (see Section 5.2.2). However, as Read 
(2000) notes, although the central intention is not language learning in incidental 
learning, the term incidental does not merely imply that language is acquired 
unconsciously. In fact, researchers argue that incidental SLA can occur when the 
person makes conscious, intentional mental effort to understand the forms and 
functions of language encoding meaning (e.g., Hulstijn, 1992, 2003; Ortega, 2009; 
Schmidt, 1990). Here thus a critical point can be made: although language 
learning was not their primary goal, the SLA of the participants was certainly 
driven by their intended cognitive effort to understand formal features of language 
as the means to understand meaning clearly.   
In regard to this point, the SLA of the participants can be well represented by 
Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) theory of language learning through the negotiation of 
meaning reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. Specifically, SLA by the 
participants identified in the findings can be related to his concept of the non-
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reciprocal type of the negotiation of meaning, whereby no immediate feedback on 
the interpretation of meaning from the message producer is provided. Some 
central notions in this theory of Widdowson are outlined as follows: 
• The person is in a situation where he/she intends to negotiate the meaning 
of text written or spoken in a second language, in the sense that he/she 
seeks to understand the meaning as intended by its producer.   
• The negotiation of meaning centrally involves a perceptual cycle between 
the existing schema (mental representation) and the meaning. 
• The person purposely chooses to use the second language encoding the 
target meaning as the means for decoding the meaning rather than 
drawing on the first language resources.  
• When there are unknown features of the language encoding the target 
meaning, the person would seek to know these features for the purpose of 
the negotiation of meaning.  
• Through the recurrent, progressive perceptual cycle of the negotiation of 
meaning, the person may actually learn (some of) these features.  
In the rest of this section, I explain a mechanism contributing to the SLA of the 
participants drawing on this theory of Widdowson’s. In doing so, I also clarify 
further how the participants were capable of undertaking this particular SLA 
mechanism and eventually developed their knowledge of academic English, in the 
light of Husserl’s (1970) theory of knowledge, centrally the notion of the 
transcending quality of the mind (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4). What makes it 
possible to explain the SLA of the participants by drawing upon the work of the 
both scholars is the convergence between them. In particular, there is a 
considerable congruence between Widdowson’s (1983) concept of the perceptual 
cycle during which “schematic knowledge is recurrently projected and modified” 
(p. 67) and Husserl’s notion of the gradual attainment of knowledge passing 
through numerous mental representations (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 for a 
related discussion).  
Firstly, it is necessary to understand the participants’ cognitive processing for 
understanding meaning expressed in relation to the framework of the negotiation 
of meaning. I present Figure 6.1 that diagrams the first round of the perceptual 
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cycle that the participants appeared to have during the negotiation of the target 
meaning, which involves transcending cognitive acts.  
Figure 6.1: The first round of the perceptual cycle during the negotiation of 
meaning 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates that the participants probably initiated the process of 
meaning negotiation with their own mental representations or the initial schemata 
related to the target meaning (Husserl, 1970; Widdowson, 1983. 1990). Through 
decoding and cognising the target meaning, they would have modified their initial 
schemata to new mental representations or developing knowledge. What emerged 
from the data (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1) was that the participants appeared to 
undertake the perceptual cycle for the same meaning recurrently. Thus, in each of 
following rounds of the perceptual cycle after the first round (presented in Figure 
6.1), they began a cycle from the mental representation amended from the 
previous round, and ended it with a further modified representation closer to the 
target meaning. Throughout this whole processing, it seemed to be necessary for 
them to engage in transcending cognitive acts centrally in three ways. Firstly, the 
use of their knowledge systems of English language (both procedural patterns and 
linguistic resources) for decoding meaning probably required them to move their 
minds outside of their first language frame (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.4). Developing 
new mental representations also would involve surmounting previous ones 
including the initial schemata (Widdowson, 1983; Husserl, 1970). In addition they 
also sometimes reached out their perceptions to real events or things 
corresponding to the target meaning to facilitate their understanding of the 
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meaning (Extracts # 52 in Section 5.2.1 & Extracts 68, 69, 70 & 71 in Section 
5.2.3).  
Then, when the participants encountered unknown or new language resources 
while undertaking the negotiation of meaning, the negotiating process appeared to 
become more complicated, acting as a facilitative force for their SLA. Figure 6.2 
represents the early stage of the negotiation of meaning (i.e., perceptual cycling) 
facilitative for SLA by the participants.   
Figure 6.2: The first round of the perceptual cycle with new language sources 
 
As seen in Figure 6.2, where unknown or new language resources were used to 
encode the target meaning, the participants replaced them with alternative English 
or equivalent first language resources (e.g., Extract # 40 in Section 5.1.4 & 
Extract 46 in Section 5.2.1). This replacement seemed to allow them to 
comprehend the target meaning and newly projected their mental representations 
of the meaning. What is important here in terms of their SLA is that the 
replacement resources (both English and the first language), cognised meaning in 
terms of new mental representations, and perceived real events or things all 
seemed to help the participants to recognise and understand the forms and 
functions of the new language resources (e.g., Extract # 52 in Section 5.2.1). 
Afterwards, the participants seemed to undertake a recursive perceptual cycling of 
the negotiation of meaning conducive to their SLA, which is illustrated in Figure 
6.3.  
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Figure 6.3: A round in the recurrent perceptual cycle involving language 
acquisitional processing 
 
Figure 6.3 indicates that as the participants were gradually establishing a direct 
association between the new language resources and the target meaning, thereby 
they needed the L1 and L2 resources that replaced new language resources less 
and less for decoding meaning. Eventually, they may have reached the state where 
they did not need the replaced resources almost at all, being able to 
(re)comprehend the target meaning by means of the new language resources. This 
point of the participants’ cognitive processing appeared to be where the 
acquisition of some of the new language resources was substantially occurring. In 
this process, besides the aforementioned transcending cognitive acts facilitative 
for SLA – moving beyond the first language frame and previous mental 
presentations and perceiving the reality, one more transcending act seemed to be 
exercised. This is the overlaying of new language knowledge on existing L1 and 
L2 knowledge, which they once utilised to replace new language resources, 
building up instead the direct association between these new resources and the 
meaning. This particular transcending act appeared to be a necessary step in the 
SLA that took place, leading the participants to remember and retain the forms 
and functions of new language resources that they newly understood.   
Overall, this section explained the mechanism of the participants’ SLA occurring 
during input based on Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) theory of language learning 
through the negotiation of meaning and Husserl’s theory of knowledge. As 
maintained throughout this thesis, the core of Husserl’s exposition of the 
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transcending cognitive act is that the person is capable of perceiving the object of 
knowledge directly without being mediated. This does not mean that the mind is 
not being mediated at all in the epistemological processes, but it means that, if 
necessary, the mind can be extended beyond any pre-existing mediating frames, 
such as cultural and linguistic frames of reference or mental representations, 
towards perceiving the object. Significantly, what enabled the participants to 
experience their SLA through the negotiation of meaning seems to be the 
capability for transcending cognitive acts: being able to extend thought towards 
the target meaning itself beyond the existing schema (representation) of it; 
towards the resources of academic English beyond their first language; towards 
the reality corresponding to the target meaning.  
6.3.1.2 SLA and hierarchical thought-language operation 
In Section 6.3.1.1, I clarified the SLA of the participants in relation to developing 
knowledge from input (reading and listening), here I seek to explain their SLA in 
terms of demonstrating knowledge as output (writing).    
To begin with, I present Figure 6.4 diagraming the mechanism of the SLA of the 
participants occurring through the hierarchical thought-language operation that 
emerged from the findings in Chapter 5.2.2.  
Figure 6.4: The SLA of the participants occurring with expressing thought in text 
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Section 6.2.2 proposed that the ontology and operation of the thought and 
language in the minds of the participants seemed to be two separate entities 
operating hierarchically in the process of creating their texts (e.g., Bruce, 2008a; 
Chenoweth & Hayes, 2001; Widdowson, 2007). As represented in Figure 6.4, this 
hierarchical operation of thought and language as two separate entities seems to 
account for how the participants were able to acquire new language resources of 
academic English while they were striving to compose LR texts in accordance 
with the necessary academic requirements. That is, in essence, their SLA appeared 
to be driven by their need to employ new resources for expressing the content of 
their thought that they formed in appropriate academic English text. Moreover, 
conforming to Bruce’s (2008a) genre knowledge, the findings indicate that the 
knowledge of academic English that the participants required and thus acquired 
involved procedural knowledge and linguistic systems (Extracts # 4 in Section 
5.1.1, Extracts # 29, 30 & 32 in Section 5.1.3 & Extracts # 61 &62 in Section 
5.2.2).  
Most centrally, the participants appeared to develop new knowledge of academic 
English for their writing while using rhetorical and linguistic resources that they 
found from the literature materials (Extracts # 59, 60, 61, 62 & 63 in Section 
5.2.2). This learning and using of the language used by the authors of the 
literature, however, was not necessarily plagiarising these authors’ work, because 
what the participants drew on from others’ texts is not the ideas of these authors 
but language forms to encode these ideas. In addition, the participants also 
appeared to learn new rhetorical patterns and academic vocabulary while revising 
and improving their texts by incorporating the feedback and input from other 
people, such as their supervisors (Section 5.3). This learning of academic English 
through the process of revising or improving their texts was, as the participants 
stated, not exactly transforming their ideas. Instead, it was more of reorganising 
the subject content knowledge that they had, or refining their writing while 
maintaining their original ideas (Extracts # 54, 55 & 56 in Section 5.2.2).  
The significance of the findings of this study revealing the SLA of the participants 
in relation to the hierarchical thought-language operation during output becomes 
evident when they are compared and contrasted with Swain’s work, which has 
investigated SLA extensively in that aspect (e.g., 1995, 2000, 2006a & b). As a 
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Vygotskyan SLA researcher, Swain is opposed to the idea that thought is 
independent of language, and proposes Vygotskyan conceptions of second 
language learning. Specifically, by reworking her own output hypothesis, Swain 
developed the concept of languaging (Swain, 2006a & b & Swain et al., 2009), 
which she defines as “the process of making meaning and shaping knowledge and 
experience through language” (2006a, p. 89). According to her, L2 learning 
basically occurs through languaging that the learner undertakes in the process of 
speaking and writing. There appear to be mainly two effects of languaging. Firstly, 
it “plays critical roles in creating, transforming, and augmenting higher mental 
processes [i.e., thinking]” (2006b, p. 99). In relation to this effect, she also asserts 
that “verbalisation changes thought” (p. 110). Thus, applying this first effect of 
languaging, SLA can be regarded as the process of “creating, transforming and 
augmenting” thought in L2 (p. 99). Then as the other effect of languaging, Swain 
proposes that, through languaging, thoughts “become available as an object about 
which questions can be raised and answers can be explored with others or with the 
self…languaging is a process which creates a visible or audible product about 
which one can language further” (2006a, p. 97).   
The second effect of languaging, which Swain proposes, accords with the realist 
position, and is consistent with the findings of the study. That is, by being 
expressed in language (particularly in written language), a person’s thought 
becomes a fixed, sense-perceptible object (Moreland & Rae, 2002). Then this 
objectified or expressed thought of the person can be the object of his/her own or 
others’ knowledge. Such a phenomenon was in fact experienced by the 
participants of this present study (Extracts # 45, 49, 50, 51, 64 & 66 in Section 
5.2.2), which appeared to facilitate their acquisition of new rhetorical and 
linguistic knowledge. Similarly, in the research studies that Swain conducted on 
her own or with other researchers (see Swain, 2006a & b; Swain et al., 2009), the 
participants certainly benefited from expressing their thought in spoken or written 
language in relation to thought becoming a perceivable object by means of 
language. Therefore, it seems that expressing thought in language facilitates one 
to develop both extra-linguistic and linguistic knowledge. 
However, the findings of this present study as well as those of the studies that 
Swain herself reports appear to provide less support for the first effect of 
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languaging that Swain claims – languaging creates and changes thought. For 
example, a finding reported in Swain (2006a), which she presents as an example 
indicating the first effect of languaging, rather seems to negate this effect: 
Our participants [have written] a story…We then reformulate the stories the 
students [participants] have written. In reformulating the stories, the intent 
has been to not change the meaning of what the students wrote, but to 
change the form of their writing so that it would be acceptable to a fluent 
user of the target language. We then ask the students…to notice the 
differences between their story and the rewritten one…they later rewrite 
what they had originally written, incorporating the substance of what they 
had languaged about. (p. 98)  
As Swain herself states, the students in the studies were able to change the 
appropriateness of language of their writing while retaining the original meanings 
of their thought. This process, therefore, does not appear to exemplify languaging 
as creating and transforming thought in the way that Swain argues, but rather one 
in which the content of intended thought is expressed in different language forms 
without its meaning being changed significantly. In effect, this appears to be what 
the participants of the present study experienced. What should be noted here is, as 
Moreland (2012) points out, the fact that the same thought can be encoded in 
different expressions or languages evidences that thought is not linguistic, and it is 
not created by the use of language (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.6). In this regard, 
the SLA that the students in Swain’s study and the participants of this study 
experienced seemed to be not creating and transforming their thought in their 
second language, but acquiring new resources to express their thought 
appropriately in their own contexts.   
Again, I wish to emphasise that, for the participants of this study the very struggle 
to express their ideas in academically appropriate ways, while not changing the 
meanings that they intended, seemed to drive them to acquire new linguistic and 
rhetorical resources. This convinces me to argue that the SLA of the participants 
was not a process of becoming able to create their thought in a second language, 
but one of expanding their second language systemic/rhetorical knowledge that 
allowed them to express their (extra-linguistic) thought accurately and 
appropriately. The implication of this argument is critical in terms of 
understanding the cognitive competence and capability of second language users. 
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In particular, it provides a basis for resisting the claims of the SCT researchers: 
who, on one hand, suggest that SLA is gaining a new tool to create and regulate 
thought; and on the other argue that this goal of SLA is hardly attainable and (thus) 
second language speakers seem to be unable to think in their second language (see 
the third issue in Section 6.2.2). For the participants of the study, SLA appeared to 
relate to their becoming successful communicators of knowledge and thought in a 
second language context, which is not exactly the same as becoming able to think 
in the language  
6.3.1.3 SLA and intersubjectivity with other community members   
In this subsection, I discuss the involvement of the academic communities of the 
participants in their SLA, which was presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.3, in terms 
of Husserl’s concept of intersubjectivity. This centrally involves clarifying the 
ontology of academic English (including its procedural patterns and linguistic 
systems) and whether the involvement of their communities indicates that their 
SLA was an outcome of social processes.  
According to Husserl (1970), intersubjectivity refers to the state in which a 
number of people perceive or cognise the same object. Husserl proposes 
intersubjectivity as one of the three conditions for achieving objective knowledge 
for the reason that, by having intersubjectivity, people can check, correct and 
validate each other’s knowledge of the object (Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4). As 
discussed in Section 6.2.3 previously, the participants appeared to achieve 
intersubjectivity with their community members in terms of developing their 
overall knowledge of the target literature. Then the findings reported in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3 indicate the intersubjectivity in their knowledge development 
particularly in relation to developing their knowledge of academic English. That is, 
by acquiring the academic English used by their academic community members 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1), the participants’ knowledge of the language displayed 
in their draft writing was checked and corrected by some of these members to 
some extent (Section 5.3).  
Husserl stresses that what fundamentally permits intersubjectivity is the ontology 
of objects of knowledge existing independently and (thus) being accessed and 
cognised by many people and, for him, language is also one type of object of 
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knowledge. Therefore, it seems to be possible to understand the 
systemic/procedural resources of the academic English that the participants 
acquired as an object or formal property in a collective term, cognised by people 
in English-medium academic contexts. In actuality, the approaches to academic 
English that the participants undertook in their effort to learn it show that they 
treated these resources as an object or a formal property, of which they developed 
their knowledge (Extracts # 59, 60, 61, 62 & 63 in Section 5.2.2).  
Conceptualising language as a formal property of a particular culture also has 
been directly and indirectly suggested in the extant literature (e.g., Bachman, 1990; 
Bruce, 2008, 2011; DeKeyser, 2003; Doughty & Long, 2003; Gass & Selinker, 
2001; Norris & Ortega, 2000; Read, 2000, 2007; van Patten, 2004; Widdowson, 
1983, 1989, 1990; Wray, 2002). For example, Widdowson (1990) notes, 
“Creativity is only possible in reference to established convention…The ability to 
adjust linguistic behaviour contingently to meet particular communicative 
requirements presupposes a knowledge of a general rules and conventions” (pp. 
153-154). Similarly, Bruce (2008a) suggests that exercising “an authorial voice by 
individuated and innovative use of the various aspects of discourse knowledge” 
requires “being able to understand and appropriately draw on various types of 
systemic knowledge” (p. 10).  
An issue in considering language as a formal property is that, this conception has 
been challenged by the social, cultural SLA approaches (see Atkinson, 2011c). 
For example, Norton and McKinny (2011) argue that SLA is not “a gradual, 
individual process of internalizing a neutral set of rules, structures and vocabulary 
of a standard language” (p. 28). Similarly, Lantolf and Thorne (2006) contend that 
“grammar is not a pre-existing closed system of formal properties, but is emergent 
in dialogic activity” (p. 9). In fact, there is no decontextualized standard language, 
and linguistic systems including grammar rules and a language changes over time, 
to which people using the language contribute (Widdowson, 2003). However, this 
cannot be a justification for denying that systemic resources exist as a relatively 
stable structure or set of formal properties and (thus) they can be shared 
intersubjectively. Contradictory to the aforementioned claimed about linguistic 
rules, Lantolf (2011) stresses the importance of “explicit knowledge of the 
relevant features of the L2”, suggesting that they should be introduced to language 
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learners by external agents (e.g., teachers) (p. 38). In addition, Norton (2000) 
reported that her participants invested in the target language and gained 
confidence when they came to have knowledge of and ability to use it. 
By acquiring the academic English communally-shared within their academic 
communities, the participants of the present study were able to receive feedback 
and comments on their drafts from their immediate academic community 
members. This was, in Husserl’s conception, achieving another aspect of 
intersubjectivity in developing their knowledge of academic English. As the 
participants themselves acknowledged, the intersubjective feedback and 
comments provided by other community members helped them to amend, repair 
and further develop their rhetorical and linguistic knowledge to be closer to 
prototypical patterns and systems (Extracts # 4 in Section 5.1.1, Extracts # 79, 81, 
83, 84 & 85 in Section 5.3 & Extract # 90 in Section 5.4.3). Thus, the help and 
support of other community members seemed to play an important role for the 
process of the SLA of the participants.  
Nevertheless, this supportive role of the communities of the participants in their 
SLA may not be evidence indicating that the SLA of the participants is a product 
of social processes. Instead, aspects involved in the intersubjectivity with other 
community members here seem to suggest rather that their acquisition of 
academic English was the outcome of their own, individual cognitive processing 
and efforts. Firstly, the participants’ knowledge of the language was able to be 
checked by others, because they firstly developed it by means of their own 
cognitive processes (Sections 5.2.2 & 5.2.3). This seems to explain the reason 
why most of the participants appeared to experience improvement in their 
academic English although others’ support in relation to their language learning 
was irregular and even seemed to be insufficient to be considered as step by step 
guidance (Section 5.3). Secondly, certainly, sources for the knowledge of the 
participants (including the knowledge of academic English) were provided by 
others. However, for the most part, their actual knowledge acquisition appeared to 
occur through their own selective, intentional uptake of some of those sources, 
rather than merely by being in a situation where such sources were made 
explicitly available (Section 5.1.2). Similarly, what made an effect of amending 
the participants developing knowledge of academic English seemed to be not 
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merely that the feedback was given to them, but more crucially that they 
selectively accepted and used it to further develop their knowledge.  
In summary, by developing knowledge of linguistic/procedural resources of 
academic English shared in their academic communities, the participants’ were 
able to receive comments and feedback from other community members on their 
knowledge of the language. This support from their community members helped 
them to correct and further develop their knowledge of academic writing to a 
certain extent. However, the data of the present study seemed to suggest that their 
SLA was an outcome of their individual mental processing rather than that of 
inter-personal processes.  
6.3.2 The scope and nature of SLA and competence in using academic 
English  
From the discussions in Section 6.3.1 previously, it was suggested that the 
academic English that the participants acquired involved not only linguistic 
systems but also thought-structuring patterns used to organise extended text. 
Based on the analysis of five participants’ LR texts in Chapter 5, Section 5.4., this 
section discusses further expanding the scope of SLA, by including elements and 
areas that constitute academic English. In so doing, I seek to understand the 
participants’ competence in using academic English as second language speakers 
of the language. In addition, I discuss the implication of the expanded scope of 
SLA by the participants in relation to thought and language in their minds being 
operated as two separate entities.  
To identify extra-linguistic areas involved in the participants’ academic texts as a 
trace of their use of academic English, I drew on Bruce’s (2008a & b) concepts of 
social genre (SG) – conventionalised classification of texts – and cognitive genre 
(CG) – prototypical, thought-organising patterns usually applied to segments of 
texts (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). These SG and CG concepts provide a 
framework for identifying the nature and features of extra-linguistic knowledge 
required for using language in English-medium academic contexts. 
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The findings presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.4 indicated that the knowledge of 
and ability to use SG and CG elements is critical for achieving textual coherence, 
and thus for expressing and communicating thoughts including critical and logical 
ideas effectively. These findings appeared to confirm the central notion of Bruce’s 
(2008a) theory of genre knowledge that one can bestow overall coherence to 
his/her English academic prose by incorporating academic SC and CG genre 
elements. For example, the participants used metatext and section headings, which 
are some elements of a LR text as a social genre (Extracts # 90 & 91 in Section 
5.4.1). By means of this, they were able to achieve the coherence of the whole text 
to a certain extent. In addition, the LR texts of the participants appeared to achieve 
a local, internal coherence when they were written in accordance with academic 
cognitive genres (CGs) to achieve more general types of rhetorical purpose, such 
as to argue, explain or discuss (Extracts # 92 to 98 in Section 5.4.1). For example, 
the LR text of Tram who used more prototypical CG elements appeared to be 
more coherent and better structured than the LR texts of the other four participants. 
Within the LR texts of the five participants, the parts that were organised in terms 
of CGs were found to be much more coherent than the rest of the text. In addition, 
their use of the two types of rhetorical device, the Concession-Contraexpectation 
interpropositional relation and attitude markers, helped the participants effectively 
communicate their critical thinking (Bruce, 2014), to a certain extent (Extracts # 
99 to 102 in Section 5.4.2). Moreover, when CG patterns are not incorporated, the 
content of texts (i.e. the participants’ thoughts) that can be accepted as logical was 
still not understood clearly (Extracts # 103 & 104 in Section 5.4.3). This again 
suggests the importance of thought-structuring genre knowledge in the context of 
using academic English.  
Based on this analysis, this study suggests that, in the concept of academic 
English as a language, extra-linguistic thought-organising conventions (i.e., SG 
and CG knowledge) need to be embraced along with linguistic systems. This 
suggestion is not new and aligns itself with genre approaches in the fields of 
English for Specific Purposes (ESP) and English for Academic Purposes (EAP) 
(e.g., Flowerdew & Peacock, 2001; Hyland, 2004, 2006, 2009; Swales, 2004). 
These genre approaches have promoted the importance of second language 
speakers of English having knowledge and awareness of academic genres. In fact, 
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the perspectives of Widdowson (1983, 1990) and Bruce (2008) that this study has 
drawn upon to understand the participants’ SLA are broadly part of genre 
approaches to language learning and use in the areas of ESP and EAP. Here what 
I seek to suggest is incorporating genre knowledge elements in the concept of 
academic English, and subsequently in the scope of second language acquisition. 
Firstly, academic English as the language that the participants of the study 
acquired can be understood as the concept that encompasses both extra-linguistic 
SG and CG elements and linguistic systems. Then it can be derivative to consider 
the participants’ acquisition of academic English or their SLA in their academic 
context as developing competence (knowledge and ability) in using both extra-
linguistic and linguistic elements of the language.  
The identification of SLA by the participants as developing such competence may 
require clarifying further the features of this competence. As reported in Sections 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2, the participants were engaged in the acquisition of new extra-
linguistic and linguistic resources of academic English by using it, and their 
central use of the language was the comprehension and composition of extended 
academic text (both written and spoken). More specifically, they used the 
language in the process of understanding the meaning embedded in text. The 
negotiation of meaning centrally involved intentional cognitive processing of 
developing existing schemata into actual knowledge of the target meaning, 
through which they appeared to develop their knowledge of new resources of the 
language. In addition, they also used the language in the course of expressing their 
ideas in the form of academic text through a hierarchical thought-language 
operation, which, again, seemed to conducive to their SLA. Considering these 
patterns of their use and learning of academic English, the central feature of the 
participants’ academic English competence, therefore, may be understood firstly 
by means of the concept of discourse competence – being able to process and 
create extended text – which Bruce (2008a) identifies as the central element of 
communicative competence. Use of discourse competence could also be explained 
by Widdowson’s (1983) concept of capacity – being able to use a language, and 
further acquire new resources of the language through its use (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.4).     
 
 
226 
 
In addition, I seek to clarify this expanded concept of SLA as developing 
competence in using both extra-linguistic and linguistic resources in relation to 
the philosophical basis of this present study, particularly to the notion of the 
thought and language in the minds that function as two separate systems. In 
reference with the findings that thought and language in the participants’ minds 
are two separate entities, I sought to explain some mechanisms of their SLA. One 
central suggestion regarding these SLA mechanisms is that the content of the 
participants’ thought was not the products or the outcomes of their SLA. Instead, I 
argued that the content of their thought seemed to be extra-linguistic, and their 
SLA seemed to occur in response to their need to encode this extra-linguistic 
thought using language resources that are academically appropriate. This principle 
being that underpinned the clarification of the participants’ SLA mechanisms 
needs to be sustained and emphasised here in considering the acquisition of 
thought-structuring genre knowledge in the scope of SLA. That is, the content of 
the participants’ thought may not what was created, transformed or augmented as 
the consequence of attaining genre knowledge as part of the acquisition of 
academic English.  
The literature review in Chapter 2, the social, cultural approaches to SLA (based 
on Vygotskyan theory of thought and language) suggest that SLA involves 
creating and regulating thought in second language. Thus, for example, Atkinson 
(1987) argues that non-Western second language speakers of English may develop 
critical thinking by learning English language because criticality or critical 
thought is what is embedded in the language (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.5). In a 
similar vein, some cultural relativist genre researchers promote the notion that 
developing genre knowledge of English would attaining new ways of thinking, 
accommodating to certain logic exclusively pertaining to English language (e.g., 
Crismore, Markkanen, & Steffensen, 1993; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Hill & 
Mannheim, 1992; Hyland, 2005, 2009; M. Johnson, 1987; Kaplan, 1972, 1987; 
Kramsch, 2004).  
However, the findings of the present study seem to refute these Vygotskyan or 
cultural relativistic notions of thought and language in relation to acquiring 
second language including second language genre knowledge. Overall, the 
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content of the participants’ thought did not appear to be created or shaped by 
acquiring academic English, as already explicated in the previous sections in this 
chapter. In addition, the findings in Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.3 and 5.4 appear to 
indicate that the criticality and logicality of the participants seemed to be 
autonomous from their academic English competence.  
In relation to their criticality, the participants acknowledged that they should 
develop subject content knowledge of their own disciplinary field to be able to be 
critical (e.g., Extracts # 76 & 77 Section 5.2.3). Then the analysis presented in 
Section 5.4.2 suggests that expressing critical thinking appropriately requires SG 
and CG knowledge. Nevertheless, their critical thinking ability itself as being able 
to make evaluative judgements against certain criteria appeared to be what they 
possessed as part of their human nature. In addition, the data presented in Extracts 
# 68 to 71in Section 5.2.3 and Extracts # 102 and 103 in Section 5.4.3 seemed to 
reveal that their application of logic to their thinking also appeared not to be the 
outcome of the acquisition of the rhetorical thought-organising conventions of 
academic English. Particularly, as seen in Extracts # 102 and 103, the content of 
thought (text) can be accepted as logical even when the competence in using 
English genre knowledge was underdeveloped, and thus the thought was not so 
effectively communicated. This implies again that the independence of thoughts 
including those to which logic is properly applied from academic English rhetoric.  
These findings conform to the realist conception of this present study that thought, 
in general, is not completely contingent on language, and also to the suggestion 
that universal logic is what one can apply to his/her thought before encoding it in 
any language (Husserl, 1970; Willard, 2003). When referring to this Husserlian 
notion of thought and language, and logic, the SLA of the participants in terms of 
the relation of thought and language in their minds and the scope of such SLA can 
be portrayed as the diagram in Figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.5: SLA by the participants in terms of its scope and thought and 
language in their minds 
 
Therefore, overall, the case of the participants seemed to suggest that the 
acquisition of academic English is developing competence in using both extra-
linguistic and linguistic elements of the language through cognitive processing 
and endeavour to encode thought appropriately in their academic context. This 
suggestion involves opposing the notion of the SCT approach to SLA and that of 
the cultural relativist genre studies that define the acquisition of a language and its 
rhetorical convention as creating and shaping the content of the second language 
user’s thought.  
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Summary and implications of Section 6.3 
Section 6.3 sought to understand the nature of the SLA of the participants by 
discussing mechanisms of their SLA, their academic English competence and 
criticality in relation to their SLA, and the necessity of considering developing 
genre knowledge as part of SLA in academic contexts.  
Section 6.3.1 discussed the mechanisms of the SLA of the participants that 
emerged from the findings in terms of three aspects. Firstly, as Widdowson (1983, 
1990) proposes, the participants appeared to learn new linguistic/procedural 
resources through negotiating the target meaning embedded in text. Crucially, 
their focused, meaning-uncovering intentionality during the process of the 
negotiation of meaning appeared to be considerably facilitative of the process and 
their acquisition of new academic English. Secondly, the SLA of the participants 
also appeared to be driven by their need to develop new text-creating resources 
that arose from the hierarchical thought-language processing for expressing their 
ideas academically appropriately. Thirdly, by acquiring the academic English that 
is a formal property of their academic communities, the participants were able to 
receive comments and feedback on their language from other community 
members, with which they modified and improved their developing knowledge of 
the language. This intersubjective support from their academic communities 
appeared to play an important role for the SLA of the participants, but this did not 
seem to mean necessarily that their SLA was a product of inter-personal social 
processes.  
Then lastly, Section 6.3.2 discussed genre knowledge (Bruce, 2008a) as a central 
element of competence in using language in an academic context, based on the 
analysis of five participants’ LR texts. In this section I challenged the cultural 
relativist idea that logic is part of the rhetoric of a particular culture and thus SLA 
in English-medium academic contexts involves developing ways of thinking in, 
and logic of English language. I instead proposed that thought is not created by 
means of language and SLA seemed to occur in cognitive processing and effort to 
express thought including critical and logical thinking by using appropriate 
language resources in the contexts.  
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The most significant point of the discussion of this section is that SLA in an 
academic context appears to occur through personal commitment and endeavour 
to develop knowledge and language, which centrally involves intentional 
cognitive processing. This intensive, intentional nature of SLA seems not to be 
adequately captured by the social, cultural conceptions, such as SLA as an end 
product of inter-personal processes, socialisation, or biological or ecological 
adaptation to social, cultural environments. 
6.4 Conclusion  
Chapter 6 discussed the findings of the present study through the lens of the 
conceptual framework established in Chapter 3. It also extensively argued against 
the postmodern social constructivist paradigm of the social, cultural approaches 
based on the discussions of the findings. Overall, the discussion was undertaken in 
two areas. In Section 6.1, I considered the ontology and epistemology of the 
participants – their minds and cognitions, thought-language relation in their 
knowledge and their knowledge from a realist perspective. In the following 
Section 6.2, I sought to explain the nature of the SLA of the participants in terms 
of some of its mechanisms, scope and the language user’s competence in English-
medium academic contexts. The section also suggested that developing genre 
knowledge may need to be included within the scope of SLA in an academic 
context.  
In the following conclusion chapter, Chapter 7, I will summarise the key 
arguments of the discussion chapter, address the limitations of the study, and 
suggest the methodological, theoretical and pedagogical implications of the study. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.0 Overview 
This final chapter concludes the study. Firstly, Section 7.1 presents the key 
arguments of the discussion of the findings. Then Section 7.2 discusses the 
limitations of the study. Section 7.3 following discusses the theoretical, 
methodological and pedagogical implications of the study. Lastly Section 7.4 
concludes with some suggestions for future research.  
7.1 Key arguments in the discussion of the findings 
The discussion of the findings of the study in Chapter 6 was based on the realist 
theoretical framework established in Chapter 3. In the following points, I 
summarise key arguments presented in the discussion chapter: 
 ontological and epistemological features of the participants displayed in 
their undertaking the LR (Section 6.2); 
 some of underlying mechanisms of their SLA, particularly in relation to 
processing the target literature and creating their own LR texts (Section 
6.3.1); and,  
 genre knowledge as an area in the scope of SLA in academic contexts 
(Section 6.3.3). 
Firstly, drawing on Husserl’s (1970) theory of knowledge, I argued that the 
personal intentionality of the participants led them to engage in social processes, 
selectively focus on knowledge sources, and develop their academic knowledge 
and language. This argument involved the reasoning that, since intentionality is 
the core quality of their minds, their cognition (the function of the mind) cannot 
be viewed solely as a product of their social interactions. In addition, the 
participants’ thought, the outcome of their cognitive processes, although 
expressed in language, appeared not to be completely contingent on any particular 
language and culture. Rather, it appeared to regulate language use and extend 
beyond both linguistic and cultural frames. Thus, it seemed that their knowledge 
of the target literature did not merely consist of subjective interpretations based on 
their own cultural frames, but involved more centrally accurate understandings of 
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the reported knowledge and views of authors under review. The realist 
conceptions of the ontology and epistemology of the participants that this study 
employs diverges from those of the social, cultural approaches, which has been 
already extensively discussed.   
Then, I sought to clarify some of the underlying mechanisms of the SLA of the 
participants that occurred through comprehending the target meaning embedded 
in text (input), and through producing text (output). Overall, the SLA of the 
participants seemed to occur as the outcome of their own intentional cognitive 
processing and endeavours, which they constantly undertook no matter whether 
participating in social interactions or not. Firstly, I suggested that the SLA of the 
participants in relation to input seemed to confirm Widdowson’s (1983, 1990) 
notion of language learning through the negotiation of meaning. I further argued 
that their SLA, through the negotiation of meaning, centrally involved the 
transcending quality of their minds (Husserl, 1970) – iteratively perceiving the 
meaning embedded in text and subsequently revisiting and revising initial 
schemata until they correspond to the meaning of the texts under review. In 
addition, the mechanism behind the SLA of the participants occurring in relation 
to output was explained. In essence, the hierarchical operation between the 
content of their thought and their knowledge of academic English (Bruce, 2008a), 
which seemed to be two separate entities (Willard, 1984), appeared to be the key 
factor that facilitated their SLA. That is, in this thought-language operation, the 
participants needed to draw on new procedural and systemic resources of the 
language in order to express their ideas in accord with academic conventions, and 
thereby they seemed to acquire some of these new resources.  
Moreover, I discussed the importance of developing extra-linguistic elements of 
academic English competence based on the analysis of five participants’ LR texts. 
As Bruce (2008a, 2011) clarifies, genre knowledge – social genre (SG) and 
cognitive genre (CG) knowledge – seems to be critical for achieving overall 
coherence and communicability of a text as English academic prose. The 
importance of genre knowledge was revealed more clearly with the finding that 
even though the content of thought may be frame an underlying and logic and 
sense of criticality, it still could not be communicated successfully when genre 
knowledge is underdeveloped. Based on this significant role of competence in 
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using genre knowledge, it was suggested that acquisition of genre knowledge 
needs to be considered within the scope of SLA along with acquiring linguistic 
resources.   
Section 7.2 following discusses the limitations of the study, and in Section 7.3, I 
discuss theoretical and pedagogical implications of the study based on these key 
arguments in the discussion of the findings presented in this section.  
7.2 Limitations of the study 
This section discusses the limitations of the present study.  
Firstly, a limitation arose from the open-ended nature of this study as qualitative 
research, which could be advantageous and disadvantageous simultaneously in 
seeking a robust investigation of second language acquisition (Dörnyei, 2007). 
The theoretical framework of the study was developed along with data collection 
and analysis, and themes emerged from what participants disclosed or revealed 
somewhat spontaneously during unstructured interviews, rather than from 
responses to structured interview schedules generated in accordance with the 
theoretical framework established prior to the field research. This inductive 
approach to data collection and analysis was intended and can be considered as a 
positive aspect of the study using a qualitative methodology. However, 
undertaking this open-ended, bottom-up approach did not allow me to engage in a 
more in-depth examination of some important findings that emerged at a very late 
stage of the investigation. For example, the conceptualisation of the participants’ 
communities from the perspective of their SLA occurred towards the completion 
of this thesis. As a result, I could make preliminary ad hoc claims based on a 
small sample of data, not being able to undertake further a corroborating 
examination of this issue.     
Investigating SLA using a qualitative methodology has created another condition 
that could be considered potentially as a limitation of the study. From the accounts 
of the participants, it emerged that the academic English that the participants 
appeared to acquire consisted not only of linguistic systems but also thought-
structuring rhetorical patterns. Based on this finding, I identified the two extra-
linguistic elements of academic English competence, the development of which 
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may be considered within the scope of SLA. However, examining the nature of 
SLA in an inductive way did not involve tracing changes in the participants’ 
knowledge of particular features, such as through the use of pre-and post-test of 
the participants. That would, of necessity be the object of a subsequent study 
perhaps using a somewhat different methodological framework.   
In addition, a further limitation relates to the newness of the research paradigm of 
the present study within the field of SLA. As stated elsewhere in this thesis, 
phenomenological realism is an established philosophical school of thought. Thus, 
the application of this philosophical orientation as an alternative research 
paradigm that this study has undertaken could potentially be a positive addition to 
the field. However, due to the fact that little previous SLA research was 
conducted based on phenomenological realism, the present study presented some 
particular challenges. Most centrally, in explaining the nature of the SLA of the 
participants, it involved a process of applying general ontological and 
epistemological principles suggested by philosophers to the particular 
phenomenon of the second language learning and use of the participants. Given 
this exploratory nature of the work, the conduct of the present study should be 
considered as initiating a research space that requires further investigations and 
attestations.    
Furthermore, given that the findings of the study emerged from a case study of 
only eight participants, the research outcomes of the study can be considered 
indicative rather than conclusive.   
The limitations of the study discussed in this section are considered when 
suggesting future research in Section 7.4.  
7.3 Implications of the study 
7.3.1 Theoretical implications 
This section discusses the theoretical implications of the present study. 
A theoretical value of the present study may be the explicitness of its resistance to 
the existing SLA paradigms, centrally to the social, cultural SLA stream, 
clarifying the nature of SLA from a particular philosophical orientation, 
phenomenological realism. In the extant literature, SLA researchers are concerned 
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that there is “a great deal of debate and disagreement…over questions [about] the 
nature of language use, language learning and their interrelationship” (Batstone, 
2010, p. v). They seem to perceive this discrepancy among different approaches 
as a problem driven by a particular emphasis on either the cognitive or the social 
aspects in researching and theorising SLA (e.g., Batstone, 2010; Hulstijn et al., 
2014; Kramsch, 2002b). Then, some of them propose, as resolution of this 
problem, to take a balanced view between the cognitive and the social, or to blur 
or cancel the distinction between the cognitive and the social, instead 
conceptualising them as integral to a holistic system (e.g, Atkinson, 2011b; 
Batstone, 2010; Kramsch, 2002a & b; Lantolf & Thorne, 2006; Larsen-Freeman, 
2011). This study, while acknowledging the importance of examining both the 
cognitive and the social, began with the suggestion that taking an imbalanced 
approach to these two dimensions of SLA may not be what fundamentally gives 
rise to disagreement among the different SLA approaches. It may have been 
created by the fact that, based on their own axiomatic beliefs, the different 
approaches provide different definitions and conceptions of the actual agents and 
mental and social events involved in language learning. Then the issue of 
divergence among the different SLA approaches, rather than being a problem, 
may be a natural manifestation of a plurality of epistemologies in the field (Ortega, 
2011, 2012). Thus, instead of seeking a balance between the cognitive and the 
social, this study has undertaken the approach of explicating central concepts 
fundamental to SLA, such as the mind, cognition and social processes based on its 
philosophical principles.  
In addition, a potential contribution of the present study to the field of SLA seems 
to be that its realist perspective offers a way of achieving commensurability and 
knowledge communication across different approaches within the field. While 
SLA researchers welcome diversity in epistemologies (Lantolf, 1996; Ortega, 
2011, 2012), they are also concerned about incommensurability among different 
SLA paradigms and theories (e.g., Dunn & Lantolf, 1998; Hulstijn et al., 2014). In 
this regard, this study firstly aligns itself with Ortega’s (2011, 2012) argument that 
commensurability in the field of SLA is achievable. She states: 
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My own preference (Ortega, 2011) is to affirm commensurability as an 
attainable and valued goal … by arguing that ‘different perspectives can 
yield different forms of rational access to the independent truth’ (Kukla, 
2006, p. 87) and that perspectival difference is necessary and of scientific 
value. (2012, p. 211) 
Thus, in her argument it is implied that a fundamental condition for 
commensurability in the study of SLA is the existence of the independent truth 
(reality), which different approaches can equally access to and investigate. In 
addition to Ortega’s argument, based on the realist perspective of the study, it can 
be suggested that the goal of the commensurability among the different SLA 
approaches can be further achieved when they are assessed and evaluated against 
this independent truth and reality. Kukla (2006) states: 
[E]pistemic practices, in order to count as epistemic, are necessarily bound 
by two sets of norms: the norms of justification and the norms of truth, or 
fidelity to the objects of inquiry. What makes the former norms epistemic in 
the first places is that they are held to the tribunal of the second. But this 
will be so only if our doxastic judgements are open to correction and 
confirmation from the independent world they seek to capture (p. 81).    
The authority of this evaluating task is not necessarily limited to theorists or 
researchers: anybody can, and should be able to exercise it as long as the person 
has a sufficient understanding of those approaches and actual experience relating 
to second language acquisition. In this way, commensurability and 
communicability across different epistemologies and approaches in the field can 
be established upon the verified and validated elements of their work, avoiding 
the two extremes – uncritical acceptance of conflicting notions or concepts and 
indifferent disregard of other approaches’ study outcomes.       
Moreover, phenomenological realism as a particular research paradigm, and the 
present study as SLA research based on that paradigm, may be considered by 
people whose worldviews and life philosophies do not accord with any paradigms 
currently available in the field of SLA. In fact, despite the apparent 
epistemological plurality, when looking at their fundamental ontological and 
epistemological axioms, the different SLA approaches seem to belong to one of 
three schools of thought, namely behaviourism (empiricism), cognitivism 
(rationalism) and social, cultural orientation (postmodernism or social 
constructivism) (see Chapter 2). Thus, it would be still possible for one not to find 
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satisfaction with any of the extant philosophical orientations in the field. I propose 
that the realist paradigm of the study as a further alternative. Phenomenological 
realism, although it may be little known to the field of SLA, is an established 
philosophical school of thought, that may equip the researcher who has a realist 
worldview with a philosophical foundation for his/her research (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1). In addition, the clarification of the ontology and epistemology of 
second language speakers and the nature of their SLA in an academic context that 
this study presents may help to inform the investigation of SLA when considering 
the realist paradigm.  
7.3.2 Methodological implications 
The methodological implications of the present study are threefold.  
Firstly, from the outset of this thesis, I have expressed a concern about the 
impression given by some research methodology resource books in applied 
linguistics, which appear to assume that any researcher performing qualitative 
research would employ the social constructivist paradigm (e.g., Croker, 2009). 
Here, based on the methodological practice of this study, I again argue that the 
real issue in the relationship between a research paradigm and methodological 
decision lies, not in making a choice between quantitative and qualitative types of 
data, but in how data are to be treated and analysed. In regard to this point, 
Richards (2009b) states, “The challenge lies more in deciding what counts as a 
core TRADITION, STRATEGY OF INQUIRY, ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK, or 
APPROACH, all terms that are used to label the different territories within QR 
[i.e., qualitative research]” (p. 150). In addition, recently, it is also noted that SLA 
researchers with different paradigmatic orientations actually learn methodological 
insights from one another (Hulstijn et al., 2014). Therefore, I suggest that 
researchers should be able to make their methodological choices beyond the 
somewhat imposing notion that qualitative research in applied linguistics would 
naturally involve elements of social constructivism.  
This point can be related to another potential methodological value of this study. 
Specifically, this study has questioned the explanations of the nature of qualitative 
data provided by some qualitative researchers in applied linguistics. For example, 
Talmy (2010) argues that the participants’ experiences are co-constructed by the 
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researcher and participants during the process of data collection (in his article, 
specifically during interviewing). Thus, according to him, qualitative interview 
data are not “reports which reveal truths and facts, and/or the attitudes, beliefs, 
and interior, mental states of self-disclosing respondents” but “accounts” of those 
“coconstructed between interviewer and interviewee” (p. 132). Although clearly 
aware of the possibility that data could be misinterpreted and that participants 
could be manipulated by the researcher, the present study does not view the data 
gathered as co-constructed. Talmy’s notion represents the social constructivist 
researchers’ view, which can be respected as one of the qualitative research 
traditions. However, it should not be considered as the only option that any 
researcher who considers qualitative research feels obliged to follow. This study 
suggests that treating data as what informs of truths, facts and participants’ mental 
states is also a legitimate approach in applied linguistics (e.g., Dörnyei, 2007; 
Mackey & Gass, 2005).  
Moreover, a further methodological contribution of this study may be the use of 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). As stated in Chapter 4, IPA 
emerged in the mid-1990s in medical psychology. Since then, it has been used by 
researchers from diverse subject fields (e.g., Wagstaff et al., 2014), but seems to 
be fairly new to applied linguistics. Based on the experience of the present study, 
IPA seems to be recommendable to those SLA researchers whose paradigmatic 
orientation is broadly realism (Reid et al., 2005). In addition, it could provide a 
useful methodological insight to the researcher who finds his/her interests in the 
mental processes and experiences of individual language learners rather than 
sociocultural or anthropological aspects of SLA. A potential disadvantage of IPA 
is that its heavy reliance on interview as the principal data collection method 
could cause validity issues. To overcome this issue, two approaches employed in 
this study can be suggested. First, as the founders of IPA also recommend (Smith 
et al., 2009), interview data can be contextualised and triangulated by means of 
supplementary document data relevant to the themes that emerged from the 
interview data. In addition, using other data collection and analysis methods 
outside of the conventional IPA frame, such as text analysis or survey analysis, 
could be also considered.   
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7.3.3 Pedagogical implications  
This section discusses some pedagogical implications that arise from the study. 
Given the context of the study, here I may restrict my discussion to language 
learning in the context of English for academic purposes (EAP), mostly in relation 
to written textual engagement (reading and writing).  
Primarily, the explication of the nature of the intentionality or intentional mind of 
the language learner can be reflected in establishing principles and rationales for 
pedagogical practices. For example, the importance of clearly informing students 
of learning objectives can be emphasised in reference to the notion of 
intentionality as a fundamental condition for their learning. However, given that 
intentionality is an inherent property of a person that cannot be incited or 
eliminated by any social influence, the rationale behind this instructional action 
should be not attempting to cause students’ intentions for learning, but seeking to 
help them to channel their intentionality towards learning objectives. In addition, 
the concept of intentionality suggests that SLA seems to be the outcome of 
cognitive processing, the function of the intentional mind, which takes place not 
only parallel with interpersonal processes during which new language sources 
become available, but also after these processes are over. This conceptualisation 
of the nature of SLA centrally involving intentional cognitive processing can be 
considered as a possible principle in relation to the design of textbooks, lesson 
plans, class activities and assignments. Moreover, clarification of the 
intentionality as the tendency to integrate pieces of knowledge into a united 
knowledge structure can give rise to rationalising the application of discourse-
based approaches to language teaching and learning. That is, introducing different 
features of a language as integral parts of extended discourse seems to accord with 
the natural processing of the learner’s mind and its tendency to organise 
knowledge of language in integrative ways.         
In addition, some instructional ideas can be suggested in reference to the 
mechanisms of the SLA of the participants occurring while engaging with reading 
and writing. Firstly, SLA during input was understood by means of Widdowson’s 
(1983, 1990) concept of language learning through the negotiation of meaning. 
This process of SLA centrally involved the gradual amending of the knowledge of 
the target meaning by perceiving the meaning iteratively, and also matching the 
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meaning with real events or things, which facilitates the person to realise and 
acquire the functions and forms of new language resources encoding the meaning. 
In relation to this, the teacher can introduce classroom activities that help students 
to raise their awareness of this mechanism of SLA, which they already have 
experienced naturally, so that they could apply it more purposefully to their 
language learning. For example, students can be given a text in which a new 
concept is described in language that included resources new to the students. The 
students may then be given opportunities for recursive readings of the text. 
Whenever they read the text, the teacher may provide materials with which 
students can observe changes in their knowledge of the concept and also those in 
their understanding of the functions of new language resources. While engaging in 
the same activity, the students may also be encouraged to relate real events or 
things to understanding the concept observe how this instantiation of the concept 
helps them with developing knowledge of the concept as well as the language in 
which the concept is described.  
Secondly, the findings that indicate the hierarchical operation between thought 
and language in the process of writing (Bruce, 2008ab, 2011) as the central 
driving force for language development can also be considered in relation to 
instructional settings. When referring to these findings, it would be important to 
help students to develop the content of their writing sufficiently before beginning 
to write. This step would involve encouraging them to form critical opinions 
about the issues that they want to discuss, for which they can relate or transfer 
their experience of exercising critical thinking in day-to-day living to their 
academic writing. Then when the students engage in the actual writing process as 
a next step, they may be provided with language resources for their writing by the 
teacher or textbooks. In undertaking this step, the student would be further 
developing their ideas by observing and evaluating their own thought having been 
written down and (thus) become more perceptible to themselves (Moreland & Rae, 
2002). Afterwards, the teacher may help them to revise their texts as a way of 
making them more prototypical academic texts.  
Finally, the findings of the study also suggests that, in English-medium academic 
contexts, the concepts of “language resources” or “features of language” can be 
extended to include both extra-linguistic procedural knowledge and linguistic 
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(systemic) resources of academic English. Genre knowledge (Bruce, 2008a) is 
identified here as the essential procedural knowledge of the language, which is 
hierarchically related to, and operated with linguistic systems. Thus, I put forward 
applying Bruce’s genre knowledge theory to teaching academic writing, which 
introduces and models procedural knowledge with the concept of cognitive genres 
(CG). 
7.4 Closing remarks with suggestions for future research  
The present study has investigated the nature of the SLA of eight PhD students 
while reviewing the target literature during the conditional enrolment period in a 
New Zealand university. The extant paradigms in researching SLA were critically 
reviewed and a theoretical framework was established based on the 
phenomenological realist paradigm. For data collection and analysis, the 
qualitative approach, IPA, was used. The findings were discussed in the light of 
the theoretical framework.    
Willig (2008) notes, “Case studies facilitate theory generation. The detailed 
exploration of a particular case can generate insights into social or psychological 
processes, which in turn can give rise to theoretical formulation and hypothesis” 
(p. 75). In closing the whole thesis, I wish to make some suggestions for future 
research by reflecting this insight of Willig’s, and the key arguments, limitations 
and implications of the study. Firstly, further qualitative research based the 
phenomenological realist paradigm can be undertaken to refine and corroborate 
the work of the present study, or to examine different issues and topics relating to 
second language learning and use in diverse social, cultural settings. In addition, 
future research can be suggested, in which the clarification of the nature of SLA in 
an academic context that the present study has presented could be utilised for 
establishing hypotheses. For example, potential research that operationalises the 
two key concepts of this study – SLA by meaning-uncovering intentionality and 
SLA through hierarchical thought-language operations – as theoretical constructs 
for measuring and assessing second language knowledge in the studies of SLA 
and second language assessment can be recommended.     
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Appendix B: PhD Student Participant Informed Consent 
Dear Participant, 
I would very much appreciate your help for my PhD study. 
My doctoral research project attempts to investigate how international PhD 
students acquire English, their second language while undertaking a literature 
review over the first six-month conditional enrolment period.  
The data I plan to collect should be as natural as possible. Therefore, except for 
interviews, data will be collected from what you do for your own literature review. 
I estimate that the amount of actual time you will spend helping me in my study 
will average about one hour a month during your first six months of conditional 
enrolment.  
I would appreciate it if you can participate in the data collection of my research, 
which will take place during your conditional enrolment period. The timings of 
data collection will be negotiated between you and me depending on the schedule, 
plan and progress you will make in relation to working on the literature review. 
The ways that you will be asked to participate are as follows: 
 Interviews and informal conversations with me. Prior to the initial 
interview, I will ask you to send me your CV; 
 Providing me with copies of the summaries or reviews of your 
supervision meetings, workshops, or seminars that are related to the 
literature review. (In case you make them, I will not ask you to create one 
of those to provide me) 
 providing me with copies of the drafts of your written work on the 
emerging literature review and your supervisors’ feedback on it, and the 
revised versions that you draft in the light of such feedback; and, 
 providing me with your study materials in relation to the literature review 
that I may request from time to time. 
Participants’ identity and any form of information will be kept confidential. All 
identifying elements will be removed from their data which instead will be coded 
and/or assigned pseudonyms. Nobody other than me and my own supervisors will 
know the source of the data. All data collected will be reported in such a manner 
that no individual can be identified. Participants will have the opportunity to 
review their interview and observation transcripts and comment on the accuracy 
of summaries.  
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Your participation in data collection is completely voluntary and you may 
withdraw at any time up to the beginning of the data analysis without providing 
any reason. Should you withdraw from the study, all the data associated with you 
will be destroyed. All data obtained in this study will be documented in electronic 
form and these coded files will be kept on a backup CD until the end of 2017, at 
which point the CD will be destroyed. 
This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of Waikato. Any issues about 
the nature of this research may be sent to my chief supervisor, Dr Ian Bruce 
(ibruce@waikato.ac.nz), in the first instance, and/or to the Chairperson of the 
FASS Human Research Ethics Committee (fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz).  
Participation in this research is optional: you can participate partially or fully as 
you may wish according to the points on the attached consent form. If you would 
like to participate in the study, please let me know via e-mail, and you will have 
opportunity to ask me questions in person to clarify anything that is uncertain to 
you.  I will then ask you to sign two copies of the attached participant informed 
consent forms and keep a copy for your records, while the other is left with me. If 
you have further queries you may also email me at hj77@students.waikato.ac.nz. 
Thank you very much for your time and help.  
Hyeseung Jeong 
PhD Candidate, Applied Linguistic
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Researcher: Hyeseung Jeong 
I, ____________________, have been given an opportunity to read an explanation of this 
doctoral research, to ask questions and have these answered. I agree to participate in 
Hyeseung Jeong’s research project completely voluntarily in the ways that I consent 
below.   
Participant Consent 
Yes No  
  I agree that I will give to the researcher the record of relevant 
correspondence /meetings/ seminars/ workshops / informal chat, etc. about 
the literature review when it is possible.  
  I agree that I will give a copy of my CV and initial proposal to the 
researcher. 
  I agree that the researcher will personally interview me. 
  I agree that the interviews will be audio recorded. 
  I agree to provide the researcher with copies of the summaries or reviews 
of your supervision meetings, workshops, or seminars that are related to 
the literature review. (In case I make them, the resesarcher will not ask you 
to create one of those to provide me) 
  I agree to provide the researcher with the drafts of the literature review and 
feedback on it from my supervisors or any other persons, when it is 
possible.  
  I understand that I may request to review all the data collected from me 
and comment on the accuracy of summaries and interpretations made by 
the researcher. 
  I understand that only the researcher and her supervisors will have access 
to any data collected obtained from me. 
  I understand that my identity will not be revealed to any other person. 
  I understand that appropriately anonymised findings from this study will 
contribute to a PhD thesis which will also be made publicly available on 
the internet. 
  I understand that I may withdraw from the study any time up to the 
beginning of the data analysis without having to provide any reason. In the 
event of such withdrawal, I may request that any data collected from me be 
destroyed and removed from the study findings. 
 
 
Signed: ___________________             Date: ___________________________
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Appendix C: Supervisor Participant Informed Consent 
Dear Supervisor Participant, 
My doctoral research project attempts to investigate how international PhD 
students acquire English, their second language while undertaking a literature 
review over the first six-month conditional enrolment period.  
My research project does not attempt in any way to examine the power relation 
between students and professional academics, or evaluate the ways of supervision. 
Rather it will explore how interaction between PhD students and their supervisors 
help the students to their knowledge and competence for composing the literature 
review. This will be part of my methodological framework, which will let me 
explore the developmental process of the students doing the literature review 
through interacting with the people of the field which they belong and through 
their internal cognitive striving. Findings from my research will be used to 
suggest the importance for international trainee researchers in acquiring the 
competence to compose a well-crafted literature review and the effective ways to 
support and guide them to perform the task successfully.  
I would appreciate it if you can participate in the data collection of my research, 
which will take place during your PhD student ___________________’s 
conditional enrolment period. The timings of data collection will be negotiated 
between you, the other supervisor(s), ____________, the student participant and 
me depending on the schedule, plan and progress you will make in relation to 
working on the literature review. The ways that you will be asked to participate 
are as follows: 
 giving me permission to observe and/or audio-record of meetings with 
your PhD students focusing specifically on the literature review; 
 permitting me to collect from ___________’s feedback  in relation to 
the literature review; and, 
 having an interview with me about your supervision directions and 
focuses in relation to the literature review. This will take up 30-60 
minutes and may be audio recorded, with your agreement  
Participants’ identity and any form of information will be kept confidential. All 
identifying elements will be removed from their data and will be coded or 
assigned pseudonyms. Nobody other than me and my own supervisors will have 
the knowledge of the data. All data collected will be reported in such a manner 
that no individual can be identified. Participants will have the opportunity to 
review their interview and observation transcripts and comment on accuracy of 
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summaries. Participants will also be offered the opportunity to discuss the 
findings of the study towards completion of the thesis.   
Your participation in data collection is completely voluntary and you may 
withdraw at any time up to the beginning of the data analysis without providing 
any reason. Should you withdraw from the study, all the data associated with you 
will be destroyed. All data obtained in this study will be documented in electronic 
form and these coded files will be kept on a backup CD until the end of 2017, at 
which point the CD will be destroyed. 
This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of Waikato. Any issues about 
the nature of this research may be sent to my Chief supervisor, Dr Ian Bruce 
(ibruce@waikato.ac.nz), in the first instance, and/or to the Chairperson of the 
FASS Human Research Ethics Committee (fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz).  
Participation in this research is optional: you can participate partially or fully as 
you may wish according to the points on the attached consent form. If you would 
like to participate in the study, please let me know via e-mail, and you will have 
opportunity to reread and ask me questions in person to clarify anything that is 
uncertain to you.  I will then ask you to sign two copies of the attached 
participant informed consent forms and keep a copy for your records, while the 
other is left with me. If you have further queries you may also email me at 
hj77@students.waikato.ac.nz. 
Thank you very much for your time and help.  
Hyeseung Jeong 
PhD Candidate, Applied Linguistics 
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Researcher: Hyeseung Jeong 
I, ____________________, have been given an opportunity to read an explanation of this 
doctoral research, ask questions and have these answered. I agree to participate in 
Hyeseung Jeong’s research project completely voluntarily in the ways that I consent 
below.   
Participant Consent 
Yes No  
  I agree that I will allow my PhD student (name) to show the record 
of relevant correspondence/meeting specifically about the literature 
review between my PhD student and me. 
  I agree that the researcher will observe the supervision meetings 
which focus on the literature review (one or two times). 
  I agree for the researcher to audio record the supervision meetings 
which focus on the literature review (one or two times). 
  I agree that I will permit the researcher to collect my feedback on  
_______________’s literature review drafts. 
  I agree for the researcher to personally interview me. 
  I agree that the interview will be audio recorded. 
  I understand that I request to review all the data collected from me 
and comment on accuracy. 
  I understand that only the researcher and her supervisors will have 
access to any data collected obtained from me. 
  I understand that my identity will not be revealed to any other 
person. 
  I understand that anonymous findings from this study will 
contribute to a PhD thesis which will also be made publicly 
available on the internet. 
  I understand that I may withdraw from the study any time up to the 
beginning of the data analysis without having to provide any reason. 
In the event of such withdrawal, I may request that any data 
collected from me be destroyed and removed from the study 
findings. 
 
 
 
Signed: ____________________             Date: ___________________________ 
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Appendix D: Peer Review Participant Informed Consent  
Researcher: Hyeseung Jeong 
I, ____________________, have been given an opportunity to read an explanation 
of this doctoral research, to ask questions and have answers. I agree that the 
researcher will use my written feedback on a literature review draft of one of her 
participants. I understand that I may request to review all the data collected from 
me and comment on the accuracy of summaries and interpretations made by the 
researcher. I understand that my identity will not be revealed to any other person, 
and it will be appropriately anonymised. I understand findings from this study will 
contribute to a PhD thesis which will also be made publicly available on the 
internet. I may withdraw from the study any time up to the beginning of the data 
analysis without having to provide any reason. In the event of such withdrawal, I 
may request that any data collected from me be destroyed and removed from the 
study findings.  
 
Signed: ______________________             Date: ________________________
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Appendix E: The First Interview Schedule 
 
‐ Self-introduction 
‐ What is your motivation for your study? 
‐ What is the purpose of the literature review? 
‐ What is your previous experience in relation to the literature review? 
‐ What are the sources (people, books, seminars…) from which you are 
learning how to do the literature review? 
‐ How do you find doing the literature review (and you PhD) in English? 
‐ What do you think are required to undertake the literature review, 
successfully? 
‐ What do you think are required to undertake the literature review in a 
second language?  
‐ Please tell you plans (if any) to develop your competence to do the 
literature review.  
 
 
 
269 
 
Appendix F: The Last Interview Schedule 
‐ What is the purpose of the literature review for a PhD thesis? (I asked it 
before, but please let me know if you had changed or expanded your 
thought on it).  
 
‐ Please tell me your experience of doing the literature in your second 
language during your conditional enrolment period (any episodes, 
challenges, difficulties, ‘break-through’ moments that you have come 
across) 
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Appendix G: An Example of Three-column Tables of Data Analysis 
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Appendix H: An Example of the Tables of Grouping of Subordinate Themes into Superordinate Themes  
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Appendix I: An Example of the Tables of Communal Pattern Identification across the Four Core Participants 
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Appendix J: Examples of the Analysis of the Final Literature Review Text 
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